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This thesis, rising from the field of reflexive International Relations (IR), is an engagement 
with knowledge production in the domain of international relations. Guided by sociology of 
knowledge, it offers a critique of representations of the international produced by IR theory 
and practice. The thesis argues that such representations may gain power to frame the 
thinking and policy action with respect to objects beyond their immediate description. In my 
work I expose how thinking about international relations in particular ways affects 
conceptions of and policies implemented with regard to the state. 
I focus specifically on the idea of international society developed by International Relations 
theory and the idea of international community, flourishing in policy practice. Both are 
contrasted with representations of the international produced in Russia with particular 
reference to the idea of the Russian World. 
The idea of international society and the cognate concept of international community	  
reinforce the production of universal norms and standards of what a state is and should be. 
They are conducive to thinking about a state in terms of well-functioning institutions 
allowing it to meet international standards and to form part of the society of states. The idea 
of the Russian World, in turn, facilitates the portrayal of Russia as a polity greater than a state 
and helps legitimize disregard for the sovereignty of other post-Soviet states. Constructing 
the international in terms of a confrontation between the Russian World and the West 
requires efforts to strengthen a polity transcending Russian borders.  
In the broader scheme,	  the research project is dedicated to thinking through similarities in the 
processes of knowledge production cutting across easily permeable boundaries between the 
academia and policy practice, the West and Russia.  
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Suleyman-Too, a mountain rising abruptly from the surrounding plains of the Ferghana 
Valley in Central Asia, has for centuries been a place of special importance for local people 
and for those visiting: merchants, scholars, pilgrims and adventurers. Considered sacred, it 
has been worshipped over several millennia and inspired an array of myths. It was probably 
in its vicinities where I first thought of the academia as a dream vocation. Back then I was 
deeply puzzled by statebuilding processes taking place in Kyrgyzstan. The subject of this 
dissertation evolved significantly since that time but my thinking would have never 
developed in the way that it has, had it not been for my manifold experiences in Central Asia, 
in particular my engagement with students from different Central Asian states, who 
challenged me to think how approaching international politics from the ‘East’ and from the 
‘West’ alters profoundly what can be seen.  
Inspiration, important as it is, remains but one component of academic work. This thesis had 
several outstanding mentors, whom I would like to thank. The intellectual stimulus that made 
me embark on this particular project was provided by my supervisors. I had great pleasure to 
work with Jennifer Gayle Mathers and Hidemi Suganami, who created what I could only call 
the perfect supervisory team.  
To Jenny I owe the courage to have voice. She has never shown any hint of doubt in my 
research, was always extremely supportive and expressed more belief in my project than I 
was ever willing to accept. Jenny had an invaluable impact not only on my thesis but also on 
my self-confidence and the way I approach my own research identity. She helped me express 
my thoughts and put them into elegant writing. Our sharing of serious and funny details on 
regional politics over e-mail and Twitter made the writing-up a diverse and pleasant 
experience.  
Hidemi, who throughout my work tactfully but firmly made it clear that I could and should 
do better, be thorough and more attentive to detail, made a profound impact on the way I 
think and read. He insisted that I should be humble but humble as a result of an in-depth 
study process and the realisation of the complexity of the little piece of the social life I was 
trying to grasp. This type of modesty excludes diffidence as it gives courage to admit how 




Jenny and Hidemi had been endlessly supportive and patient, helping me not only to improve 
the clarity of my ideas but also providing advice on how to steer the project towards the most 
promising areas. They allowed me to engage in a relaxed wandering between disciplinary 
boundaries, the exploration of traditional as well as critical approaches. Under their tutelage 
my work developed into a thesis I genuinely wanted to write. 
I am indebted to Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, who provided constructive criticism and 
advice at the later stages of this research and with whom it was a pleasure to teach on the 
Charisma and Politics module. Berit encouraged me to take some bolder moves, not to be 
afraid of involving self-reflection and to experiment with ethnography. Berit was also very 
open and frank in providing career advice. I also wish to thank Jenny Edkins who, as my 
discussant at the most important presentation of this research at Aberystwyth University, 
pushed me to consider broader implications of my work.  This project changed a number of 
times but setting off would have never been possible, had it not been for my first supervisory 
team: Elena Korosteleva and William Bain. I am very grateful for Will’s patient reminding 
me that I should never be satisfied with what I know about the idea of international society. 
Aberystwyth International Politics Department and the research community it hosts 
stimulated me to think bolder and never to be afraid of taking issue with existing literature. 
Out-of-the-box approaches, so I was persuaded, may be more fruitful than a lean analysis 
following well-established theoretical canons.  
On my way towards the research project I encountered a number of very helpful individuals. 
It is impossible to enumerate them all but I would like to give my special thanks to at least 
some. John Heathershaw was the first to believe in me as a researcher and valued my ideas 
about Central Asia. Deniz Kandioti shared her enthusiasm and passion for research. Bhavna 
Dave’s course taught at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 
was a source of inspiration, while Jonathan Goodhand helped me develop my scattered 
thoughts into a master’s dissertation. Maxim Ryabkov provided invaluable support and 
advice during my research at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. My heartfelt thanks go to 
people who took time to participate in research interviews contributing to this thesis in many 
constructive ways, either challenging my ideas or sympathising with my research question 
and recognizing the need to poste it. 
Last but not least I would like to thank my husband, Marcin for his patient and insightful 
feedback as well as unrelenting belief in my work. The entire scholarly endeavour would not 
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have been initiated without my mum, Hanna, who has been giving all her love, help and 
compassion through my life as a pupil, student and researcher. 
This thesis was made possible through the Aberystwyth University Research Studentship 
with additional support from the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies 
and Caroline Adams Travel Bursary, which contributed to financing research in Russia. 
Research in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and 2013 was supported by the OSCE Academy Fellowship. 
Several conference grants, including the International Studies Association travel grant, 
allowed me to share ideas and benefit from feedback at the initial stages of developing the 
project.  
There are many other people and places I am thankful to for guiding me through the serious 
undertaking of research and scholarly writing but Suleyman-Too added mysticism necessary 
to survive in the world hanging between research and political myth. Myths resurface in the 
thesis in ways I could not have predicted when I first embarked on this project. 
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CHAPTER	  1	  Introduction:	  In	  search	  of	  a	  vantage	  point	  on	  the	  
international	  
Cartography is held to be the branch of human activity which reflects the perception of 
the world in different time periods. Maps have always performed a variety of functions and 
served specific needs. As research tools, they have assisted in the comprehension of spatial 
phenomena and have been regarded as the depository of knowledge.1 Their purely utilitarian 
purpose has been to facilitate navigation, to guide from one place to the next, while providing 
information about the surroundings. Their less overt function, however, has been no less 
important. Maps have been used to represent a particular vision of the world, to illustrate a 
historical narrative and to position the map’s author or commissioner in the world in a 
specific way. One prominent example of a map which celebrated its paymasters was the 
terrestrial globe commissioned by the emperor Charles V and engraved by famous 
cartographer Gerard Mercator. Its main aim was to clearly outline the international reach of 
Habsburg imperial power. Cartographic propaganda and manipulation, to use Jerry Brotton’s 
apt terminology, has been profuse. Political appropriation of maps was a common 
phenomenon as they were used for conquest and, once an area was claimed, to show off 
possessions. They were instruments of imperial administration, a device in wielding 
economic power as well as an indispensable tool of national self-determination and identity 
building.2  
Mapmaking has been an activity common to every culture, although, as noted by experts 
in the history of maps, every culture has a distinctive way of mapping its particular world. 
There are also many different approaches to mapping the same area since maps usually 
answer specific needs of their intended audience. Despite this seeming plurality, there has 
been no scarcity of pretenders to the title of the perfect map-maker. Cartographers’ claims to 
have created the ideal map rest not only on their ambition to present a true description but 
also on the goal of creating a map which would be aesthetically pleasing, imaginative, 
stimulating the experience of actually being at the depicted place.  
Throughout history some map authors, particularly those following the Greek tradition, 
have been using science to validate their claims for the maps’ authenticity. Others resorted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 N. J. W. Thrower, Maps and civilization: cartography in culture and society, 3rd ed., Chicago, London: 
University of Chicago Press: 2007. 
2 J. Brotton, A history of the world in twelve maps, London: Allen Lane: 2012, 226-227, 385. 
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theology to provide orientation and to make their point.3 Modern maps pretend to be correct 
on the grounds of their reliance on science and technology but they, too, may hide a specific 
agenda going beyond practical navigational purposes. Too often do we tend to forget that 
maps are always subjective and reflect on specific historical contexts and ideologies. In 
addition to a graphical depiction of an area, maps present a worldview. Through the 
combination of ambition, purposefulness and ideology maps have the power to arrange the 
world in specific ways. Another Mercator’s project, which for over 400 years had retained 
hegemony over our geographical imagination, is the projection of the world placing Europe 
as its centre, thereby distorting the size of other continents.4 
Popular perceptions of maps matter. Due to the process of their scientific validation as 
well as through the work of aesthetics, we tend to have confidence in maps. The mapping of 
Liberland can serve as a very recent illustration of a map’s power to reorder the landscape. 
Several outlets have published a map of Central Europe depicting the state of Liberland on 
the border between Serbia and Croatia. Liberland is a political fiction, a performance 
arranged by a Czech politician but the fact of its visual portrayal on a map made it into an 
almost material entity. Not only did it stir imagination but it affected consciousness, arranged 
the perception of political reality. Liberland has been represented on a map published by The 
Guardian newspaper, in Wikipedia and on Liberland’s official webpage. Since its 
announcement, the state received several hundred thousand citizenship applications. Though 
its mapping cannot be claimed to be the single cause, materiality rendered by the practice of 
its representation on a map, did play a role in producing some sort of Liberland’s political 
influence.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 J. Brotton, Great maps, London: Dorling Kindersley: 2014, 7. 
4 The Mercator projection map, which origins date back to 1569, placed the mapmaker’s country, in this case, 
Germany, at the centre of the map. The Equator was placed two-thirds of the way down the map rather than 
halfway down. The result of such arrangement was the representation of Europe as larger than South America 
and Greenland larger than China. For a more nuanced discussion of the Mercator projection, see: Brotton, A 







Figure	  1	  Examples	  of	  maps	  constituting	  Liberland	  as	  part	  of	  Central	  European	  political	  landscape5 
In addition to maps’ power to influence political landscapes, cartographic depictions 
have catered to yet another important human ambition – the aspiration to picture the whole 
world. Capturing the world as though from a bird’s eye view, and creating a true 
representation of it, have been a persistent driving force behind mapmaking. First such 
attempts known to us had been undertaken by the Babylonians.6 Closer to our time the 
challenge cartographers have put for themselves was to create a standard or uniform map, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The three images presented in the thesis come from (clockwise): D. Nolan, ‘Liberland: hundreds of thousands 
apply to live in world's newest 'country'’, The Guardian, 24 April 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/24/liberland-hundreds-of-thousands-apply-to-live-in-worlds-
newest-country, About Liberland – the official Liberland Webpage https://liberland.org/en/about/, Wikipedia  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberland. 
6 The urge to create maps was even described as a basic human instinct, a desire determined by biology and the 
instinct of survival above all else. Brotton, A history of the world in twelve maps, 3-5. 
4	  
	  
one covering the whole of the Earth’s surface, reflecting the accurate dimensions of countries 
and continents, universally accepted and constructed with the use of identical naming 
conventions, symbols and colours for the entire globe.	  The International Map of the World 
initiative proposed by Albrecht Penck in 1891 is probably the best example of such 
cartographic ambition. It was to be composed of 2,500 maps, each of which produced using 
uniform conventions, and together covering the entire earth.7 
Research	  problem	  and	  objectives	  	  
Maps are but one device for imaging and representing the world. International Relations 
(IR) theory and the policy discourse are powerful means, which, even though they purport to 
be merely describing relations between states, contribute to arranging the international. 
Theories of IR, according to positivists, function as depositories or organizers of knowledge. 
Scholars who do not share positivist assumptions would usually agree that IR theories have 
utilitarian purposes. They are to facilitate navigation in international politics, which may 
either be interpreted as enabling greater understanding or as guiding statespeople in the 
design and implementation of foreign policy.8 Academic IR is not free from ambitions 
perturbing and motivating mapmakers. The urge to create a better theory would not be an 
entirely unfamiliar sentiment to many scholars. A more thorough representation, at the same 
time comprehensive and nuanced, one taking a rich variety of aspects of international politics 
into consideration, representing international relations in their entirety, is viewed by some as 
the holy grail. The world of policy necessitates such representations to no lesser extent, if for 
different purposes. The international realm, which is explicable, becomes amenable to change 
and it may be acted upon. A concrete representation of the world allows for designing and the 
implementation of goal-oriented policies. In such a world, progress may not only be promised 
but can be planned and becomes credible. 
The two, IR theory and policy discourse, intersect in multiple ways. They rely on one 
another to varying extent for validation, confirmation and legitimization. Both aim to explain 
reality and make it amenable to their respective goals: that of exploration on the one hand and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Brotton, Great maps, 213.  
8 This critique refers to classical theorising in IR. There is a broad debate regarding the place and aims of critical 
IR theories. Robert Cox should be credited as one of the first who distinguished between ‘problem solving’ and 
‘critical’ theorising. The most recent input into the broad discussion on the role of theorising in IR was provided 
by contributors to the special issue of the European Journal of International Relations, ‘The end of IR theory?’. 
T. Dunne, L. Hansen and C. Wight "The end of International Relations theory?", European Journal of 
International Relations, 19: 3, 2013. 
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that of policy action, on the other. Most crucially from the perspective of this research, when 
they take the international realm as their object, both fields create specific representations of 
it thereby arranging the international in certain ways. IR theories are always rooted in a 
specific history and as such present a vision of the world, just one among many. Such a 
vision may, intentionally or not, contribute to the positioning of specific events or political 
communities above others. 
The academic study of international relations has on numerous occasions taken solace in 
holistic representations of the international realm. Such representations are characterized by 
the belief that the parts of the whole are intimately connected and explicable only by 
reference to the whole. At times arriving at such a representation has been considered the 
very aim of theorising. At other times, a holistic representation of the world served as the 
starting point for studies concerned with a variety of different questions and research 
objectives.9  
International society is one such holistic representation of the international and has long 
been a framework for analysis of high currency in IR as studied.10 The English School, one of 
the academic approaches to the study of international politics, usually introduces international 
society with a classical definition put forward by Hedley Bull. This definition establishes and 
helps uphold a view of the international composed of states, where the formally anarchical 
structure is supplemented with societal elements: common interests, norms, rules, and 
institutions.11 The English School students have made a strong case that we can only make 
sense of world politics if we take into account its structure as a system of states with an 
element of society added to it.  
A concept of international community, widespread in the policy discourse, shows that the 
policy world does not remain entirely reliant on academia when it comes to representations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The English School can serve as a prominent example of the drive for a holistic representation of the 
international. Nick Wheeler’s analysis of humanitarian intervention and, more recently, Jason Ralph’s 
deliberations on British foreign policy in Iraq, take international society as the starting point guiding their 
respective research agendas. See J. Ralph, "The liberal state in international society. Interpreting recent British 
foreign policy", International Relations, 28: 1, 2014; N. J. Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention 
in international society, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2000. 
10 Reflections on international society transcend the nebulous boundaries of the English School approach and 
can be found in writings on issues such as international norms, special responsibilities, status in international 
politics or historical sociology. Examples of writing on international society distancing itself from the English 
School include: A. E. Towns, Women and states: norms and hierarchies in international society, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 2010; S. G. Harding, The feminist standpoint theory reader: intellectual and 
political controversies, New York; London: Routledge: 2004. 




the world. Despite some shared characteristics with the scholarly concept of international 
society, international community has become a self-standing depiction of the international, 
which requires no specific backing by IR theory. The growing number and complexity of 
international problems supposedly requiring policy action prompted policymakers to become 
more forthcoming and bolder in producing representations of the political world. 
International community is one such representation and it has held sway particularly since the 
end of the Cold War. The growing currency of this idea in specific policy areas coincided 
with increasingly interventionist agenda of Western states. The language of political 
argument on international issues, especially in the domain of development assistance and 
statebuilding, has been pervaded with invocations of and appeals to international community. 
The ideas of international society and community purport to be objective. Scholarly 
writing on IR has, on the one hand, presented international society as a neutral theoretical 
framework allowing for a better grasp of international politics and not tainted by any 
ideology. On the other hand, international society has been reified as really existing, a fact, 
rather just an interpretation of global international politics. Moreover, international society 
and community are cast in largely positive light. They invoke positive connotations, for they 
have been described using appreciative language. Behind the discourses of international 
society/community looms the promise of order. The society’s naturalness is additionally 
reinforced by the historical narrative of the international society expansion to the point when 
it became global and universally accepted. 
Western scholarship and the policy world do not have a monopoly on creating 
representations of the international. The gaze which constructed the idea of international 
society/community tended to be cast from the West and reflects a specific standpoint in IR 
theorising and in policy practice. Just as mapmaking has been an activity common to 
different cultures, representations of the world are generated by policymakers and academia 
in several places, perhaps more so in states with global political aspirations. One such source 
of worldly representations is Russia. This dissertation turns to Russia to illustrate the 
relativity and discuss critically the alleged naturalness of representations originating in the 
English-speaking world. The idea of the Russian World, or Russkii mir, which has been 
gaining sway in recent years in the Russian academic and policy worlds, assumes and 
reproduces a specific representation of the international. The world is composed of poles, 
understood as political-civilizational blocs, rather than states, and the Russian World, as one 
pole, tends to be portrayed as in confrontation rather than cooperation with the West. 
7	  
	  
Ideational representations, regardless of their sources, may become immensely powerful, 
i.e. they are capable of arranging the international in certain ways and frame the thinking and 
policy action with respect to objects beyond their immediate description. When it comes to 
representations of the international such as international society/community and the Russian 
World, the important aspect is that they may not only legitimize but also frame thinking and 
policy practice with respect to the state.12  
This dissertation’s most overarching objective is to engage critically with the process of 
academic and policy knowledge production, to study ways in which particular representations 
of the international are produced, reproduced and gain power. Rather than interrogating 
specific representations of the international solely on the basis of their logical assumptions or 
conceptual underpinnings, the thesis engages with social processes through which such 
representations become constructed, reified and acquire agency of their own in the scholarly 
and policy practice of knowledge production.13 Through my analysis I hope to disturb images 
that have become well ingrained in the thinking about international politics. 
The central research question of this thesis asks how holistic representations of the 
international impact on the conceptualization of and policies towards the state. In 
particular the thesis explores academic approaches to the idea of international society and the 
policy practice employment of the cognate concept of international community. These two 
are juxtaposed with representations of the international produced in Russia with special 
reference to the idea of the Russian World. 
The research design is best outlined in three steps. The first step is to challenge the 
naturalness of international society and community by juxtaposing them with representations 
of the international constructed in Russia. Step two is to show how these representations 
influence the state. Thirdly, I undertake a broader reflection on knowledge production on the 
international. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is the reverse of the so called ‘domestic analogy’. The usual starting point for IR enquiry is the 
interaction between states. Large parts of scholarly practice have been dedicated to analysing how states form 
larger regional groupings or entire international systems. Within that current, the domestic analogy argues that 
interstate relations can be viewed as mirroring the type of institutional control in place between individuals and 
groups within the state. How the state is organised can be used to describe the organisation of the international. 
H. Suganami, The domestic analogy and world order proposals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1989. 
Yet another strand of research within the broad area analyzing links between the international and the domestic 
argues that international norms shape domestic structures. See G. Sørensen, Changes in statehood: the 
transformation of international relations, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave: 2001: 48. 
13 For examples of the interrogation of IR theories on the basis of their logical assumptions, see A. R. 
Humphreys, “Kenneth Waltz and the limits of explanatory theory in International Relations” (University of 
Oxford, 2007); A. R. Humphreys, “The heuristic application of explanatory theories in International Relations”, 




The main claim of the thesis is that holistic representations of the international have a 
bearing on the way a state is viewed and acted upon.14 How the international is imagined, 
shapes conceptions of a state and helps devise and legitimise policies undertaken with regard 
to the state. Whereas the cognate concepts of international society and international 
community naturalise a specific model of a state, engagement with Russia’s view of the 
international illustrates that a specific model of a state does not need to be an obvious 
component of the international realm. 
The representation of the international in terms of the society of states validates a 
specific model of a state. The production of a state model is greatly facilitated by the 
argument that only specific entities are entitled to participate in international relations, those 
complying with membership criteria. In other words, if we subscribe to the argument that that 
international society is a real entity and covers the whole world, it becomes natural to say that 
every state needs to conform to international society’s requirements.  
The idea of international community, pursued by policy practitioners, enables states to be 
classified into various kinds, from failed and weak to strong and developed. It galvanises a 
requirement for a state to meet a variety of international standards. Presenting a state which 
is other than democratic and institutions-based as one difficult to accept, it depoliticizes the 
state. The state becomes an obvious constellation of specific institutions and norms based on 
the rule of law. This idea legitimizes statebuilding policies and allows for their representation 
as unquestionably good and those who undertake them as benevolent agents of international 
community. 
Russian political and scholarly discourse produces a distinct representation of the 
international. The Russian World is an idea in flux, with no definite contours but has 
implications for the way Russian policymakers view and act with regard to a state. Since the 
international is regarded as an arena for contending poles, or power centres, and the West as 
the major competitor, a strong Russia, which in this context signifies an entity transcending 
state borders, becomes necessary. Only such a Russia is a viable pole in a multipolar order. 
This image of the international requires a conception of Russia greater than a state. At the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This is not an instance of a second-image-reversed approach, which focuses on the effect specific 
international politics and processes have on states’ domestic structures. The emphasis is strongly on constructed 
representations of the world and on thinking and acting state on part of international actors and IR theorists, 
rather than changes occurring in states polities and politics as a result of global processes. 
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same time it allows for the downplaying of the sovereignty of other post-Soviet states. Unlike 
in the case of Western-led statebuilding, where a specific state model is very well articulated, 
it is impossible to find a model of a state that Russia would be promoting, forging or 
enforcing in the post-Soviet space. What surfaces in Russian discourse are categories 
transcending ‘traditional’ state borders. The Russian World relies explicitly on spiritual, 
linguistic and cultural ties, binding the post-Soviet space and demarcating it from the West. 
Much less emphasis is placed on state institutions embedded in a rule-of-law system of 
governance. 
The above argument has broader implications. By taking issue with the naturalness of 
international society, exposed strongly by the comparison with the Russian World, the thesis 
reflects on knowledge production practices. It challenges the possibility of a neutral and 
holistic representation of the international. IR scholars cannot claim to be grasping 
international relations in their entirety, IR knowledge will always be underpinned by ideology 
and produced from a specific viewpoint. There is no one position that affords a sufficiently 
broad or overall perspective on IR. No single vantage point on international politics exists. 
International society, just like the Russian World, is an inherently political idea, rather than 
an analytical framework or an entity existing out there. If the political is associated with 
plurality, contestation and conflict, international society as a research framework 
depoliticizes the interpretation of the international realm as it precludes other possible ways 
of viewing international relations.15  
There exist parallels between academia and the policy realm in their respective practices 
of knowledge production. Theory purports to describe and schematize activities of statesmen 
in order to reach greater degrees of comprehension. Practice, for its part, turns to academia in 
search of objective and knowledge-based advice or justification of the policy pursued. But, 
not only has the policy practice become bolder in the activity of producing knowledge. There 
are similarities in how ideas advanced in the ivory tower and outside it, in the West and in 
Russia, are prone to reification, have a universalizing tendency and make use of the 
civilizational rhetoric. Representations of the international, resulting from knowledge 
production taking place in the academic and policy realms, perform functions akin to those 
attributed by the literature to political myths. While creating the illusion of simplicity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 I follow Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the political. H. Arendt, The human condition, 2nd ed., Chicago, 
London: University of Chicago Press: 1998 [1958]. 
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control, just as political myths they provide significance, help make sense of experience and 
act as stimulus for action.16  
The research presented in this thesis claims significance on the grounds that it constitutes 
a reflection on IR theorizing and hopes to animate the discussion on the objectives and 
ambitions of IR as a discipline. Adding but a voice in the conversation on the role of theory 
in ‘reordering global realities’17, I hope to trigger a re-consideration of academic IR relations 
with political practice from the perspective of knowledge production and with greater 
recognition of multiple viewpoints on the international. 
Sociology	  of	  knowledge	  and	  international	  relations	  
Ours is a troubled discipline18 
 
This section outlines an approach to the study of representations of the international 
realm. Sociology of knowledge perspective helps me account for the process through which 
world images acquire power to shape the way a state is perceived and acted upon. 
Philosophy describes as ‘logical empiricism’ the process of taking as the point of 
departure the picture of the world as it is constructed by scientific investigation and 
subjecting it to analysis.19 My approach does not focus on the structure of thought but 
attempts to engage with social processes allowing this thought to emerge and gain power. 
Engaging with certain views of the international constructed by scholars and practitioners, I 
strive to reveal their main features and point to consequences of framing the world in this 
particular way. The sociology of knowledge permits the recognition and engagement with the 
fact that representations of the international are a reflection of the historical, cultural and 
political environments of their creators and disciples.20 They respond to specific 
preoccupations and may cater to those who are on the side of specific norms.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 C. Bottici, A philosophy of political myth, New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2007. 
17 K. Booth, International Relations: All That Matters, London: Hodder & Stoughton: 2014, 46. 
18 K. Booth, “Dare not to know: International relations theory versus the future”, in International relations 
theory today, eds. K. Booth and S. Smith (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). 
19 R. Carnap, Foreword to Modern philosophy of science by Hans Reichenbach, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul: 1959. 
20 It is not determined to what extent social and political concerns fall into the remit of the philosophy of social 
science. The more contemporary descriptions of what philosophy of social science entails are less and less 
restrictive and allow for sociological aspects to be taken into consideration, see e.g. introduction to  G. Delanty 
and P. Strydom, eds., Philosophies of social science: The classic and contemporary readings, (Philadelphia: 
Open University Press, 2003). 
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Despite the breadth of the meta-theoretical debate in IR, few authors would locate their 
work explicitly within the sociology of knowledge. Diverse perspectives and substantive foci 
of IR theories make IR meta-theoretical scholars focus primarily on logical presuppositions 
of arguments they study rather than reflect on sociological determinants leading to these 
arguments’ development.21 In general terms, the discipline of IR has not yet fully embraced 
the possibilities of critique offered by the study of the relationship between human thought 
and the social context within which it is produced.22  
Rather than attempting to use, follow or apply methodological tools developed by a 
particular scholar, this research derives its inspiration from programmes pursued by several 
thinkers. The initial muse has been Karl Mannheim’s pioneering contributions to the 
sociology of knowledge, especially his concern with social sources of political ideologies.23 I 
relied on Pierre Bourdieu’s more recent insights into the philosophy of social science and 
engaged with a perspectivist view on political ideas, distinctive in the work of Quentin 
Skinner. I deliberately use the word inspiration. Mannheim, Bourdieu and Skinner’s oeuvre is 
monumental and, for the purpose of this thesis, I can only draw on general ideas stemming 
from it rather than engage in detail with their specific arguments. Close following or even 
direct application of methods developed by a specific philosopher has been relatively 
common among PhD researchers but adopting tools Bourdieu or Skinner developed for the 
purpose of their work could turn out restrictive in the same sense as viewing my research area 
through an IR theoretical framework would be. Having the work of three scholars as my 
inspiration allows for a re-engagement rather than plain replication of methodological 
concerns voiced decades earlier and regarding distinct subject matters. 
All three inspirations are in many ways connected and crystallize around common 
themes, even though these authors have been separated by time, language and specific 
culturally influenced approaches to knowledge. What connects these thinkers is their interest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For examples of this approach, see e.g.: Humphreys, “The heuristic application of explanatory theories in 
International Relations”; P. T. Jackson, The conduct of inquiry in international relations: philosophy of science 
and its implications for the study of world politics, Abingdon and New York: Routledge: 2010. In political 
theory this direction is best exemplified in Q. Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and 
Action”, Political Theory, 2: 3, 1974. 
22 An important exception to this rule can be found within the feminist perspective and the postcolonial 
tradition. See also a pioneering work by I. Hamati-Ataya, “Reflectivity, Reflexivity, Reflexivism: IR's" 
Reflexive Turn"-and Beyond”, European Journal of International Relations, 19: 4, 2012. 
23 For Mannheim the task of a sociologist was to unmask ideology by identifying the sources for presuppositions 
forming that ideology. S. Fuller, The philosophy of science and technology studies, New York; London: 
Routledge: 2006, 18. 
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in the relationship between political ideas, their potency and the socio-historical context 
within which they arose. 
Since Karl Mannheim was an early-20th century sociologist of knowledge, it is in order 
to acknowledge later developments in the subject. The new sociology of knowledge, 
according to those who attempt to charter its territories, is primarily interested in types of 
social organisation making specific orderings of knowledge possible. The emphasis is on 
institutional structures and their impact. But, the new sociology of knowledge does not 
remain indifferent to enquires about how ideas become plausible to those who hold them and 
– in a self-conscious return to Mannheim’s pioneering work – part of the literature discusses 
standpoints and their influence on knowledge production and authority accorded to particular 
knowledges. It argues that those excluded from power ‘have a unique vantage point from 
which to understand aspects of the world that may be invisible to dominant groups’.24  
Standpoints are important for this research due to the contrast I am exposing between 
representations of the world produced from two distinct perspectives: a Russian and a 
Western one.25 Standpoint epistemology in IR started from feminist criticisms regarding 
women's absence from, or marginalized position in, social science. Feminism drew attention 
to the way knowledge in IR was determined by gendered perspectives on the world. Authors 
like Donna Haraway, aiming to deconstruct truth claims, spoke against disembodied 
scientific objectivity and called for more nuanced perspectives or ‘situated knowledges’.26 
Postcolonialism used a ‘situated perspective’ to foreground rather than expunge the 
subjective in theorising.27 In more general terms, standpoint research wishes to challenge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 A. Swidler and J. Arditi, “The new sociology of knowledge”, Annual Review of Sociology, 1994.; A. Wylie, 
“Why standpoint matters”, in The feminist standpoint theory reader: intellectual and political controversies, ed. 
S.G. Harding (New York; London: Routledge, 2004). 
25 I accept that terms Western and Russian are gross simplifications. My intention is to point to elements I 
identified as prevailing in scholarly and policy discourses in liberal democratic states (not necessarily limited to 
the geographical West, as a number of examples stem from Japan and South Korea) and in Russia.  
26 D. Haraway, “Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial 
perspective”, Feminist Studies, 14: 3, 1988. In addition, the feminist critique of IR produced significant 
literature on the subject; works by Enloe and Zalewski are regarded as pioneering and illustrative of this 
approach. C. H. Enloe, Bananas, beaches & bases: making feminist sense of international politics, London: 
Pandora: 1989; M. Zalewski and C. Enloe, “Questions about identity in international relations”, in International 
relations theory today, ed. K. Booth and S. Smith (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). For a thorough reflection on 
standpoint epistemology, see S. Harding, “Rethinking standpoint epistemology: What is strong objectivity?”, in 
Feminist epistemologies, ed. L. Alcoff and E. Portter (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). 
27 Robbie Shilliam, for instance, extensively considers intersections between the politics of knowledge and the 
social world. R. Shilliam, ““Open the Gates Mek We Repatriate”: Caribbean slavery, constructivism, and 
hermeneutic tensions”, International Theory, 6: 02, 2014. Tickner pointed to disciplinary gate-keeping practices 
as responsible for the lack of systematic exploration of IR from third world perspective. A. Tickner, “Seeing IR 
Differently: Notes from the Third World”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 32: 2, 2003. For a 
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notions of objectivity in science and the neutrality of epistemic agents.28 It studies relations 
between the production of knowledge and practices of power.29 Both feminism and 
postcolonialism, develop standpoint epistemology geared towards problematizing subjects 
and agents of knowledge. They underscore historical contingency of knowledge claims and 
recognize their social location. Feminism and postcolonialism have their own agendas in 
resorting to the sociology of knowledge. Their political projects stress the lack of recognition 
for the perspectives of those speaking from the position of powerlessness. 
This thesis engages with the first problem crucial for the new sociology of knowledge – 
that of how ideas become plausible to those who hold them – by asking about processes 
through which specific ideational representations of the international gain power to influence 
the conceptualization and policies with respect to the state. The second thread permeating the 
new sociology of knowledge writing, and in IR recognised as standpoint epistemology, is 
relevant to my discussion of viewpoints on the international. Knowledge about the 
international is particularly problematic in that regard as, on the one hand, the international is 
supposedly a shared space, thus potentially amenable to a common description. On the other 
hand, perspectives of particular states undoubtedly influence and subjectify the construction 
of knowledges about the international realm pursued in different states.  
I part company with standpoint writing in two ways. Firstly, this literature is mainly 
concerned with different perspectives premised on gender, class or race. My engagement is 
with perspectives on the international produced by policymakers and scholars of a state, be 
they Western liberal democracies, like Great Britain – home to the English School, or Russia. 
I do not claim a viewpoint from Russia is better or more objective. I am rather interested in 
similarities that may exist in Russian and Western processes of knowledge production. It has 
been pointed out on numerous occasions that the way Russia approaches the world poses a 
challenge to a liberal order.30 Rather than focusing exclusively on rival arguments, sociology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
broader exploration of postcoloniality as a ‘situated perspective’ see C. Epstein, “The postcolonial perspective: 
an introduction”, International Theory, 6: 2, 2014. 
28 Wylie, “Why standpoint matters”, 339. 
29 Harding adds how standpoint theory ‘presented itself as philosophy of science and epistemology and a 
methodology or method of research, appearing to conflate or even confuse fields standardly kept distinct’ S. G. 
Harding, “Introduction: standpoint theory as a site of political, philosophic, and scientific debate”, in The 
feminist standpoint theory reader: intellectual and political controversies, ed. S. Harding (New York; London: 
Routledge, 2004), 2. 
30 M. Mendras, Russian Politics. The Paradox of a Weak State, London: Hurst and Company: 2012; V. 
Morozov, “Western hegemony, global democracy and the Russian challenge”, in The struggle for the West: a 
divided and contested legacy, ed. C.S. Browning and M. Lehti (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2010); 
R. Sakwa, “A 'New Cold War' or twenty years' crisis? Russia and international politics”, International Affairs, 
84: 2, 2008. 
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of knowledge makes it possible to point to similarities in the way images of the international 
are painted on scholarly and policy canvas. Further research could engage in more depth with 
the question why knowledge stemming from Russia is marginalised in Western academia and 
the policy world. 
Finally, sociology of knowledge permits answering Bourdieu’s call that ‘the social 
sciences must take themselves as their object’31 and gives hope for transcending some of the 
divisions pervading the study of international politics, specifically that between critical and 
classical approaches. It is suggested that both camps should be more honest about 
legitimisation strategies accompanying their claims. 
Inspirations	  for	  a	  sociology-­‐of-­‐knowledge	  approach	  to	  IR	  
With all due humility and recognition of the many limitations in my engagement with 
Mannheim, Skinner and Bourdieu, it is fitting to introduce the inspiration animating my 
approach to research. Mannheim, whose writing was premised on the idea that there is a 
sociological component to knowledge, focused on the interpretation of knowledge within a 
socio-cultural setting.32 He persuasively argued that everyone's beliefs, including those of a 
social scientist, are the product of the context they were created in. Perspectives change 
according to differences in time and social location.	  Social class and even generation were the 
determinants of knowledge for Mannheim.33 He was puzzled by the way collective thought 
patterns were constructed and found expression in political action, or, as he described it: ‘how 
men actually think… how it really functions in public life and in politics as an instrument of 
collective action’.34 His methodological approach was premised on the assumption that a 
particular worldview was exhibited and therefore could be read from an array of texts 
produced by a ‘generational cohort’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 P. Bourdieu, Science of science and reflexivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2004, 85-114. 
32 This work is by far not the first to be inciting Mannheim into an IR discussion. Great names such as E.H. Carr 
were not ignorant of his work and made use of his arguments for IR study, but in areas markedly different from 
those animating this research, see: E. H. Carr and M. Cox, The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction 
to the study of international relations, Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave: 2001, 15, 45. 
33 Mannheim’s work, despite the fact that it continued to nourish new scholarship, came under criticism for its 
thin conception of knowledge and a reductionist image of the relationship between knowledge and social 
position, see Swidler and Arditi, “The new sociology of knowledge”: 306-305. Indeed, Mannheim 
acknowledged that ‘an optimum of truth’ can be reached and the key question was which social standpoint 
offered the best chance for reaching it: K. Mannheim, Ideology and utopia, London: Routledge: 1997. These 
assessments are not consequential from the point of view of this thesis. Given that engagement with sociology 
of knowledge has often been neglected within IR, it is resolute and justified to look for inspiration at the very 
source, in works perhaps less nuanced but hinting to the fundamental issues for the relation between knowledge 
and social processes. 
34 Mannheim, Essays on the sociology of knowledge; K. Mannheim, Conservatism: a contribution to the 
sociology of knowledge, vol. 11, London: Routledge: 1997. 
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With due respect to the rightful claim that Skinner’s methodological programme, for its 
immense competence and vision, can never be imitated,35 I merely attempt to draw on 
assumptions that Skinner’s scholarship seems to me to be based. In a reflexivist manner, 
Skinner, in parallel to his studying of political ideas, was contemplating the best method for 
approaching the history of political thought. His method stands out for the way in which he 
presented the chief political writings of a period together with the examination of lesser 
writers, which were to provide the general social and intellectual context necessary to grasp 
thinking patterns and conditions in which leading theorists worked. His history of political 
thought is thus a presentation of the development of ideologies rather than an ordered 
procession of authors or texts, which offers an account of linkages between political theory 
and practice.36  
Skinner’s oeuvre contends that the creation and communication of ideas take place from 
and with particular perspectives. From that it follows that it is important to analyse not only 
what is written but also why it was written. To address the latter, one needs to take into 
account a specific convention, in other words the collection of texts addressing similar issues 
and sharing specific vocabulary, assumptions and convictions permeating the intellectual 
milieu within which they were conceived.37 Skinner’s aim was to recover specific texts’ 
historical identity and the method assisting the task was a historical and intertextual approach, 
which the author himself classified as a ‘hermeneutic enterprise’.38  
The reliance on Skinner’s heritage allows me to distinguish my approach from the one 
taken by the new sociology of knowledge, in particular the post-Kuhnian direction, interested 
primarily in organizational practices across academic disciplines and the way hierarchy in 
social organisation impacts intellectual paradigms.39 My intention is not to undertake a 
thorough study of organizational practices but to focus on the production of ideas in more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 K. Palonen, Quentin Skinner: history, politics, rhetoric, Cambridge: Polity: 2003. 
36 The Foundations is the best exposition of this approach. Q. Skinner, The foundations of modern political 
thought, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1978. See also a methodological essay summarising a 
number of Skinner’s methodological texts: Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and 
Action”. 
37 A connection to Mannheim is permeating this approach. J. Tully, ed., Meaning and context: Quentin Skinner 
and his critics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Q. Skinner, “A reply to my critics”, in Meaning 
and context: Quentin Skinner and his critics, ed. J. Tully (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Q. 
Skinner, “Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas”, ed. J. Tully (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988). 
38 Skinner, “A reply to my critics”, 232. The present work is not aspiring to be a contribution to intellectual 
history nor does it follow hermeneutical approach closely but elements of Skinner’s method have had a strong 
influence on the direction this research had taken. 
39 Swidler and Arditi, “The new sociology of knowledge”. 
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general sense, from the perspective of sharing and upholding these ideas by generations of 
scholars. 
Bourdieu, in his sociological analysis of science, presented all scientific activity as 
historical activity. All supposedly trans-historical truths have historical genesis, they are 
attached to place and time and oriented by specific social mechanisms. Knowledge of society 
is structured by confines of social worlds contributing to its creation.40 Theory, claims 
Bourdieu, remains valid when it can be used for a specific purpose of a scientist. A paradigm 
has the power to determine questions that can be asked and distinguish them from those 
unthinkable. Scholarly ideas may not owe their force to the content of their message but to 
social factors accompanying their production. In addition, Bourdieu argued that the 
conventions of science as an academic discipline make scientists downplay the role or even 
necessity for imaginative acts in devising hypotheses or theories.41 
Whereas all three authors – Mannheim, Bourdieu and Skinner – have drawn our attention 
to the need for contextualisation, it was primarily Mannheim and Skinner’s interest in 
collective thought patterns and their emphasis on political action, which coincide with this 
thesis’ interest in the construction of and the power of ideas in theoretical and policy practical 
realms. Skinner, in The Foundations, argued that the connection should be made between 
theory and practice or even priority should be given to politics over thought.42 This inspires 
but also legitimizes my interest in how knowledge is produced and how ideas circulate in 
academic and practical international relations. Skinner gives the activity of everyday politics 
qualities of its own, which are inherently connected to theorizing. Mannheim, for his part, 
accounts for the way a political ideology assumes a place in the ordering of human 
experience. He points to several important characteristics and functions such ideology should 
espouse. Firstly, it must be rooted in concrete experience. Secondly, its role should be to 
assign meaning to the experienced world and to provide practical orientation.43  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Bourdieu, Science of science and reflexivity. In the British tradition of political science and the history of 
ideas, Quentin Skinner is credited as the pioneer in drawing attention to the significance of historical 
contextualisation in the study of political ideas. 
41 Bourdieu, Science of science and reflexivity, 15-18. 
42 Skinner, The foundations of modern political thought.; Skinner, “A reply to my critics”, 233. 
43 Mannheim, Conservatism: a contribution to the sociology of knowledge. 
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Producing	  knowledge	  and	  the	  contentious	  divide	  between	  the	  theory	  and	  
practice	  of	  IR	  
The discussion about the status and aim of theory in IR is an important instance of the 
discipline’s self-reflexive engagement with knowledge it produces. It is the closest IR 
scholarship has come to the engagement with the philosophy and sociology of knowledge.  
The notion of theory in IR is problematic to say the least and it has generated heated and 
at times emotionally charged debates in the IR intellectual community.44 There has always 
been either too much theory, understood as generalisation, or too little theory, understood as a 
rigorous approach to study. The discipline was once characterised as in the state of 
‘theoretical confusion’.45 An ahistorical view of IR exposes radically different opinions: for 
Martin Wight, due to the absence of sovereignty and domestic order, enabling political 
theorising about the state, arriving at an ‘international theory’ was difficult. It did not exist as 
clearly delineated body of thought but it was found scattered in various places, including in 
the practitioners’ utterances and essays.46 Others see a theory reaching its limits or indeed its 
very end.47 But, as Booth astutely observed, domestic and international political theories have 
always been ‘ideas of their times’.48 They have been inspired by events taking place on the 
international arena, expectations, hopes and disappointments with international politics, 
decisions and actions undertaken by those held to be IR main protagonists.  
Historical contextualisation and an individualistic approach to each and every theoretical 
proposition, important as they are, may be problematic. The discipline, or rather sociological 
processes within it, privilege continuity. A degree of continuity is what allows the discipline 
to exist and legitimize its claims to knowledge. At the same time, the counter-orthodoxies, 
leading to splits into competing ‘paradigms’, spur fears of the subject’s disintegration and 
evoke calls to put the specialty back together again.49 Despite the state of the discipline 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See for instance Ken Booth and Steve Smith’s animated responses to William Wallace’s article reviewing 
several major works in IR theory: W. Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice 
in International Relations”, Review of International Studies, 22: 3, 1996.; responses S. Smith, “Power and Truth: 
A Reply to William Wallace”, Review of International Studies, 23: 4, 1997; K. Booth, “Discussion: a reply to 
Wallace”, Review of International Studies, 23: 3, 1997. 
45 F. Halliday, Rethinking international relations, Basingstoke: Macmillan: 1994. 
46 M. Wight, “Why is there no international theory”, in Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of 
international politics, ed. H. Butterfield and M. Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966). 
47 C. Epstein, “Constructivism or the eternal return of universals in International Relations. Why returning to 
language is vital to prolonging the owl’s flight”, European Journal of International Relations, 19: 3, 2013. 
48 Booth, “Dare not to know: International relations theory versus the future”. 
49 Booth, “Dare not to know: International relations theory versus the future”, 329. It is not the aim of this 
section to provide a substantive overview of theoretical standpoints on international relations. This task has been 
undertaken by a number of textbooks. For a brief introduction to theoretical constellations and meta-theoretical 
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recognised aptly as ‘creative chaos’, the hope for it being put together again as the ‘dancing 
star’ and the subject of all subjects in the social sciences does not fade.50  
Over the years, controversy has been mounting over the meaning of ‘theory’ in IR, the 
substantive conditions for a specific proposition or body of propositions to count as theory, 
characteristics a theory should exhibit, such as coherence or parsimony, and the aim of 
theorising in general. This is not surprising, given that the ‘problem’ of theory is a socio-
political issue permeating many disciplines.51 Discussions abound on the consequences of 
labelling specific parts of knowledge as theory. Denoting a piece of scholarship as theory 
raises its status in the academic world, irrespective of the fact that different meanings and 
functions are accorded to theory. Authors approaching international politics from the so-
called area studies perspective tend to adopt theoretical frameworks, even in the face of 
apparent incompatibility between their observations and assumptions inscribed within a 
particular approach. ‘Localised’ knowledge is viewed as inferior to theory-based and 
generalized theoretical approach.52 
There is no one thing which could correspond to the word ‘theory’ and IR scholars are of 
course not ignorant of this basic assertion but social conditions accompanying scholarship are 
unforgiving. It matters what theory, as the descriptive adjective placed before the word theory 
may change the approach certain groups of scholars take towards that theory. For some, 
‘classical’ IR theory immediately evokes negative connotations due to its alleged defence of 
the status quo, at the same time as for others ‘critical’ theory is a-scientific.53 Ole Wæver, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
debates of the 1980s and 1990s, see e.g.: O. Wæver, “Resisting the temptation of post foreign policy analysis”, 
in European foreign policy: the EC and changing perspectives in Europe, ed. W. Carlsnaes and S. Smith 
(London: SAGE, 1994); S. Smith, “The self-images of a discipline: a genealogy of international relations 
theory”, in International relations theory today, ed. K. Booth and S. Smith (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). For a 
short exposition of main questions distinct theoretical approaches to IR have been engaging with, see: Booth, 
“Dare not to know: International relations theory versus the future”, 338-339. Earlier debates have been 
recapitulated in H. Bull, “The theory of international politics 1919-1969”, in The Aberystwyth Papers: 
international politics, 1919-1969, ed. B. Porter (London: Oxford University Press for the University College of 
Wales, 1972). See also K. J. Holsti, The dividing discipline: hegemony and diversity in international theory, 
Boston: Allen & Unwin: 1985. 
50 Booth, “Dare not to know: International relations theory versus the future”. 
51 For an extended discussion about the meaning of theory in contemporary sociology, see G. Abend, “The 
Meaning of 'Theory'”, Sociological Theory, 26: 2, 2008. The critique Abend develops regarding types of theory 
is particularly interesting, see pp.187-89.  
52 Very few authors are explicit and open about problems related to the application of theoretical approaches to 
developments they encounter ‘on the ground’. Cai Wilkinson is a notable exception. C. Wilkinson, “On not just 
finding what you (thought you) were looking for. Reflections on fieldwork data and theory”, in Interpretation 
and Method, ed. D. Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2013). 
53 What adds to the complexity of this issue is that scholars have begun to interpret divisions between theories in 
many ways. Der Derian, for instance, claimed that both ‘camps’, the classical and the critical IR theorists, 
recognised that: ‘international societies, institutions, and regimes have been historically constructed, out of the 
desire of order and the fear of anarchy’. The difference lied solely in the approach to anarchy, which was 
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instance, modelled theoretical debates along the lines of positivism and deconstruction, a 
spectrum spanning between a ‘border of boredom’ and a ‘border of negativity’, both 
descriptions pejoratively charged.54 
All the reflections on the role and characteristics of theory are part and parcel of the 
broad epistemological discussion regarding what can be known about international relations 
and how one might endeavour to attain that knowledge.55 Explanatory potential was deemed 
to be the theory’s very essence and the main source of its legitimate existence.56 For Kenneth 
Waltz, theory’s task was to explain laws even if theory itself was distinct from reality.57 Hans 
Morgenthau claimed IR theory should be abstract and apolitical, for only such features were 
expected to make theory into a tool for conducting world affairs.58 Samuel Huntington, with a 
degree of disregard for those attempting to distinguish between explaining and understanding, 
suggested that understanding requires theory but added that abstraction and simplification 
are necessary for theory and one cannot expect to explain all the facts.59 For the English 
School, an historically informed study of IR was to ‘provide a sense of what makes the world 
hang together’. The attainment of a holistic vision of world politics – as opposed to the focus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interpreted as either posing a threat to order or order as resulting in anarchy. J. Der Derian, “Introduction”, in 
International theory: critical investigations, ed. J. Der Derian (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 4. This 
interpretation of differences between theoretical approaches is deeply problematic if we take into consideration 
that some critical approaches contest the very fact of taking international society as the main object of study in 
IR. 
54 Wæver, “Resisting the temptation of post foreign policy analysis”. 
55 Questions about the knowability of social reality perplexed scholars in various disciplines. For early 
constructivists all knowledge of the world, the commonsensical and the scientific, involves constructs, i.e. ‘a set 
of abstractions, generalizations, formulations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought 
organization’. A. Schutz, Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff: 
1962, 5. But, even though the early constructivists denied the existence of pure facts, they assumed that certain 
aspects of the world, those relevant from the point of view of ‘a body of accepted rules of procedure of 
thinking’, could be grasped. Ibid. 
56 K. N. Waltz, Theory of international politics, London: McGraw-Hill: 1979, 6-7. On the importance of 
explanation in IR scholarship see e.g. Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice 
in International Relations”. The expectation for IR theory to predict international events has been largely 
dropped, especially following the unexpected fall of the Soviet Union; compare Booth, “Dare not to know: 
International relations theory versus the future”, 329. The prescriptive function is hotly debated particularly 
within norms-oriented scholarship and ethical foreign policy, e.g. K. E. Smith and M. Light, Ethics and foreign 
policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2001. 
57 Kenneth Waltz was one of the first IR scholar, perplexed by the variety of meanings ascribed to theory in 
academic IR. On Waltz’s understanding of theory, see: J. Rouse, “Feminism and the social construction of 
scientific knowledge”, in The feminist standpoint theory reader: intellectual and political controversies, ed. 
S.G. Harding (New York; London: Routledge, 2004). 
58 H. J. Morgenthau, Truth and power: essays of a decade, 1960-70, London: Pall Mall Press: 1970. 
Requirements regarding IR theory have been considered by many scholars, see e.g. Bull, “The theory of 
international politics 1919-1969”, 30. 
59 Steve Smith made a powerful case for the distinction between theory concerned with explaining, 
understanding and emancipation. Smith, “Power and Truth: A Reply to William Wallace”: 513-514. 
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on unit-levels – has been a clear driving force behind theorizing.60 This drive continues. 
Buzan and Wang recently praised the English School for its ambition to construct a theory ‘at 
the global level’.61 
The slightly disregarded fact has been that most IR theories, in making an explicit claim 
to knowledge about the international and in usurping the right to explain the international, 
produce powerful images of the world.62 It is now a truism, but an easily forgotten one, that 
knowledge of IR is not discovered, neither is international politics simply described or 
catalogued. Knowledge on issues as diverse as the international is the result of socially 
conditioned production processes. The idea of international society is particularly interesting 
in that regard. The way literature developed a detailed yet comprehensive world image based 
on the English School’s initial, rather narrow, claims about the society of states, is 
remarkable and will be thoroughly discussed in the Chapter Two.  
In addition to specific language and value appeal, i.e. such exposition which establishes 
and foregrounds a positive image, particular representations of the international gain 
acceptance and power through scholarly processes of erecting and sustaining systems of 
knowledge. These constructs require adherents to accept and, to some extent reproduce, 
contours of the world image created by a particular theory. Criticised as self-affirming 
research, these practices should be studied in greater depth, which only reinforces the claim 
that sociology of knowledge perspective has merit in discussing theory and images of the 
international produced by it.63 
Because theories purport to represent the world transparently and in an unambiguous 
way, they may become commonsensical. This happens when the origins and values 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 A. Hurrell, On global order: power, values, and the constitution of international society, Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press: 2007; T. Dunne, “System, State and Society: How does it all hang together?”, 
Millenium – Journal of International Relations, 34: 1, 2005. 
61 J. Wang and B. Buzan, “The English and Chinese schools of international relations: comparisons and 
lessons”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7: 1, 2014: 44. 
62 In the thesis a powerful idea and a powerful image are used interchangeably and both denote to 
representations of the international produced by the academia and by the policy world. As I argue in Chapter 
Six, the aesthetics of worldly representations enhances their knowledge claims. 
63 The production of paradigmatic research programmes and its consequences were criticised on numerous 
occasions under such derogatory terms as sectarianism or scholasticism. Compare D. J. Levine, Recovering 
international relations: the promise of sustainable critique, New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
2012., G. van der Ree, “The Politics of Scientific Representation in International Relations”, Millennium-
Journal of International Studies, 42: 1, 2013., Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and 
Practice in International Relations”. C. Death, “Governmentality at the limits of the international: African 
politics and Foucauldian theory”, Review of International Studies, 39: 3, 2013. 
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underpinning them become forgotten.64 Representations of the world may not only be 
naturalised but, through social processes accompanying their production and reception, may 
acquire significant power. Sociology of knowledge allows engaging with the process through 
which ideas gain power to ‘arouse and direct social consciousness; provide objectives to be 
sought; and prompt action in their pursuit’.65  
International practice cannot be said to remain entirely passive in the realm of knowledge 
production. To the contrary, the world of policy speaks more often and in greater detail than 
previously. Its discourse can be found not solely in the speeches of politicians but in 
international declarations, white papers, blue papers, strategies, plans and reports. The praxis 
of international politics, aided by policy-oriented research centres, has become bolder in 
defining, according names and labels to the reality it acts upon, thereby producing knowledge 
about the international. It is also enormously consequential, as documents adopted by such 
bodies as the United Nations are generally held to be expressing commonly agreed and even 
universal visions.  
The earlier instance of the theory-praxis discussion in the domain of IR oscillated around 
themes of scholarship’s policy relevance and the degree to which scholars should participate 
in devising policy. Academic IR was, on the one hand, criticised for moving away from 
government.66 On the other, it was expected to maintain a certain distance, allowing it to 
deliver a position on policy or question the common sense of policy debate.67 Assigning 
completely separate spheres to theory and praxis was questioned on several accounts. A 
connection between the two was drawn primarily on the basis of the expectation for theory to 
be generalizing practice. Practice, in turn, was supposed to be using theory for devising or 
legitimating action. Large parts of theoretical inquiry were practically motivated. Scholars 
admitted that all IR ‘to a greater or lesser extent does “empirical” work’68 and that IR as a 
discipline grew out of reflections on policy.69 Indeed, IR as contemporarily practised in 
universities often devotes the entire effort to the interpretation of practitioners’ conduct. But, 
even if a theory-practice linkage rather than a separation was recognised,70 the discussion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Levine, Recovering international relations: the promise of sustainable critique; van der Ree, “The Politics of 
Scientific Representation in International Relations”. 
65 M. Foley, Ideas that shape politics, Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press: 1994, 208. 
66 Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations”. 
67 Smith, “Power and Truth: A Reply to William Wallace”. 
68 Booth, “Discussion: a reply to Wallace”. 
69 Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations”: 302.	  
70 Smith, “Power and Truth: A Reply to William Wallace”. 
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remained premised on the non-recognition of knowledge-production capacity in the policy 
world.71 
While the conventional aspects of theory-praxis discussion are of continuing relevance, 
the supposition that both realms produce knowledge opens up space for engagement with the 
power of ideas. The process of knowledge production taking place in policy practice should 
not be disregarded especially within the discipline of IR, where intersections between 
academic study and policy are so numerous and multidirectional.72 Sociology of knowledge 
facilitates a reflection on the rigid dichotomy and hierarchy privileging academic over policy 
concerns. It allows the questioning of the notions of scholarly detachment and engagement 
with praxis and makes possible a re-engagement with Weber’s fundamental argument that 
politics and scientific study are necessarily different vocations. This classical Weberian 
viewpoint has been reproduced in many different ways, including by IR scholars, who saw 
policy practice as distinct from theory due to its lack of ‘theoretical groundings’.73 With the 
help of Quentin Skinner’s emphasis on ‘political life itself’ and his push towards the 
reflection on actual political activities and rhetoric rather than on abstract philosophical 
principles,74 one realises that a policymaker’s view of the world is difficult to dismiss as 
‘untheoretical’.75 
Engagement	  with	  and	  contribution	  to	  the	  literature	  	  
This dissertation partakes in the broad effort to engage critically with the processes of 
academic and policy knowledge production. As a contribution to how we study and think of 
international relations, it is not a standard engagement with any of the literatures it traverses. 
I approached literatures and policy texts as discourses which collectively produce and uphold 
specific representations of the international. Given the breadth and sophistication of texts I 
analysed, I looked at them with due humility. I did not intend a thorough exploration of all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Smith did mention that ‘practice is unavoidably theoretical’ and that theories constitute the world but neither 
did he elaborate on these remarks nor provided examples of what he meant. Smith, “Power and Truth: A Reply 
to William Wallace”: 515. 
72 It has been argued that IR grew out of reflections on policy. Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and 
Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations”: 302. Indeed, IR as contemporarily practised in 
universities often devotes the entire effort to the interpretation of practitioners’ conduct. 
73 Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations”. See 
also Morgenthau’s claim that an intellectual and a politician in their professional activities are ‘oriented towards 
different ultimate values’ Morgenthau, Truth and power: essays of a decade, 1960-70, 14. 
74 Skinner, The foundations of modern political thought. 
75 Booth, “Discussion: a reply to Wallace”; Smith, “Power and Truth: A Reply to William Wallace”. 
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arguments but hoped to cast a summarizing and questioning gaze, contesting holistic 
representations of the international these discourses advance. 
The dissertation engages with the body of IR scholarship discussing international society 
but, while acknowledging its achievements, develops a sociology-of-knowledge critique of 
this idea, contrasting it with representations of the international constructed by Russian 
scholarly and policy discourse. Thereby my work partakes in the discussion about the aim of 
IR theorising and ways of envisaging the international. In that regard, the thesis makes its 
contribution by exploring the link between representing the international and 
conceptualizations and policy action undertaken with regard to a state. 
The exponential number of publications engaging critically with IR theorising would 
suggest there exists a refined critique of international society, one taking on board conceptual 
issues and social processes surrounding this area of knowledge production. But criticism 
advanced to date has been partial. A thorough engagement with the problem of reification or 
agency has been lacking. Disapproving assessment has been either voiced from within, i.e. by 
scholars broadly accepting international society as a framework and attacking its specific 
expositions or historical accounts or by those rebuffing the English School’s Eurocentrism 
and therefore discrediting international society altogether. The revisionist approach 
challenged the consensual nature of norms and their universal observance, as postulated by 
Martin Wight and his followers.76  
The idea of international society was criticised for reflecting only a particular historical 
experience, that of Western states. The classical figures of the English School have been 
castigated for their excessive Eurocentrism and the neglect of coercive aspects in bringing 
about the allegedly shared norms of international society.77 The idea was under attack for 
helping to legitimize a highly unequal international system, comprising practices of 
imperialism and colonialism. Mistaken, according to critics, was the presentation of 
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77 One recent example of that criticism comes from Barry Buzan and George Lawson, "The Global 
Transformation: The 19th Century and the Making of Modern International Relations", International studies 
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international society expansion as a progressive and positive process. Some critics vowed to 
replace ‘expansion’ with ‘subjugation’ of other regions by European states.78  
Those who chose to examine international society and its membership requirements from 
the point of view of the non-Western world, criticised the overreliance on the West European 
example and the superficiality of order built on the supposedly shared foundations of 
international society. Since the modern world’s history was divided into two different 
patterns of international political and legal order, more appropriate would be according to 
Edward Keene, to acknowledge the ‘dualistic nature of order’. Institutional and legal 
structures of that order developed differently in Europe and beyond. While European order 
was tolerant with regard to ethnic, cultural and political difference, the ‘extra-European’ one 
was preoccupied with the civilizing mission. The key challenge posed by Keene centred on 
the fact that thinking in terms of international society prevents from taking other forms of 
international order, such as imperial systems, seriously.79   
The idea of international society advanced by the English School has been critically 
addressed from the perspective of states considered to occupy its margins, but it has never 
been contrasted with a perspective of a state which used to be regarded as a superpower and 
for whose elites and society its great power status remains an important part of identity. My 
contribution in this area consists of a thorough engagement, rather than dismissal, and 
exploration of how the idea of international society is produced, works and gains power. 
What helps me in this endeavour is a contrast I draw with the Russian perspective on the 
international realm.80 
Plentiful attempts have been made to describe and understand Russia from an 
international society standpoint but the English School literature, and Western IR scholarship 
more broadly, has not been committed to acknowledging and researching Russian 
perspectives on the world. As a successor to the Soviet Union, Russia has a history of 
offering comprehensive and alternative models of socio-political organisation and it has 
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Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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engaged particularly actively in developing knowledge of international relations. During the 
Soviet period, IR as a discipline developed in the USSR in relative isolation from the thinking 
advanced in the West. A study of Russian debates allows for a closer scrutiny of assumptions 
behind Western IR scholarship.81 I attempted, however, not to compare the international 
society perspective with Russia’s construction of the international with the help of the same 
set of elements. Instead, one provided the lens to look at the other. Russia became part of my 
method. It provided a mirror to hold up to Western portrayals of the international realm. It is 
usually easier to come up with criticism regarding ‘the other’ than to overcome or reflect 
upon modes of thinking deeply embedded and structured by one’s own values and 
worldviews. To the extent possible, therefore, I attempted to direct Western criticisms 
regarding Russian or Soviet IR back at theories constructed in the West. I would like to claim 
this is a contribution to methodological approaches in the study of knowledge on 
international politics. 
Finally, I engaged with the relation between knowledge production in academia and in 
policy practice with the aim of elucidating parallels in these two domains’ efforts to construct 
representations of the international.82 My ambition has been to speak to IR audiences in the 
hope that my arguments resonate with theorists and practitioners. In casting a critical gaze at 
practices of representing the international, I do not wish to antagonise IR scholars nor render 
their work devalued. The most desired contribution, which in this case very much depends on 
this text’s reception, would be to simulate a reflexion and broader discussion about the social 
foundations of knowledge produced in international politics as well as about sociological 
processes that make specific ideas powerful, to ‘unveil, unmask and bring into light what is 
hidden’.83 
Methodology	  –	  the	  experience	  of	  reflexive	  IR	  
To reflect on my individual process of knowledge production is as important as 
arguments developed in this work. In the English-language tradition of IR scholarship, 
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methodology is usually held to be the collection of methods.84 I take a broader view of 
methodology. Akin to a research design, methodology allows me to delineate the philosophy 
of knowledge I engage with and discuss epistemological and ontological assumptions of my 
research. 
Methodology I developed throughout this research, rather than adopted from the outset, 
has three main foci: 
a) methodology as a dynamic and reflexive process. During the research journey, not only the 
research question but also methodology evolved as a result of constant reflection on the 
research process;85 
b) methodology as a political choice denoting the fact that a particular methodology 
influences rather than only guides the research process; 
c) ethnography of IR theory and practice. Ethnography is understood as both an approach to 
research and a set of methods.86 Reflexive ethnography postulates conscious self-examination 
of the researcher’s interpretative presuppositions, including the process of interaction through 
which they acquire information.87 Deep immersion in theoretical and practical discourses 
enabled me to develop a perspective that is both sceptical and empirical, in the sense that it is 
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based on deep engagement with arguments and reflection on sociological circumstances of 
particular epistemic communities engaged in knowledge production. It allowed for the 
contestation of the classical understanding of ‘fieldwork’ as associated with going out there 
to the world of policy practice. My ethnographic research has taken place within academia as 
well as among policy practitioners. 
My own methodological stance had undergone transformation along with the project’s 
advancement and the development of my research consciousness. The initial approach was to 
apply international society as a framework for research with the ambitious aim of developing 
Barry Buzan’s claims regarding regional international society.88 The original project was 
aimed at comparing what I had identified as two different models of a state, one promoted by 
Western international society and one by Russia in Central Asia. This analysis was to be 
guided by the theoretical framework of international society. By illuminating processes 
taking place at the intersection between international society and regional hegemony, I 
wished to contribute to theory development. Adopting international society as a starting point 
for research was not only limiting in terms of questions I was allowed to ask but it also 
required me to see the world in a particular way. Rather than a facilitation for understanding, 
the theoretical starting point, one which young researchers are usually told to adopt, 
prevented me from addressing issues arising from the research process. 
This failed application of theory turned out to be crucial for my research process as it 
prompted an in-depth and scrupulous questioning of research predicaments. The research 
process and my greater understanding of how methodology and research methods are 
political activities rather than technical devices, made me refrain from relying on a specific, 
uniform theoretical framework.89 The main thrust came to be a critical engagement with the 
practice of applying such a framework as a tool in the study of international politics. As a 
result, this research developed primarily as a reflection on and critique of specific 
representations of the international produced by academia and the policy world. Since this 
work is interested in how academics and practitioners engage in world-making and with what 
effect, arguments presented in the thesis rely on a constructivist ontological position and an 
interpretivist epistemological one.  
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The account provided is not the sole or final interpretation of the problem.90 Throughout 
my work on the thesis, I accept rather than suppress or deny complexity. I acknowledge that 
there are multiple interpretations possible steered by the diversity of perspectives. Ultimately, 
this dissertation is a narrative and unavoidably a contribution to the political myths it speaks 
about. 
Methods	  and	  localities	  
Parts of the thesis which engage with international practices regarding the state draw on 
examples from Central Asia, in particular Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia is the physical location 
where liberal policies of international statebuilding and those undertaken by Russia meet. 
Central Asia is not a case to draw conclusions from but works as an illustration of arguments 
regarding policy practice. It was also in Kyrgyzstan that the initial observation animating the 
research project was made. Back in 2011, my curiosity was inspired by the fact that donors, 
institutions representing generally Western liberal states, were unable to engage with Russia 
when it came to policies they attempted to implement in Kyrgyzstan. These two types of 
actors pursuing activities in Kyrgyzstan seemed to be striving for different goals. They also 
accorded significantly different meanings to such key terms as security and state.91 The initial 
contention was that they pursue different state models. It soon became apparent, however, 
that Russia was not interested in moulding Kyrgyzstan’s institutions according to any specific 
model. Instead, its activities seemed to be guided by an utterly different conception of 
international politics. Circumstances related to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine 
forced me to broaden the geographical focus beyond Central Asia. It was impossible to 
bypass Russian discourse produced with regard to Ukraine given the more and more coherent 
representation of the international realm were expressed following the Maidan Revolution. 
The choice of methods is usually said to be guided by methodology.92 Since 
methodology encompasses the epistemological rationale for a particular choice of methods, it 
is only logical that the order from methodology to methods is maintained. But the practice of 
doing research did not conform to this ideal sequence. Methods I adopted influenced the 
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research trajectory and stimulated a change in the research design. My initial decision bound 
to the theoretical framework I chose, was to follow methods discussed by the English 
School.93 I engaged with C.A.W. Manning’s suggestion that international society may be 
amenable to anthropological research.94 Interviews I conducted in Kyrgyzstan unsettled this 
initial presumption. Observations from discussions with research participants escaped all 
attempts to force them into a theoretical framework.95 A change of perspective and a 
thorough re-organisation of my research question opened new ways to the gathering and 
analysis of material. It remained a laborious process since the thesis traverses various 
segments of knowledge production in two languages, both foreign to the author, but it turned 
into a much more reflexive rather than purely mechanical undertaking. This thesis was 
informed by a literature review, critical analysis of texts and self-reflexive political 
ethnography. Throughout the research process, I learned to treat material gathering and 
analysis not as separate consecutive activities but as intertwined and contributing to sense-
making.96 The following section discusses my research methods in some detail. 
Language	  and	  critical	  analysis	  of	  texts	  
For Bourdieu, language was immensely powerful. His prolific writing on the subject 
influenced a tradition in social sciences called discourse analysis. Treating talk and text as 
social action and language as constructive, permitted me to move beyond the text content to 
focus on internal organisation of discourse in order to find out what the discourse was 
doing.97 Since there are no universally agreed procedures for undertaking discourse analysis, 
I treated academic and policy text as discourse, which means I engaged with texts not solely 
on the basis of arguments, but broader socio-political frameworks partly conditioning their 
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production and partly emerging as texts’ products.98 My analysis traced recurring elements in 
texts and aimed at identifying patterns within larger contexts. Analytical material in the thesis 
is therefore presented as a summary of features accompanied by illustrative extracts. 
The argument concerning representations of the international was drawn on the basis of 
analysing: academic writing, including monographs, journal articles and textbooks, policy 
documents, speeches and interviews. Skinner’s approach to texts in political philosophy 
inspired my decision to focus on a broad array of texts in order to see how the thinking on 
international society has been evolving, rather than choosing one or two texts that the English 
School is best remembered for. Textbooks were taken into account for their aim to delineate 
what is worth knowing and their formative influence on future scholars and policymakers. 
Policy documents were selected on the basis of their significance in terms of informing the 
praxis, i.e. those created by key players in knowledge production and policy implementation, 
those establishing ‘paradigms’ or setting directions, such as the UN, the World Bank and 
regional development banks. The focus has been on discourse produced by national and 
international organisations as well as individual decision makers and practitioners in the field 
of statebuilding.  
The reconstruction of representation of the international produced in Russia was drawn 
from official discourse (official policy formulations, speeches by key decision-makers) and 
contemporary Russian scholarly debate. I utilized the following sources: 
a) the official discourse:  
• key speeches and articles of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev 
• key documents, including foreign policy and national security concepts 
• the annual review of Russia’s foreign policy, published by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
b) writings at the intersection of official policy and analysis: 
• journals, such as the International Affairs (Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn), Russia 
in Global Politics (Rossiya v globalnoi politike) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Bourdieu’s critique of formal linguistics pointed particularly to the fact that semiotic analysis ignored social 




• reports and analyses of think-tanks with close links  to the Kremlin, such as 
Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISI), Foreign Policy and Defence 
Council (SVOP), Valdai Club 
• opinion sections of state-sanctioned outlets, such as Rossiyskaya gazeta daily 
c) scholarly journals and online publications of academic institutions: 
• related to general IR issues and politics, such as Mezhdunarodnyye 
otnosheniya i mirovaya ekonomika, Sovremennaia Evropa, Gosudarstvo i 
pravo, Vlast’. 
These sources were mostly read through the means of Russian. All translations of 
Russian language sources are mine unless provided in the English language on official 
webpages or by the authors.  When an English version was analysed, I used the Russian 
version to check against the translation of specific terms (e.g. ‘statehood’, ‘international 
community’). In several cases when a Russian term is of particular importance, a Russian 
Latinised term was used in brackets next to the English language nearest equivalent. 
Following examples set in English-language literature analysing Russian politics, I 
adhered to the Library of Congress standard for transliteration of Russian.99 The only 
exception I make is to use ‘i’ to denote to both Russian и (i) and й (ĭ), e.g. Русский мир is 
transliterated as Russkii mir. In case of well-known politicians, I used the spelling of their 
names most common in the English language literature. In cases where an author of Russian 
origin published in English language, I used the publication’s spelling of their name when 
citing their work and when referring to them in the text. 
I refrained from using the definite article in phrases such as international community or 
international society in order not to imply a reference to a single defined entity. Nor did I use 
inverted commas since different works the thesis studied accorded varied meanings to the 
term.  
Reflexive	  ethnography	  
In order to supplement the engagement with scholarly arguments presented in academic 
literature, I decided to subject IR theory to methods that IR as a discipline uses in its study of 
political practice. These include: participant observation, interviewing IR scholars on the 
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subject of their academic practices and the perceived influence of their work on policy 
debates. I interviewed scholars working with the international society perspective, IR 
scholars working in Russia and Russian scholars employed in Great Britain (altogether seven 
interviews, whose participants asked to remain anonymous). I have been a member of the 
English School section of the International Studies Association (ISA), participated in ISA 
annual convention panels in San Francisco and Toronto and took part in two collective 
academic endeavours, engaging with international society: a special issue of the Global 
Discourse journal and a collectively-authored book. 
Ethnography of IR was supplemented by ethnographic research of policy practice. The 
English School, despite numerous claims to be representing the way international politics 
plays out in the minds of states-people, has never engaged in analysing the practitioners’ 
discourses. At the same time scholars who embark on what is called ‘fieldwork’ in the hope 
of being closer to the policy centres may find such ‘centres’ to be dispersed and multifaceted. 
There is no one uniform policy kernel which produces the discourse guiding policy action. 
Production and interpretation take place on many different levels. Policies are the effect of 
complex processes crossing many boundaries, not only national but also educational. My 
engagement with the world of policy practice was based on in-depth, semi-structured expert 
interviews conducted in Kyrgyzstan (August-December 2013) and in Russia (October 2013, 
February 2015).100 This thesis has also benefited from insights gained during previous 
research stays in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and 2012. I conducted expert interviews in Kyrgyzstan 
with representatives of institutions and organisations responsible for planning and 
implementing activities which may be classified as international statebuilding. In Moscow, 
the interviews enquiring about political practice were held in: official state institutions 
(Rossostrudnichestvo), governmental research and educational centres (the Diplomatic 
Academy) and universities (the Russian Academy of Sciences; the Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations, MGIMO).  
The aim was not solely to use the interviews in order to gain insights and opinions but to 
engage practitioners in a mutual process of reflection related to our, me as a researcher and 
my counterpart as a practitioner, understandings and assumptions. This attitude was a result 
of my reflections on the questions about the responsibility of the academics and the 
‘audience’ of my research.  
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The six chapters of the thesis discuss representations of the international and their 
bearing on knowledge produced and policy implemented with regard to the state. In Chapter 
One I outlined the research background, specified the research question and objectives. In 
addition to explaining sociology of knowledge inspirations for my research, I outlined the 
contours of my reflexivist research philosophy. This required a detailed exposition of 
methodology, a thorough description of methods and sources. 
Chapter Two is concerned with the idea of international society discussed by English-
language IR literature, primarily by scholars associated with the English School of IR. 
Surveying major trends in the English School writing, the chapter traces the route through 
which the English School research, first driven by the need to justify IR as a discipline in 
social sciences and later by the urge to explain contemporary issues in international politics, 
arrived at the point where a particular interpretation of international politics became reified 
and acquired agency. International society, though it might initially have been just a 
metaphor for the international realm, has increasingly become associated with the world. 
These steps consolidated the recognition of international society’s universality. An effective 
statehood, armoured with institutions able to ensure stability and meet the standards of 
democracy, becme the only possible option permitted by this reified view of the international. 
Chapter Three looks at policy discourse and its frequent employment of the term 
international community, particularly within the framework of international statebuilding. It 
argues that policy practice engages in producing knowledge on the international and may, just 
like the academia, construct powerful representations of it. Reification, far from being 
restricted to the realm of IR theory, is preponderant in praxis. The discourse of policy 
practice presents statebuilding as an activity undertaken in the name of international 
community. It relies on a particular understanding, description and, ultimately, reification of 
this community. The representation of the international as international community and the 
parallel process of endowing international community with agency normalise a particular 
state model as the only conceivable option and statebuilding as a natural and desirable 
political practice. The chapter refers to Kyrgyzstan to illustrate how international community 
reification and agentification perpetuates statebuilding policies aimed at the construction of a 
state according to specific standards. 
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Chapter Four challenges the reification and purportedly objective nature of 
international society by exploring the perspective on international politics prevalent in 
Russian contemporary scholarly and policy discourse. The chapter claims that several factors 
underpinning Russia’s perception of the international, such as a distinct interpretation of 
history, the feeling of exclusion and the claim to great power status, have fuelled a 
confrontational rather than co-operative view of the international realm and contributed to the 
galvanization of the idea of the Russian World.  
Chapter Five explores how Russia’s representation of the international is interwoven 
with views on the state. Unlike in the case of Western-led statebuilding, where a specific state 
model is well articulated, it is impossible to find a model of a state that Russian discourse 
would be promoting, forging or enforcing in the post-Soviet area. The idea of the Russian 
World facilitates the portrayal of Russia as a polity greater than a state and helps legitimise its 
political disregard for the sovereignty of other post-Soviet states. Constructing the 
international in terms of a confrontation between the Russian World and the West requires 
efforts to strengthen a polity transcending Russian borders. Russian scholarly and policy 
discourse does not engage in any precise elaboration of requirements for the right kind of 
state in terms of institutions or standards underpinning it. To the contrary, the aim is neither 
to be explicit about a state nor to build one. The objective in the post-Soviet area is to sustain 
feeble polities relying on relations with Russia. 
The concluding Chapter Six situates the discussion in the broader debate on knowledge 
production. It summarizes reflections on representations of the international realm produced 
by theory and practice of international politics and points to similarities in the knowledge 
production process in the West and in Russia. Reflecting on ways in which representations of 
the international influence concepts and policies regarding the state, the chapter goes a step 
further and asks what makes certain representations of the world powerful. Sociological 
processes underlying the knowledge production enterprise make certain ideational 
representations of the international realm perform functions attributed to political myths. 
Simmilarly to political myths, these representations are believed to be true or acted upon as if 




Limitations	  and	  implications	  for	  further	  study	  	  
In recommending the practice of reflexivity, I am also aware of handing over to others 
instruments which they can turn against me101  
 
The account presented in this thesis suffers from numerous limitations. I decided to 
criticize the enterprise of knowledge production, in which I unavoidably participate myself. I 
cast a critical gaze at representations of the international but – by describing them and 
delineating their characteristics – I, too, contribute to their construction. Whenever one 
embarks on waging a critique, simplifications regarding the object of criticism are 
unavoidable. I have been reading the English School work through a particular prism, which 
resulted in the exposition of only particular aspects of international society scholarship. 
Critical engagement with the ways the idea of international society has been constructed, 
represented and used is not aimed at dismissing the effort put into its conceptualization but is 
a reflection on potential outcomes of looking at the world through this perspective. I treat 
international society as a representation with no aspirations to validate or dismiss it on the 
grounds that the real world is different. As a representation, however, it has become a 
powerful idea which only reinforces the need for a reflection on its characteristics and the 
process of its production. Undoubtedly, writing on international society is broad and diverse. 
There is no single, undisrupted image of the English School. My take on writing about 
international society is but one representation, created as a result of my specific reading of 
that literature. I approached this literature as a body following a particular research vector. I 
discerned and engaged with the ‘trend of thought’ permeating these works and contributing to 
the creation of a particular narrative of international society.102 Pushing the English School 
writings to their conclusions, I undoubtedly at times compromised nuance. I intended to 
avoid, but I may not have entirely succeeded, crediting authors with meanings they had not 
intended to convey. I also attempted not to make value judgements about the moral rightness 
or wrongness of particular views of the world. 
It is important to outline what this work is not engaging with. Firstly, my aim is not to 
argue that the view of the world as covered by the institutional structure of international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Bourdieu, Science of science and reflexivity, 115. 
102 I borrow the phrase ‘trend of thought’ from Ossowska, who engaged with the power of ideas by showing 
how certain doctrines or knowledges may affect morality. M. Ossowska, Social Determinants of Moral Ideas, 
vol. 22, Philadelphia,University of Pennsylvania Press: 1970.   
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society is empirically inaccurate. I do not claim that relations between two or more states 
cannot be termed ‘societal’. Nor am I asking about Western relations with Russia, the eclipse 
of the West or the post-Western international order. My aim is to engage thoroughly with 
representations, to point to the fact that such representations may become powerful. 
Pertaining to the knowledge production effort, they may frame the thinking and policy action 
with respect to objects beyond their immediate description.  
I do not intend to make a contribution to the sociology of knowledge, accepting that my 
arguments, localised as they are in one particular field of study, shed light on issues 
pertaining to this field but shy away from speaking to the diverse debate led by those who 
take social science as their object.103 Not being able to claim mastery over sociological 
literature, it is impossible for me to offer any substantial contribution to that area which 
would not be narrowly focused on the domain of international studies.  
Despite these limitations, I hope this thesis and its conclusions open several important 
areas for further study. A decade ago, Ken Booth noted that one of the most exciting recent 
things in IR had been the injection of ideas and perspectives from different regions and 
continents. Over twenty years prior to that, Hedley Bull had concluded his analysis of 
approaches to the study of international politics between 1919 and 1969 with a poignant 
question: ‘If the theories that are available are almost exclusively Western in origin and 
perspective, can they convey an adequate understanding of a world political system that is 
predominantly non-Western?’104 An interesting research question which follows from this 
thesis could enquire about the status of knowledge on IR produced in non-Western contexts, 
in particular when it originates from states deemed not liberal. Such an enquiry would be a 
welcome contribution to the debate about what makes knowledge on IR legitimate, who 
claims authority to produce knowledge about international politics, and on what grounds. 
This chapter opened with a brief discussion of maps, their functions, power and 
significance in cartographers’ unremitting desire to represent the world accurately. Ambitions 
tormenting cartography and not at all foreign to the study of IR, exacerbate similarities 
between the two seemingly different disciplines and expose their immersion in the knowledge 
production enterprise. Representations of the world produced in the form of maps or IR 
theories, despite their influence on political realities, remain fragile and subject to criticism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 This group can by no means be reduced to sociology of knowledge. Different fields, with boundaries difficult 
to set clearly, take interest in the study of science and knowledge: philosophy and history of science, 
epistemology, to name these with distinguishable identity. 
104 Bull, “The theory of international politics 1919-1969”, 55.; Booth, “Discussion: a reply to Wallace”: 373. 
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Albrecht Penck’s the International Map of the World, an undoubtedly spectacular map-
making idea, suffered defeat. Prior to the First World War, its creation was supervised by the 
British Government, which saw the leadership role as an opportunity to shape the project 
according to its own interests. The UN overtook the initiative in 1953. Three years later the 
USSR put forward a proposal for a new world map based on a modified scale. The UN 
rejected the proposal but the original project never regained its vigour and in late 1980s the 
UN terminated the International Map of the World initiative. The Soviet scheme turned out to 
be more successful. It culminated with the exhibition of the entire map in Moscow in 1976. 
The map, used by Soviet authorities as a showcase of the Soviet bloc’s ability to produce 
anything the West aspired to create, reflected on the spirit of international affairs back in the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Brotton, A history of the world in twelve maps, 439-443. 
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CHAPTER	  2	  The	  idea	  of	  international	  society	  reified	  and	  its	  
implications	  for	  the	  state	  
 
 
The role of theory goes deeper than language. It affects mental frameworks. (…)  
If there is no other language in which to think or talk about politics 
 and if theoretical categories have been internalised,  
then theory must determine how the world is perceived1 
 
Contemporary thought is endangered by the picture of nature drawn by science. This danger 
lies in the fact that the picture is now regarded as an exhaustive account of nature itself so 
that science forgets that in its study of nature it is studying its own picture2 
 
Introduction:	  engaging	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  international	  society	  
Had this research followed a more traditional path, it would be only fitting for this 
chapter to open with a literature review articulating a theoretical framework for the study of 
selected phenomena occurring in international society.3 International society, as discussed by 
the English School, is usually introduced with the classical definition, put forward by Hedley 
Bull, encompassing common interests, norms, rules, and institutions. Such definition 
establishes and helps uphold a view of the international which is composed of states and 
where the formally anarchical structure is not incompatible with societal elements. This 
definition is usually provided in order to guide the analysis and facilitate the answering of 
questions about events and processes occurring in the society of states. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The quotation derives from a book devoted to a critical analysis of IR theory as an academic discipline in the 
Soviet Union, M. Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, Brighton: Wheatsheaf: 1988, 329. 
2 M. Benson, Cosmigraphics: picturing space through time, New York: Abrams: 2014. 
3 Examples following such an orthodox path include: Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in 
international society. S. Suzuki, Civilization and empire: China and Japan's encounter with European 
international society, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: 2009. Y. A. Stivachtis and M. Webber, “Regional 
International Society in a Post-­‐Enlargement Europe”, European Integration, 33: 2, 2011. L. Schouenborg, The 




This chapter advances an alternative perspective. It approaches international society from 
a knowledge production perspective, studying it as a powerful, holistic (i.e. one in which the 
parts of the whole are intimately connected and explicable only by reference to the whole) 
representation of the international. Rather than inaugurating with the question ‘What is 
international society?’, it asks instead about the grounds for and consequences of posing the 
question in this specific way. The chapter’s objective is to engage with conceptual 
ramifications and expose processes taking place in IR scholarship dedicated to the study of 
international society. It traces the route through which English School research, first driven 
by the need to justify international relations (IR) as a discipline in social sciences and later by 
the urge to establish the English School as a distinct theoretical approach and, finally, willing 
to account for new international developments, arrived at the point where a particular 
interpretation of world politics became reified and seen as a causative force, i.e. something 
really existing between states and possessing agency.  
The narrative opens with a brief introduction to the context out of which international 
society arose as a framework for analysis in IR. It points to C.A.W. Manning, who first 
pondered international society not only as a legitimate concern but as the key subject-matter, 
the organizing idea for IR as an academic pursuit. Despite his strong argument about the 
notional aspect of international politics, this chapter considers Manning as the first to have 
embarked on the reification process.4 I proceed with exploring Hedley Bull’s claim that 
international society is a neat intellectual construct, which helps understand international 
politics. While Bull’s The Anarchical Society may be regarded as an exercise in the 
conceptualization of international politics with no pretence to reflect exactly arrangements 
existing in real politics, his collaborative work, The Expansion of International Society, 
contributed to international society’s reification. Subsequent scholars attached agency and 
responsibility to what came to be termed ‘solidarist international society’. While international 
society might have initially been just one way of interpreting the world, it has increasingly 
become associated with the world. A parallel move was to propose international society as a 
grand IR theory, i.e. a more rigorous approach to the study of international politics, one 
allowing for explanation at the global level. Such positioning of the idea was to validate the 
English School knowledge claims thereby elevating its status in the discipline. Presenting 
international society as a theoretical framework implies that it is not tainted by ideology. 
Taken together, these developments in knowledge production led to a merger of an idea with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Manning, The Nature of International Society. 
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empirical reality. They consolidated the recognition of international society as a global, 
universally accepted, benign and utilitarian structure. 
The representation of the international in terms of solidarist international society led to a 
greater recognition of a state and its role. Sovereign statehood has always been the criterion 
for international society membership, but how the state was to be governed internally became 
relevant to the international society conception only later. The reification has been tightly 
bound to and facilitated the naturalization of a particular model of a state-member of 
international society, one which fits into the world as it exists out there.  
The	  invention	  of	  IR	  theory	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  international	  
society	  
It has been thirty years since Hedley Bull and Adam Watson’s seminal work The 
Expansion of International Society was first published. This influential volume argued that 
international society, spreading from the European centre, reached the whole globe.5 This 
work built on Bull’s The Anarchical Society and Martin Wight’s Systems of States. What Bull 
conceived of in The Anarchical Society as an intellectual construct helping understand 
international politics, the authors of The Expansion reified. The volume presented 
international society as a phenomenon existing out there in the world, with global reach and 
universal acceptance. Around this time a group of scholars interested in the history and 
‘workings’ of international society and postulating rationalism in the study of international 
relations became known by two names: the British institutionalists and the English School. 
The latter term, though less precise, gained greater popularity.6 The roots of IR’s concern 
with international society, however, go further back in history. It was even before the Second 
World War that Manning had suggested:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Expansion continues to be the focal point of IR debates, for instance at the 2014 Globalisation of 
International Society Research Workshop at the University of Queensland. The second edition of The Expansion 
was published in 2015. 
6 Several monographs were devoted to the English School: B. Buzan, From International to World Society? 
English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004; T. Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School, Basingstoke UK, New York: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998; A. Linklater and H. Suganami, The English School of International Relations : A 
Contemporary Reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. The name has been popularised 
by an article critical of the English School approach: R. E. Jones, "The English School of International 
Relations: A Case for Closure" Review of International Studies 7: 1, 1981, and other critical writings, e.g. S. 
Grader, “The English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation”, Review of International 
Studies, 14: 1, 1988, as well as by ardent supporters of the English School claims P. Wilson, “The English 
School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader”, Review of International Studies, 15: 1, 1989. 
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Probably we most of us have our personal mental pictures of an international society 
in enjoyment of more or less permanent peace7 
The context out of which international society arose as a framework for analysis was the 
drive to establish IR as a separate field of scholarly enquiry. C.A.W. Manning can be 
regarded as the first who pondered the concept within the framework of IR as an academic 
discipline.8 Manning, in the first half of the 20th century, thought of the society of states as 
the ontology of International Relations. He believed the international society was the 
idiosyncratic subject-matter, justifying the need to create a separate academic discipline 
dedicated to its study. Manning was particularly interested in the way states coexisted in the 
absence of an international system of government. He argued that the condition of possibility 
for such an arrangement was based on common assumptions shared by states as well as their 
constant effort to keep such organisation in place.9 But, according to Manning, international 
society was not something existing ‘out there’. It was an element of a prevalent assumption 
operating in international politics. It was only as a result of state leaders and diplomats acting 
on this assumption that inter-state relations could take on features that external observers 
recognised as ‘societal’. For Manning, who is now identified as an early constructivist, 
international society was a set of ideas to be found in the minds of statesmen.10 Hidemi 
Suganami sees Manning as ‘a Rationalist in Martin Wight’s sense, and early constructivist, 
who saw that the society of states as a social construct was subject to interpretation, 
reinterpretation, and reshaping’.11 
There are, however, several inconsistencies in the way Manning writes about 
international society. In a pioneering essay on the society of states, he suggested that 
international society could be studied just like a ‘tribe’ or any other society subject to 
anthropological analysis. IR, therefore, could become a study of the role ‘of sovereign state in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 C. A. W. Manning, Peaceful change: an international problem, London: Macmillan: 1937, 190. 
8 Deeper roots can be found in the history of international law, for a thorough exposition, see Keene, Beyond the 
anarchical society: Grotius, colonialism and order in world politics. 
9 Manning, The Nature of International Society; A. James, The bases of international order: essays in honour of 
C.A.W. Manning, London: Oxford University Press: 1973, vii. 
10 Proponents of constructivism in IR have been criticised for their unreferenced re-discovery of inputs made a 
decade earlier by the English School. For examples of this critique, see e.g.: H. Suganami, “C. A. W. Manning 
and the study of International Relations”, Review of International Studies, 27: 01, 2001: 5; A. Hurrell, 
“Evaluating the English School”, International Studies Review, 9: 4, 2007. In addition to Manning, other 
scholars associated with or claimed by the English School camp, such as E.H. Carr and Herbert Butterfield, 
referred to international society in a distinctly constructivist manner. For a broader elaboration of this argument, 
see: T. Dunne, Inventing international society: a history of the English school, Basingstoke UK, New York: 
Macmillan Press Ltd: 1998, 34. 
11 Suganami, “C. A. W. Manning and the study of International Relations”. 
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the life of international family’.12 Knowledge of the social universe of states could be 
obtained by means analogous to those used by Bronislaw Malinowski in his anthropological 
study.13 Despite arguing for international society as a notional entity, an assumption held by 
those who talked and acted in the name of states, Manning also assumed that engagement 
with international society can be localised.14 This is most probably related to his personal 
experience of observing the workings of the League of Nations in one particular location in 
Geneva.	  Scholars perpetuated the discrepancy Manning initiated. According to Barry Buzan, 
Manning perceived international society as existing in practice, as a condition of the real 
world. The role of research was to reconstruct and describe that practical arrangement.15 
Manning might have fallen into the trap anthropology as a discipline learned to avoid. 
Namely, the ‘naïve empiricism’ or ‘ethnographic realism’, which take the existence of a 
reality external to the observer and readily lending itself to be discovered as unproblematic.16 
Indeed, in one of the very first reviews of Manning’s book The Nature of International 
Society, he is accused of using a ‘phenomenological approach’, one he himself was critical 
of.17 Manning was not the only classical English School author who made references to 
anthropology. Bull, in his defence of international society, compared the study of the 
international realm to anthropological accounts of African political systems.18 To his credit, 
he also maintained that international society is just one representation. 
The direct implication of Manning’s thinking was that there may be just one (idea of) 
international society. Manning did not acknowledge that there may be different views on the 
international or diverging opinions as to how it should work. His empirical observation 
proved that statesmen shared one idea and acted upon it. What follows from Manning’s 
thought is that statesmen have similar if not identical ideas concerning inter-state relations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Manning’s writing is renowned for its overuse of metaphors and rather unclear writing style, T. E. Aalberts, 
“Playing the game of sovereign states: Charles Manning’s constructivism avant-la-lettre”, European Journal of 
International Relations, 16: 2, 2010. 
13 Manning, The Nature of International Society, 204-205. 
14 Manning, The Nature of International Society, 43.  
15 Buzan, From international to world society? English school theory and the social structure of globalisation, 
13. 
16 K.H. Kohl, “Introduction”, in The end of anthropology?, ed. H. Jebens and K.H. Kohl (Wantage: Sean 
Kingston, 2011), 5; Robben, “Reflexive ethnography”, 446. 
17 C. A. McClelland, “The Nature of International Society”, American Political Science Review, 56: 4, 1962: 
984. 
18 H. Bull, “Society and anarchy in international relations”, in Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of 
international politics, ed. H. Butterfield and M. Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 44. The argument that 
international society can be observed empirically has been recently reinvigorated. Navari, Theorising 
international society: English school methods; P. Wilson, “The English School Meets the Chicago School: The 
Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions1”, International Studies Review, 14: 4, 2012. 
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International society was an official assumption in the light of which the game of states was 
being played. It was also a utilitarian structure and as such acquired positive connotations. It 
was presented as allowing for the preservation of the precarious orderliness of interstate 
relations in the world under anarchy. 
‘What	  is	  international	  society?’	  
The foundations laid by Manning animated subsequent English School debates. Among 
the problems that concerned early disciples of the English School were the components of 
international society and when international society could be said to have come into 
existence.19 These are closely linked to the oft quoted focus of inquiry by Martin Wight:  
The first question to be considered was, «What is international society?» There is 
another … «How far does international society, supposing there be one, extend?»20  
The problem with such framing of the debate is that it was almost mechanically 
conducive to reification. The question was no longer framed in constructivist terms, it was no 
longer about assumptions. Instead of asking when such assumptions coalesced or when they 
became dominant, the English School started asking when a society began and where, 
geographically, it ends. The way these two questions were posed implied the acceptance of 
international society as a tangible phenomenon. Wight himself, in one version of the answer, 
suggested that international society was a ‘political and social fact, attested to by the 
diplomatic system, diplomatic society, the acceptance of international law and writings of 
international lawyers’.21 Wight was another scholar torn between the anthropological study of 
international society and the treatment of it as an idea. He developed an argument that the 
international system is inherently ambiguous and we need metaphors that capture that 
ambiguity.22 But geography and spatial representation of international society was present in 
Wight’s writing. After the Hague conference in 1907, he claimed, Western international 
society covered a greater part of the world and after 1945 he saw world politics as divided 
into two international societies, the West European and the communist one: ‘their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 M. Wight, Systems of states, Leicester: Leicester University Press: 1977, 110. 
20 M. Wight, G. Wight, and B. Porter, International theory: the three traditions, Leicester: Leicester University 
Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs: 1991, 49.  
21 Wight, Wight, and Porter, International theory: the three traditions, 30. 
22 M. Wight, “The Balance of Power”, in Diplomatic investigations : essays in the theory of international 
politics, ed. H. Butterfield and M. Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 149-151. 
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overlapping, as for example in the United Nations, being less important than their mutual 
exclusiveness, as in the non-recognition of Red China’.23 
In the preface to the first volume produced by the English School, Diplomatic 
Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, Martin Wight and Herbert 
Butterfield claim: ‘The frame of reference [for the present collection of essays] has been 
diplomatic community itself, international society (…) nature and distinguishing marks of the 
diplomatic community, the way it functions, the obligations of its members’. The approach 
the authors took in the volume was ‘empirical and inductive’ and the stated aim of the 
publication was to ‘clarify the principles of prudence and moral obligation which have held 
together the international society of states throughout its history, and still hold it together’.24 
What is implicit in such a description is that international society may be considered in terms 
of membership, boundaries and criteria for admission.25 As a result the focus turned to 
geography and spatiality, and the distance between assumptions and reality narrowed. 
Hedley Bull gave the most comprehensive answer to Wight’s question: what is 
international society. Bull outlined the concept in his seminal work The Anarchical Society 
(1977). The book quickly emerged as a canonical work in the field of IR, welcomed as a 
commendable attempt at theorising IR beyond the realist-idealist opposition.26 Bull was the 
figure who started broadening the classical minimalist conception of international society, 
unsuitable, in his view, to account for new developments in international politics.	   The 
classical minimalist conception of international society, ascribed to Manning and James, 
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24 H. Butterfield and M. Wight, “Preface. Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international 
politics”, in Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics, ed. H. Butterfield and M. 
Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 12. 
25 Marin Wight’s scholarship was far from uniform in its treatment of international society. On the one hand 
reification was evident, e.g. when he referred to post-independence 19th century North and South Americas as 
international society’s ‘peripheral members’ Wight, Systems of states, 117. On the other, Bull in the introductory 
essay to International theory: the three traditions emphasised that Wight distanced himself from behaviourists 
in that he sought to engage with moral questions and rather than arrive at certainty, what he aimed for was ‘an 
account of the debate among contending theories and doctrines, of which no resolution could be expected’ H. 
Bull, “Martin Wight and the theory of international relations”, in International theory: the three traditions, ed. 
M. Wight, G. Wight, and B. Porter (Leicester: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1991). Bull, admitting his unrelenting admiration for Wight’s scholarship, pointed towards several 
deficiencies. Wight’s work, which ‘saw modern international society as the product of Western culture’, was 
vulnerable to the charge of Eurocentrism. Bull, “Martin Wight and the theory of international relations”, xxii-
xxiii. 
26 That states, through their interactions, reflexively formed a society was a major topic undertaken also by 
Manning The Nature of International Society and A. Watson The evolution of international society: a 
comparative historical analysis, Abingdon: Routledge: 1992, but the clear distinction between international 




encompassed sovereign states, international law and diplomacy.27 The very existence of 
international law was deemed sufficient to conceive of relations between states as forming a 
society.28 In Bull’s words, international society was more complex. It was said to exist ‘when 
a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society 
in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’.29  
Bull, in his early work, constructed international society as an analytical framework and 
just one of several possible interpretations of the international.30 Following Martin Wight’s 
distinction of three traditions of thought (realist, universalist/revolutionary and 
rational/internationalist), Bull equated the latter with viewing ‘international politics as taking 
place within an international society’.31 For Bull, however, and especially if one takes into 
consideration his work in general rather than his early publications, the relationship between 
international society and reality or international politics as it existed out there, was more 
complex. In a probably impossible attempt to bridge the description of international political 
reality with delineating its desired moral course, Bull regarded international society as a way 
‘through which such order as exists in world politics is now maintained’.32 For Bull ‘the 
element of society has always been present […] in the modern international system’.33 This is 
where order, rather than an ethical presupposition, takes the form of a positivist description, it 
is an answer to a ‘what is’ type of a question. Order acquired an ethical dimension when Bull 
suggested it was ‘an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or 
values’.34 
In The Expansion of International Society the tense relationship between ethics and the 
description of the world becomes muted. Not only did Bull move away from the ‘what is’ 
question, he started explaining how the society of states came into being and expanded into a 
global one. This is probably why The Expansion should be regarded as a crucial step in the 
process of international society reification. What Bull initially outlined in 1977 as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Manning, The Nature of International Society; A. James, “International society”. 
28 James, The bases of international order: essays in honour of C.A.W. Manning. 
29 Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics, 13. This definition, though widely used, has 
also been criticized predominantly for the lack of precision, especially if it were to form the basis of a 
theoretical approach to the study of international relations. For an elaboration of this argument and the 
presentation of its proponents see: A. Linklater and H. Suganami, The English school of international relations: 
a contemporary reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2006, 81. 
30 Bull, “Society and anarchy in international relations”. 
31 Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics, 23. 
32 Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics, xxxii. 
33 Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics, 38-49. 
34 Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics, 4. 
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framework, a way of looking at and evaluating the world, became equated with empirical 
reality when Bull and Watson asked: 
Has the geographical expansion of international society led to a contraction of the 
consensus about common interests, rules, and institutions, on which international 
society properly so called, as distinct from a mere international system, must rest? Or 
can we say that the framework of the old European society of states has been 
modified, adapted, and developed in such a way that a genuinely universal and non-
hegemonial structure of rules and institutions has taken root?35  
The work describes the creation of European international society and its encounters 
with the outside world, including Russia, India and Africa. It proceeds with the account of the 
broadening of membership, as a result of non-European states joining international society, 
among which are the Ottoman empire, China and Japan. Finally, authors present the 
evolution of European-turned-global international society into a global one, with key 
contributions by Bull on the Third World’s revolt against the West and Vincent on racial 
equality.36 
The character of the interaction between European society and non-European societies 
remained disputed. Two models were proposed. According to the first, international society 
emerged in Europe and came to dominate on the global scale, superseding other regional 
societies mainly because of its military supremacy.37 This narrative has been strengthened by 
works of Gong and Watson.38 The competing approach stressed the relative 
underdevelopment of European international society at the beginning of its global expansion 
and the resulting evolution of European international society under the influence of 
encounters with non-European societies.39 Little argued for a more nuanced reading of the 
Expansion, stressing that particular contributions acknowledged the role of interactions 
between Europe and other parts of the world.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 H. Bull and A. Watson, eds., The Expansion of international society, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 8. 
36 H. Bull, “The Revolt Against the West”, in The Expansion of international society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).; R. J. Vincent, “Racial Equality”, in The Expansion of international society, ed. H. 
Bull and A. Watson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). 
37 Bull, “The emergence of a universal international society”; A. Watson, “European International Society and 
its Expansion”, in The Expansion of international society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1984). 
38 G. Gong, The standard of "civilization" in international society, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1984; Watson, The 
evolution of international society: a comparative historical analysis. 
39 B. Buzan and R. Little, "The Historical Expansion of International Society", unpublished paper (2008). 
40 R. Little, “Reassessing the Expansion of the International Society”, E-International Relations, ( last accessed 
2 May 2013), http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/02/reassessing-the-expansion-of-the-international-society/.  
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The expansion of international society was supposed to have come to a close in the 
second half of the twentieth century, culminating in a global structure of nearly two hundred 
states. The expansion was understood in terms of the spread of rules and institutions, 
especially that of international law, seen as the crucial element of the social interactions 
between sovereign states.41 Thus institutions of international society were considered 
functional, pragmatic and necessary for the coexistence of political communities. It was, 
according to Manning, ‘pragmatic inevitability’ for states to accept positive international law 
originating in the West. The English School saw this expansion as a historical process. Not 
only was it a success story but also a rational way of conducting international relations.42 
The Expansion discussed whether international society can embrace multicultural 
membership. It referred to one of the key questions posed by Wight about cultural 
homogeneity: how far is this a necessary condition for the effective functioning of states-
system and, by implication, what are the prospects for the institutions of contemporary 
international society, which have their origins in European civilization and now encompass 
the world and a variety of cultures. The answer provided by Bull and Watson suggested that 
new ‘entrants’ to international society sought to reshape existing rules in order to reduce 
discrimination but, overall, they did accept the existing institutional framework, finding it 
helpful also in arranging relations between them. They were deemed to have accepted the 
culture of modernity upon which international legal, diplomatic and administrative 
institutions rested.43 
Bull confirmed the ontological status of international society several years later: 
…states, although not subject to a common superior, nevertheless formed a society – a 
society that was no fiction, and whose workings could be observed in institutions such 
as diplomacy, international law, the balance of power and the concert of great 
powers.44 
The society was no fiction because states acted on the assumption that such a society 
existed. The idea could not be judged as either true or false but it was nevertheless action-
guiding and meaning-conferring. But society of states as just an assumption acquires 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics, 123, 136; Bull and Watson, eds., The 
Expansion of international society. 
42 H. Suganami, “The English school, history, and theory”, Ritsumeikan International Affairs: 9, 2011. 
43 Bull and Watson, eds., The Expansion of international society, 430-435. 
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materiality if one starts, as Bull did, discussing its expansion and embarks on mapping this 
expansion onto the world in a historicised manner.  
The history of IR as a discipline has a bearing on the evolution of this debate. It is thus 
important to situate this process of reification in a broader context. Work on international 
society was conducted at an important juncture for IR as an academic pursuit, when IR 
scholars felt the need to assert their work as a legitimate field of enquiry.45 Once this had 
been achieved, there emerged a need to distinguish the British from the American perspective 
on the study of IR. Long before Stanley Hoffmann noted that IR was an American social 
science,46 the English School was keen to distinguish itself from American IR: ‘The British 
have probably been more concerned with the historical than the contemporary, with the 
normative than the scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological, with the 
principles than policy’.47 The common narrative of international society facilitated the desired 
distinction from work stemming from the US and granted recognition in the academic 
community. 
Solidarism	  and	  ‘agential’	  international	  society	  
It may be argued that the English School developed in the international political context 
not exactly suited to its own claims. Most writing was produced under conditions of the Cold 
War rivalry between two superpowers. But it was only the post-Cold War liberal optimism 
and the supposed triumph of democracy that re-invigorated the international society debate. 
The fall of communism convinced politicians (in particular the Bush and Clinton 
administrations and Tony Blair’s government) and scholars (Francis Fukuyama and his 
influential The end of history) of the victory of the Western model of politics and economy. It 
was expected that liberal values would acquire wide-spread acceptance and that intervention 
aimed at peace-building and human rights protection would not only bring results but would 
raise no objections.48 This was a fertile ground for the English School analysis, which in that 
period engaged in endowing the already reified international society with agency.  
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At this point it is important to introduce the distinction between pluralist and solidarist 
views on international society, originally proposed by Hedley Bull.49 Bull defined solidarist 
international society as one that exhibits enough solidarity to enable ‘collective enforcement 
of international rules and the guardianship of human rights’.50 Pluralism, in contrast, was to 
denote diversity as the fundamental feature of international society. In Bull’s writing, 
pluralism and solidarism were conceptualized as alternatives. The pluralist view of 
international society was based on the concept of coexistence and appreciation of difference. 
Solidarism was centred on the possibilities for progress, the existence of a superior human 
value that should be promoted and protected. The proposition that states have duties to 
humanity is the natural development stemming from this strand of thinking.51 However, for 
Bull and his followers, even the pluralist view of international society implies a goal-oriented 
structure, aimed at securing order. Hurrell, for instance, explains pluralist or thin society as 
one in which there are three fundamental goals: ‘the preservation of the society of states 
itself, the maintenance of the independence of individual states, and the regulation – but not 
elimination – of war and violence amongst states and societies’.52 Pluralism appears to 
acknowledge diversity, but within international society. 
Both the minimalist definition of international society, presenting it as composed of 
sovereign states, international law and diplomacy, and the more elaborate and complex one 
proposed by Bull, turned out to be insufficient to account for processes such as the promotion 
of human rights and democracy worldwide. In order to make sense of these developments, 
Tony Knudsen argued that the society of states was moving towards a solidarist dimension, 
and came up with indicators conforming this thesis: the concept of human security, the idea 
of responsibility to protect, the renewed notion of just war, as well as the creation of legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Bull, “The Grotian conception of international society”. 
50 Bull’s approach strengthened the impression that pluralism and solidarism are mutually exclusive and 
international society may represent one type only at any given time. Bull’s own position with regard to 
international society as pluralist or solidarist has not been constant. Bull’s pluralism has been much more 
prominent in his earlier work. It was in his later interventions that he leaned towards solidarism. His ambiguous 
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Journal of International Studies, 40: 1, 2011. 
52 Hurrell, On global order: power, values, and the constitution of international society, 3. 
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bodies and institutions empowered to prosecute and protect individuals, e.g. the International 
Criminal Court or the European Court for Human Rights.53 It was claimed that the newly 
achieved Western domination was coupled with greater normative ambitions as well as with 
the attempts to impose the solidarist agenda on other states.54 Nicholas Wheeler termed the 
period the ‘solidarist moment’.55 For Wheeler the practice of humanitarian intervention 
represented a ‘new solidarism in the society of states’.56 The aim for international politics 
was now explained as reaching beyond the classical international society goal of the 
preservation of order.57 As a consequence, what was initially reified, i.e. treated as a thing 
existing in space and time, now acquired agency. International society was now to ‘save 
strangers’ and empower states.58 
Endowing international society with agency became common in many English School 
writings but it remains deeply problematic and rarely has been subject to a thorough 
exposition. Incoherence persists with regard to the agent behind that motion, desire and 
ability on part of the society of states. Even though international society is on numerous 
occasions called to action or assigned responsibility, the English School remained undecided 
on how to approach the agency conundrum.59 Ascribing agency to states has been a common 
practice; Bull saw states as ‘providers of world order’ and as the carriers of ‘political 
functions of international society’.60 Other prominent English School authors conferred 
agency in governments, statespersons or diplomats acting in the name of states.61  
Chris Brown’s work is pioneering in its attempt to describe agency with regard to 
international society as a whole. Brown linked agency with purpose and suggested that the 
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2005: 21. 
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society of states, being a practical as opposed to purposive association, could have no 
objectives other than to facilitate coexistence of its members.62 This would suggest it was 
impossible to endow international society with agency but Brown noted an important change 
occurring with regard to the goals structure. The development of the human rights regime and 
the ascendance of solidarism, he noted, informs and modifies the goals framework of 
international society.63 
Other scholars went further as they attached agency and responsibility to what came to 
be termed solidarist or liberal international society.64 Solidarist society acting in defence of 
human rights could, under certain conditions, undertake legitimate humanitarian intervention. 
The research question guiding Wheeler’s analysis asked: ‘how far the society of states has 
developed a new collective capacity for enforcing minimum standards of humanity’.65 The 
query is premised on the assumption that international society has a collective capacity to act, 
to establish and follow a moral judgement regarding the standards of humanity. 
An answer to any question of political theory involves value judgements. These are 
rarely answers describing what is but far more often answers in terms of what ought to be.66 
As a consequence answers to these questions are never objective and inevitably tainted by 
political ideology, understood as a fairly coherent value system. Answering the questions that 
international society scholars have been concerned with is impossible without some sort of 
reification. Although reification is a perennial, and most possibly unavoidable problem in all 
social sciences, it has profound consequences for the study of IR.  
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For instance, in case of Wheeler’s Saving Strangers, the way the question was asked 
presupposed the answers. There were strangers to be saved in the first place and there was 
international society with an obligation to come to their rescue. The ‘solidarist theory of 
humanitarian intervention’, which Wheeler devised as a framework for deciding what should 
count as a legitimate humanitarian intervention, required idiosyncratic presuppositions: the 
liberal notion of individual freedom and the Enlightenment vision of the need and possibility 
of undertaking collective action.   This society, we read, has the ‘prevailing morality’ and the 
capacity for setting boundaries of acceptable conduct.67 What is implicit in this analysis is 
that international society as an agent becomes equated with the West. Notwithstanding the 
selection of cases, among which there are interventions led by non-Western states (all of 
which took place during the Cold War), Wheeler’s argument is always about how such 
interventions should be endorsed by international society, i.e. the West: ‘the society of states 
should have welcomed India’s, Vietnam’s, and Tanzania’s acts of rescue’.68 Wheeler not only 
recognised the ‘voice of solidarism’ in diplomatic exchanges and ‘solidarity exhibited by the 
society of states’ but openly advocated a ‘solidarist project’, claiming that there is a 
possibility to reconcile order and justice especially with regard to the enforcement of human 
rights.69 The deeply contentious aspect of this analysis is that international society is, on the 
one hand, the analytical framework and, on the other, becomes the agent. 
What distinguishes Saving Strangers is the extensive conversation with realism presented 
in parallel to the development of the book’s argument. Wheeler’s implicit objective has been 
the refutation of realist claims in IR theory. The book discusses two building blocks of 
realism – the primacy of power politics and the state-centric nature of politics. While realism 
regards humanitarian intervention as contingent upon powerful states’ parochial interests, the 
solidarism advocated by Wheeler underlines a moral obligation to intervene regardless of 
these interests and in accordance with cosmopolitan ethics transcending loyalty located in the 
state.70 What becomes evident is that not only the question Wheeler explicitly identified as 
guiding his research but also the agenda of countering realism determined to a significant 
extent the argument pursued in his study. It serves as yet another illustration of how the 
development of a discipline interacts with its knowledge claims. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society, 10-12. 
68 Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society, 139. 
69 Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society, 285. 
70 Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society, 27-30, 290. 
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Hurrell noticed that solidarist international society depended on and reinforced the power 
of dominant states. He equated a states-based political order with international society and 
aimed to analyse the ‘character’ of that society.71 He also recognized the indispensable role of 
solidarism in meeting the challenges faced by international society. Despite the fact that 
international society is not seen by Hurrell as a natural feature but as a social construct based 
on shared ideas, embedded in historical practices, he does conceive international society as a 
‘polity’,72 analysing its changing structure, membership and the introduction of insider-
outsider categories.73  
Wheeler and Hurrell’s arguments share two important underlying presumptions: not only 
is it possible to think of international politics in terms of solidarist international society, but 
that society has moral purposes, which it should strive to fulfil.74 These presumptions make 
the reification of international society difficult if not impossible to avoid. If the starting point 
of a research agenda is the assumption that ‘something has to be done’, there inevitably arises 
a need for an agent. The merger of the analytical starting point with an agency-bearing entity 
is deeply problematic and remains unresolved in both authors’ writing. 
Ian Clark implicitly ascribed agency to international society, pointing out that 
international society pursues different types of purposes, from coexistence to cooperation, 
depending on the extent of shared values among states.75 In his most recent intervention, 
Clark asked: ‘When international society acts, who is it that acts in its name?’. The answer he 
provided in the ensuing discussion was not conclusive. Importantly, however, Clark explicitly 
embraced international society as a ‘powerful agent’.76 
The reification problem has several implications. Firstly, it gives shape to a particular 
view of the world; it grounds certain assumptions about the nature of international politics. 
Secondly, international society became reified as a ‘holistic concept’, meaning one that 
pretends to represent the whole of international politics. Such a representation was aided by 
the illusion of equality between states. There has been insufficient acknowledgement on the 
part of the English School that what is meant when agential international society is invoked is 
usually simply the West. More recent scholarship drew attention to the exclusivity of agency. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Hurrell, On global order: power, values, and the constitution of international society, 4-6. 
72 Hurrell, On global order: power, values, and the constitution of international society, 17-20. 
73 Hurrell, On global order: power, values, and the constitution of international society, 41, 287. 
74 Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society; Hurrell, On global order: 
power, values, and the constitution of international society. 
75 I. Clark, Legitimacy in international society, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press: 2005, 23. 
76 I. Clark, The vulnerable in international society, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2013, 14. 
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Reus-Smit and Buzan saw liberal-constitutionalist states as constructing international 
society’s core and thus its ‘principal agents’.77 The present-day global international society is 
presented as global but the community of liberal-constitutionalist states remains at its core. It 
has prevailed as the winning coalition following last century's major conflicts, most recently 
the Cold War. The core states have been principal agents in the production and reproduction 
of the practices underpinning international society, the ‘vanguard group’ able to shape 
international society values.78 
A number of works are less explicit in the reification of international society. Robert 
Jackson has been very consistent in presenting international society in normative terms: 
‘Modern international society is basically a normative framework by reference to which 
foreign policy, diplomacy, the threat or use of armed force, and other international activities 
are to be judged’.79 But such accounts are not unproblematic. They usually portray 
international society as a moral success contributing to interstate order: ‘the enormous moral 
achievement that is represented by the building of a global international society based on 
state sovereignty’.80 Also in this case international society ceases to be an interpretation and 
becomes a tangible fact, lending itself to be ethically evaluated. It is no longer just an 
assumption in the minds of statesmen. 
In conjuncture with the process of reification, international society has been not only 
validated but praised. Academic literature has usually presented it in positive light, as 
bringing order (Bull) or as acting for the benefit of common humanity (Wheeler). Wheeler 
described it even as a ‘guardian angel’.81 The English School discourse is filled with 
appreciative adjectives, such as common, nouns such as order, commitment, values, and 
consensus: ‘International society is generally understood as the consensus which binds states 
together through a common commitment to certain minimum values such as sovereign 
independence and respect for international law’82; ‘international society refers to the 
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institutions”, International Organization, 51: 4, 1997: 584-585; Buzan, From international to world society? 
English school theory and the social structure of globalisation. 
78 Buzan, From international to world society? English school theory and the social structure of globalisation, 
223. 
79 Jackson, The global covenant: human conduct in a world of states, 31. 
80 Jackson, The global covenant: human conduct in a world of states, 37. 
81 Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society, x. 
82 R. Fawn and J. Mayall, “Recognition, self-determination and secession in post-Cold War international 
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interstate order in which the members recognize each other, share common interests, and 
agree to be bound by certain minimal rules of coexistence’.83  
Further	  steps	  in	  reification:	  theorizing,	  mapping	  and	  
teaching	  
Even critical engagements with international society tend to reinforce rather than 
question the reified framework. Despite the fact that historical inaccuracies were identified in 
a ‘Eurocentric grand narrative’, authors who argue that up to the 19th century the 
development of norms and rules was the result of two-way interactions between Europe and 
other regions, do not question international society per se but only the narrative of its 
emergence. Scholars choosing to examine international society and its membership 
requirements from the point of view of the non-Western world are right in castigating the 
overreliance on the West European example and in exposing the superficiality of order built 
on the supposedly shared foundations of international society.84 The English School was 
criticised for the neglect of coercive aspects of international society’s expansion and for 
presenting the expansion as a progressive and positive process.85 The inequality theme found 
its reflection in the debate about the standard of civilisation.86 The narrative that developed 
around the standard of civilization emphasized that Western states, in their encounters with 
non-Western societies before the early twentieth century, considered themselves to be the 
representatives of genuine (read ‘better’) civilisation. This belief justified the expansion of 
their own social, political, legal and cultural norms and practices beyond Western Europe.87  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 T. Dunne, “Good citizen Europe”, International Affairs, 84: 1, 2008: 15. 
84 The modern world’s history, Keene argued, was divided into two different patterns of international political 
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While European order was tolerant with regard to ethnic, cultural and political difference, the ‘extra-European’ 
one was preoccupied with the civilizing mission – inward world of promoting toleration and outward of 
promoting civilization. Keene, Beyond the anarchical society: Grotius, colonialism and order in world politics, 
41.  
85 Suzuki, Civilization and empire: China and Japan's encounter with European international society. 
86 G. W. Gong, The Standard Of "Civilization" In International Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.  
87 For more recent engagement and contemporary interpretations of the standard of civilisation, see:  Keene, 
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Civilization," in Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of 'Civilisations' in International 
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The challenge to the orthodox view posed by these works was not thorough-going. They 
did not question international society per se, taking issue solely with elements favourable to 
states that might otherwise be termed imperialist. The insistence on the ‘dualistic nature of 
order’ does not dismiss the idea of order nor does it problematize this order’s existence. That 
some sort of international society, however unequal, existed, was not the key point of 
contention. Nor was the historicised narrative of its emergence. The expansion of 
international society continued to be the overarching frame even if the focus was on the 
attitudes of Western states towards the ‘encountered’ political orders.88 
Against the backdrop of growing criticisms and accusations of Eurocentrism, Barry 
Buzan advocated a more ‘scientific’ approach to international society and pledged to offer a 
thorough structural reconceptualization of the classical premises of the English School. He 
promised to add more precision to the study of international society by refining its key 
concepts. The English School scholarship was now to be a systematically organised field of 
study. He perceived international system, international society and world society as analytical 
concepts revealing the material and social structures of the international. In order to introduce 
the coherence deemed necessary to build a clear theoretical framework, Buzan proposed to 
understand relations between individuals as first-order society and those between collectives, 
such as states, as second order societies. The picture was supplemented by primary and 
secondary institutions of international society.89 This theoretical contribution was to allow for 
considering international order globally with a simultaneous appreciation of the regional 
perspective. 
Buzan’s chief objective was to position the English School as a self-standing approach 
within IR. Among the unintended consequence has been the neutralization of international 
society. The society of states becomes a theoretical framework, a neutral tool that facilitates 
the exploration and understanding of the international realm. In Theorising International 
Society authors, following in Buzan’s footsteps, reinforce international society as a 
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“Introduction: international society and the English school”, in International society and its critics, ed. A.J. 
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89 Buzan, From international to world society? English school theory and the social structure of globalisation, 
14; B. Buzan, “The Middle East through English school theory”, in International society and the Middle East: 
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theoretical framework.90 One contribution to this edited volume stands out for its 
acknowledgement of the role of viewpoints. It approaches international society as an ideal 
type and argues that ‘any ideal type is, in effect, an interpretation of the social world in terms 
of a particular set of cultural values’ and ‘is always constructed from a particular point of 
view’.91  
A move parallel to proposing international society as a theory of IR was to map this 
theory globally and onto regional developments. Together with the greater regional 
integration observed in practice, the need arose to account for the regional dynamics at play 
in global international society.92 This scholarship claims that elements of international 
society at the global level are to be found at the sub-global scale and that some societal 
aspects may be more pronounced regionally than globally. Certain regional states’ groupings 
may represent ‘greater normative content’ or increased consciousness of common interests 
and values and, thus, a propensity for the joint formulation of specific common rules and 
institutions.93  
While the discussion of regions in terms of international societies is in many respects 
illuminating, it has important limitations. The two key analyses exploring the Buzanian 
version of the English School in a regional context focused on the Middle East and 
Scandinavia. In spite of the close application of Buzan’s theoretical approach, the results of 
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these studies were inconclusive.94 More importantly, the unintended consequence has been 
that international society became closely linked with geography. It was turned into a structure 
that can be mapped onto the ground. These steps consolidated the recognition of international 
society universality and reinforced the mistaken perception of the absence of its ideological 
underpinnings. 
Presenting international society as a theory and ‘applying’ it in global and regional 
analyses have not been the only moves contributing to naturalisation and reification of 
international society. The teaching practice has not been spared the reified presentation of 
international society. Textbooks are a source of primary data in sociology of knowledge and 
worth paying attention to for their educational and repository function. They are generally 
held to be authoritative. They delineate what is worth knowing and work as guidebooks for 
students and examiners. The way international society is represented in textbooks is thus 
worth looking into. Despite the well-argued charge of generalisation waged against Bull’s 
The Anarchical society95, several IR textbooks continue approaching international society as 
an unquestioned being, part of international reality existing out there.96 The Oxford 
University Press textbook The globalization of international politics: an introduction to 
international relations by John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens is one prominent 
example. The handbook is recommended as ‘the leading introduction to international 
relations’ and its two latest editions (4th and 5th) both dedicate separate chapters to the 
emergence and the globalization of international society.97 The chapter entitled “The 
evolution of international society” presents international society as ‘composed of 
interconnected but independent sovereign states’ and concludes that ‘the collapse of the 
Soviet Union from 1989 completed the globalization of international society’.98 Such framing 
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Press: 2010, 45. 
98	  Even though the author mentions that international society as a term came to be applied to a particular 
historical narrative, this relativizing is not thorough as he concludes that international society ‘has been present 
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reifies international society into a spatial being, an entity that can be located on a map. 
Through such geographical framing, international society acquires materiality. The placing of 
the discussion is part of the textbook entitled Historical context additionally legitimizes the 
view of international society as a material entity evolving through history.  
Another Oxford University Press textbook, Introduction to International Relations: 
theories and approaches, makes a reference to Bull and Watson’s The Expansion of 
international society but considers the history of international politics in terms of the 
globalisation of the state system rather than globalisation of international society. Authors 
state very clearly that international society is a ‘tradition in IR’, which emphasises the 
importance of international relations based on rules and norms of international law, 
international organisations and diplomatic activity. There are, however, several instances 
when international society becomes reified and universalised quite apart from the 
representation of it as just one among many theoretical approaches. The discussion about two 
elements of juridical statehood – constitutional independence and recognition – attests that 
both are needed to ‘pave the way for membership in International Society’. Reified 
international society becomes indispensable in the debate of international responsibility, 
when statespeople are said to have responsibility to international society and its members.99  
The	  right	  kind	  of	  state	  member	  
Speaking about international society in terms of its agential powers and goals it was 
supposed to achieve, was paralleled by the greater recognition of a particular type of state and 
its role in the society of states.  
Sovereign statehood has always been present in the conception of international society 
but with the reification of ‘solidarist international society’ came greater recognition of a 
particular standard and greater emphasis on state’s roles in the society of states. How a state 
was governed inside – which generally was not an issue for early English School theorists, 
content with legal recognition of external attributes of stateness granted by international law 
– came to be exceedingly relevant to the conception of international society. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in different forms throughout world history’, see: D. Armstrong, “The evolution of international society” In The 
globalization of world politics…, p. 37. 
99 R. Jackson and G. Sørensen, Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches, Third ed., 
Oxford University Press: 2007, 19, 26, 147.  
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Despite the broad agreement among the classical English School scholars that the state is 
the foundation on which international society rests, reflections on the concept of the state 
were not particularly sophisticated in the early English School writings.100 The focus on 
interstate relations led classical authors – Manning, Wight and Bull – to leave the question of 
what constitutes a state aside. Classical international society scholars refrained from 
problematizing ‘the state’, perhaps purposefully – in their endeavour to have ‘a field of their 
own’ and distinguish themselves from political scientists.101 Manning did not delve into any 
details when he suggested that the state is composed of the machinery of government, 
citizenry and territory.102 For him it was sufficient to argue that ‘the “person” of international 
society is typically a sovereign state, and this by the nature of its constitution’.103 Wight did 
ask about the ‘kinds of members’ of international society and proposed distinguishing ‘the 
structure of the state (e.g. city-state, feudal kingdom, nation-state, federation) from the 
structure of government (e.g. democracy, dictatorship)’.104 A certain degree of disregard for 
the internal arrangements of state was perpetuated by James’ theory of state sovereignty 
based solely on states’ legal claim to constitutional independence.105 
A significant development has been Wight’s claim that international society made the 
legitimacy of a particular form of government a matter of importance for the entire 
international community. This characteristic was said to distinguish the present day 
international society from its predecessors.106 Subsequent authors paid more attention to 
states’ specificities. The Expansion’s authors pondered the adequacy of the term state to 
denote the political reality of the post-colonial entities which did not accept certain European 
norms, especially that of constitutional law: ‘…one may also doubt whether (...) the state is 
still a shared experience or reference and whether we can count on the existence of an 
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organically unified system of states’.107 Despite their declared adherence to the value of 
pluralism, contributors to The Expansion came to regard only a particular type of state as 
desired and, consequently, as the inevitable outcome of international society’s spatial 
expansion. Unless a political entity was organised according to a specific model, it could not 
take part – let alone play a role – in international society. Watson illustrated this with the 
example of Russia: 
The gradual Westernization of Russia … and the establishment by Peter the Great of 
an effective Westernized state gave Russia in the 18th and 19th century ... the desire 
and the ability to play a major part both in the management of European international 
society and the expansion of European government and technology to Asia108 
It was relatively unproblematic to argue that in Western Europe, as a result of historical 
events, states evolved from units predicated on monarchical patriarchy towards entities 
expressing and furthering interests of their citizens.109 That such ‘moral purpose of the state’ 
was a universal one was, however, far less clear. What aided the process of naturalizing this 
conception was presenting the international in terms of the society of states. International 
society framework required a particular kind of state. The argument about international 
society expansion and its global reach was followed by the debate about ‘rightful 
membership’,110 ‘what constitutes a legitimate state?’111 and states that may not ‘fit’.112  
Robert Jackson famously classified states not matching international society as ‘quasi-
states’.113 His aim was to describe those states that, although admitted into international 
society, were unable to govern themselves or lacked ‘positive sovereignty’ understood as the 
ability to satisfy the needs of their populations. Following decolonization, according to the 
narrative advanced by Jackson, ex-colonial states entered the ‘game’ even though they had 
neither been ‘empowered domestically’ nor possessed ‘institutional features of sovereign 
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states’. Jackson’s work galvanized the idea that a state in international society cannot be any 
kind of state. Quasi-states needed to ‘grow up’ and take up responsibilities of what the author 
presented as regular members.  
Reus-Smit, for whom the starting point of the analysis was ‘modern international 
society’ built on the pillars of contractual international law and multilateralism, argued that 
international society’s intersubjective values have a bearing on a state’s identity and provide 
the rules of rightful state action.114 Reus-Smit was explicit in how the international informs 
the particular at the state level: 
Societies of states, I have argued, are ordered by constitutional structures. These 
complexes of metavalues define the social identity of the state, and the broad 
parameters of legitimate state action’115 and ‘I have argued that international 
institutional action is shaped by deep constitutive values. Societies of states are 
communities of mutual recognition; they are bound together by intersubjective 
meanings that define what constitutes a legitimate state and what counts as 
appropriate state conduct.116 
Clark developed these arguments further arguing that legitimacy, which he regarded as 
crucial for the conceptualization of international society, was composed of rightful 
membership and rightful conduct:  
The core principles of legitimacy express rudimentary social agreement about who is 
entitled to participate in international relations, and also about appropriate forms in 
their conduct (…) This represents the very essence of what is meant by an 
international society: legitimacy thus denotes the existence of international society.117  
The historical analysis of international society undertaken by Clark was organised 
according to the following narrative. In the eighteenth century, international society members 
were designated on the basis of legitimate succession. In the post-World War I period, the 
recognition of minority rights was a membership criterion for states of South and Eastern 
Europe. In the post-Cold War era, the extent to which international society shaped standards 
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regarding internal arrangements of the state, in Clark’s denomination the principles of 
rightful membership, broadened and the processes accelerated.118 Since the 1990s, a liberal 
democracy, characterised by adherence to human rights and good governance principles, 
constituted a legitimate state.119 The framing of international society-state nexus becomes 
explicit in the following paragraph:  
It is not peoples alone who enjoy their separate national rights to democratic 
governance but international society itself claims a collective right to ensure such 
national democracy, by dint of its entitlement to enjoy international peace.120  
Clark intended to distance himself from this vision, which was presented as an account 
of what proceeds in the international realm. He was also cautious in casting judgements on 
these developments. We may infer his critical assessment from comparisons he made 
between contemporary membership criteria and the expectation for states to live up to 
acceptable international standards to the old European standard of civilization.121 The very 
fact, however, that Clark decided to portray international politics as international society and 
decided to choose membership and conduct as defining features, perpetuated the claim that 
only one type of a state fits international society. As Clark describes: 
Many of the key issues that have exercised policymakers since 1990 – such as 
humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion, the development/security interface, 
post-conflict reconstruction, the identification and treatment of rogue states, and 
regime change – are all at base symptomatic of the paradigm shift currently being 
experienced in international society’s conception of rightful membership. To the 
extent that international society has it in its capacity to legitimize certain types of 
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states, this in turn specifies the precise relationship between the member states and 
international society itself.122  
For Hurrell deeper cooperation between states based on the agreement about what 
constitutes a common good was the reason behind the growing pressure for a specific 
domestic arrangement of the state: 
As cooperation comes increasingly to involve the creation of rules that affect very 
deeply the domestic structures and organization of states, that invest individuals and 
groups within states with rights and duties, and that seek to embody some notion of 
common good (human rights, democratization, the environment, the construction of 
more elaborate and intrusive inter-state security orders), then these questions of 
society and community re-emerge.123 
What ensued was that quasi-states started to be explored expressis verbis as problems for 
international society.124 There is a much broader literature, beyond the explicit adherence to 
or sympathy with the English School, which reifies ‘international community’ and on that 
basis produces requirements regarding the state. The inability of quasi-states to sustain 
themselves ‘as members of international community’ is the focal point of such discussions. 
Achieving a certain version of statehood is a necessary condition for a state to be 
acknowledged as an ‘equal member of international society’.125 Some see a state’s claim to 
sovereignty as composed of two types of contract: one between a state and its citizens and 
one between a state and the international community. The latter is premised on the adherence 
to international norms and standards of accountability and transparency.126 What follows 
quite naturally from these deliberations is the claim that: ‘We study how states collapsed in 
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order to learn how to put them back together ... the reconstruction of the sovereign state is 
necessary ... statehood needs to be reconstituted in the modern age’.127 
The ‘model state’ has become the most conspicuous element of what some scholars 
qualify as the new standard of civilization. The standard, in its refurbished version, is said to 
be exposed mainly in trade and financial regulations.128 Brett Bowden argued persuasively 
that the global market serves as a ‘civilizer of peoples and societies’ both in their domestic 
and external relations.129 But the ‘standard’ resurfaces also in terms of the capacity of a state 
to engage with international society as well and the very type of state, its administrative 
functions, adequate internal organisation and government accountability.130  
The standard of civilization is one way of approaching the problem. A parallel approach, 
and one pursued by the English School, is to see the natural process of greater convergence 
among states. Since international society requires not only a type of ‘fellow feeling’ but also 
the sense that the other is ‘of one’s own kind’,131 a conclusion was reached that convergence 
in the type of state may be a significant element for order and security:  
Pluralism is abandoned when states not only recognise that they are alike…, but see 
that a significant degree of similarity is valuable, and seek to reinforce the security and 
legitimacy of their own values by consciously linking with others who are like-minded, 
building a shared identity with them.132  
Hurrell approached the theme from a different angle. He noticed that a state-centred 
vision of the international automatically requires a particular state: 
For a state-centred conception of international order it is clearly of immense importance 
if a significant number of weak states are no longer able to provide the kinds of 
localized order that the statist model presumes.133 
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Despite the fact that the classical English School approach to the state limited the 
membership of international society to sovereign states without referring to the states’ 
internal qualities, the right kind of state became more and more central, along with the 
process of reification and universalisation of international society. 
Conclusion:	  international	  society	  reified	  
Arguably, the most contentious element in the scholarly treatment of international 
society is its ontological status, largely resulting from inconsistency in the approaches 
developed by classical authors. Some scholars approach international society as really 
existing and as such amenable to empirical study. Others would claim it is solely a normative 
framework and this camp is further divided into those suggesting it is an actually existing 
framework, and those viewing it as an ideal beyond reach but worth striving for. The third 
camp approaches it as an analytical framework, a device aiding the study and broadening our 
understanding of international politics. These three strands are not neatly delineated in 
academic works. For Jackson, international society was a ‘moral and legal framework’;134 for 
Clark it was a political framework but one which allowed for the application of 
‘constitutionally mediated’ norms. In his other writings Clark presented international society 
in terms of ‘historically changing principles of legitimacy’.135  
That various authors differ as to their conceptions of international society was first 
pointed out in Grader’s analysis of the English School scholarship. She noted that for 
Manning it was metaphysical, for Bull empirical and normative, while others, such as 
Northedge, would opt for a system rather than society of states.136 In a reply to Grader’s 
criticism, Peter Wilson argued that international society is ideational and norm-based for both 
Manning and Bull.137  
While acknowledging that writings on international society are not unified and that the 
English School itself is a contentious concept, this chapter illustrated how a specific portrayal 
of the international influences conceptions and expectations with regard to the state. I 
explored the process through which the idea of international society became reified and has 
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been employed not only as a neutral explanatory framework but came to be identified as a 
spatial entity and a construct in possession of agency. I argued that this reification is 
inseparable from and spurs the expectation for a particular model of a state.  
Reification takes place when a description is granted the character of a thing and acquires 
a phantom objectivity, seemingly rational autonomy to the extent that it conceals trace of its 
fundamental nature.138 Reification is the ‘tendency to forget that concepts and theories cannot 
capture the full, dynamic, constantly changing nature of things-as-such (...) reification gives 
particular, contingent, and contestable agendas a false sense of necessity, inevitability, 
scientific objectivity, or naturalness’.139 IR theory has not been spared the charge of 
reification. Daniel Levine saw reifications encouraged by all IR theoretical approaches. 
Reification, explained as a ‘kind of forgetting’ that there existed a distinction between 
theoretical concepts and real-world objects to which they refer or which they purport to 
describing, progressively naturalizes academic concepts. Levine argued that reification is 
intertwined with the process of academic production of paradigmatic research programmes. 
Unchecked, reification may slip into ‘vulgar messianism’ and leave scholars trapped into a 
world of their own ‘reified mediations’.140  
Reification and agentification are problematic processes in all social studies but in case 
of IR study they have especially far-reaching consequences. The knowledge production 
process presents ideas such as international society not only in a compelling way but also in a 
way which makes them seem unquestionably positive and universally accepted. Such framing 
may stimulate the thinking that values and policies pursued by one state or a group of states 
can be treated as though they were the values and policies of all. Of course it can be argued 
that producing a coherent scholarly narrative requires generalization. The danger is when we 
forget that we are generalizing. Representing international society as a contingent historical 
fact, a spatial entity or as a timeless and universally applicable theory are instances of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 E. Cudworth, T. Hall, and J. McGovern, The modern state. Theories and Ideologies, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press: 2007, 107. 
139 D.J. Levine and A. D. Barder, "The closing of the American mind: ‘American School’ International 
Relations and the state of grand theory", European Journal of International Relations, 20:4, 2014. 
140 Levine, Recovering international relations: the promise of sustainable critique, 14-16, 23. Levine structured 
his critique of IR theorists into three sections: realism, communitarianism and individualism. He engaged with 
E.H. Carr under the communitarian banner but international society as theorised by scholars discussed in this 
thesis, remains beyond the scope of Levine’s analysis. The author seems to be embracing the English School as 
part of an innovative approach to normative IR theorising (p. 80). The aim of his scholarly endeavour is also 
markedly different form the objective pursued in this thesis. Levine set out to assemble a ‘sustainably critical’ 
IR theory which would acknowledge that all IR disciplinary traditions are unions of fact and value (p. 25).  
68	  
	  
reification. The risks of such reification are magnified by the fact that these views have been 
expressed from the position of authority accorded to the academia.  
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CHAPTER	  3	  The	  world	  as	  international	  community	  and	  the	  
imperative	  to	  build	  states	  
  
 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language 
 and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably1  
 
Introduction	  
The second chapter of this thesis illustrated the process through which the idea of 
international society became reified in academic discourse and facilitated the linking of the 
seemingly existent and global international society to a requirement for a particular model of a 
state. Deliberations presented in Chapter Two prompted the question about ways in which the idea 
of international society operates in contemporary international relations practice. The English 
School cannot claim the power to influence political practice but it is important to acknowledge 
multiple analogies between meanings and characteristics ascribed to international society by 
academics and the notion of international community produced by policy discourse.2 While it 
would be impossible to claim there existed a causal link between the idea of international society 
advanced by the English School and the political discourse of international community, both of 
these ideas represent the international, tend to have positive connotations and the way they are 
discussed is prone to reification. My objective in the present chapter is to explore ways in which 
the idea of international community operates in contemporary politics, processes through which it 
becomes commonsensical, gains power and real-life consequences.  
This chapter argues that the policy world idea of international community galvanised a 
requirement for a state to meet a variety of international standards, it allows for states 
classification and creates conditions that make it hard to imagine a model of a state other than 
democratic and institutions-based. It thus depoliticizes the state, which becomes an obvious 
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constellation of specific institutions and norms based on the rule of law. This idea legitimizes 
statebuilding policies and allows for the representation of these practices as unquestionably good 
and those who undertake them as agents of international community. 
This chapter takes as its starting point the observation that in one particular policy area, that of 
development cooperation, the discourse of international community and policies of international 
statebuilding are not only intertwined but mutually indispensable.3 Statebuilding is presented as an 
activity undertaken in the name of international community and it relies on a particular 
understanding, description and, ultimately, reification of this community. The need for 
statebuilding arises from what international community is considered to be and the activity is 
carried out by those claiming to represent it. The reified idea of international community allows 
for the discursive construction and legitimation of a particular state member. This paves the way 
for policies directed at the implementation of the desired model.  
The	  production	  of	  international	  community	  discourse	  
The language of political practice is filled with appeals to and invocations of international 
community. Even though the term is in ubiquitous use, this pervasiveness has not rendered it 
utterly devalued. On the contrary, not only has it become an idea of high currency but more and 
more power is accorded to it. International community is able to organise humanitarian action, 
end suffering, denounce violence, and even build states. According to this narrative, the 
international community acts for the sake of order, economic development and poverty reduction. 
From that we may infer that international community not only has agency but is, in fact, 
exceptionally powerful. But, despite international community being presented as possessing 
agency, obligations and power, contemporary IR literature generally stops short of discussing the 
role and functions of the term international community as part of discourse. Surely, the potency of 
international community is not sustained by any concrete material factor, like that of nuclear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Statebuilding, though escapes clear definition, tends to be associated with longue durée processes of forming 
domestic order, establishing state-society relations and nation-building. C. Tilly, Coercion, capital, and European 
states, A.D.990-1990, Oxford : Basil Blackwell: 1997 [1990]; C. Tilly and G. Ardant, The Formation of national 
States in Western Europe, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press: 1975; J. S. Migdal, Strong societies and weak 
states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World, Chichester; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press: 1988. In the post-Cold War period international statebuilding came to denote the involvement of a 
third party in state formation processes primarily in the post-conflict situations. S. Chesterman, You, the people: the 
United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press: 2004. 
This thesis refers to international statebuilding as encompassing different types and degrees of involvement into other 
state’s affairs with the view to creating, amending or adjusting its polity, governance or socio-economic situation. The 
growing body of literature on statebuilding continues proposing new definitions. Those less critically oriented, tend to 
emphasize the technical side of international statebuilding, essentially identifying it as a technical ‘project’ to be 
implemented. P. C. McMahon and J. W. Western, “Introduction: The supply side of statebuilding”, in The 
international community and statebuilding: getting its act together?, ed. P.C. McMahon and J.W. Western (London ; 
New York: Routledge, 2012), 1. The critically oriented writing equates international statebuilding with liberal 
imperialism D. Chandler, ed., Statebuilding and intervention: policies, practices and paradigms, (Abingdon; New 
York: Routledge, 2009). Development cooperation (or development aid) is an umbrella term accorded policies 
focused on supporting economic, social and political development of states classified as developing. Statebuilding 
may be classified as one branch of development cooperation. 
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weapons. Its authority stems from the usage of this special term and the values attached to it. 
Crucially, it renders power to those who claim to represent the international community. Since 
ideas, especially those aspiring at universality, as well as the language used to express them, have 
their real-life consequences, questioning international community becomes a task of perennial 
importance. International community is just a representation but as a dominant narrative in policy 
discourse produced around the project of development assistance, statebuilding in particular, 
facilitates and reinforces the unquestioned acceptance of a state-model and steers policies geared 
towards its attainment. 
There is no neat separation between the ivory tower employing the term ‘international 
society’ and the policy practice world with its preference for ‘international community’. The 
international community discourse is coproduced by practitioners and scholars. Beyond the 
English School, the idea of international community features prominently in academic writing. 
Appearing in a variety of contexts, on most occasions it is employed indiscriminately. Authors 
who do not ponder the concept in and of itself, but make use of it in their writing on international 
affairs, regularly equate international community with the West, or more broadly, democratic 
states. They also tend to use international community and international society interchangeably.4 
Academic literature treats international community usually as a rhetorical and legitimizing 
device.5 International community has also been presented as ‘a desirable end-goal which should be 
achieved for global governance to be effective’ and as ‘a community of morals, ethics, and 
common identities’.6 Scholars have been perplexed by the potential moral agency of international 
community.7 Some argue that it may be rhetoric, practice and a specific actor group.8 Bliesemann 
De Guevara and Kühn rightly suggest we should be approaching ‘international community’ in the 
various contexts in which it is used by actors. This allows the exploration of changing images and 
protagonists of ‘international community’ in contexts such as e.g. intervention in Afghanistan or 
manipulations of the image of international community by local elites in the Balkans.9 Back in 
2003, the Foreign Policy journal dedicated a forum to the question, ‘What is the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Martha Brill Olcott writes on Central Asia: ‘international society helped Kyrgyzstan into its current crisis’. M. B. 
Olcott, Central Asia's second chance, Washington, D.C., Bristol: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
University Presses Marketing: 2005, 106; ‘The Tajik government, weak and with only incomplete control of the 
country, turned to the international community for help’, Olcott, Central Asia's second chance, 23. Central Asia 
scholars tend to present international community in direct opposition to Russia, e.g. Anna Matveeva offered a 
comment on the Russian troops’ withdrawal from the Tajik-Afghan border in 2004-2005: ‘the international 
community stepped in to replace retreating Russia in a belief that it could do a better job dealing with the Tajik 
officials’. A. Matveeva, “Russia's changing security role in Central Asia”, European Security, 22: 4, 2013: 5. 
5 B. Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez, “‘International community’ after Iraq”, International Affairs, 81: 1, 2005: 31; B. 
Bliesemann de Guevara and F. P. Kühn, “The “International Community” – Rhetoric or Reality?”, Security and 
Peace, 2, 2009; D. C. Ellis, “On the Possibility of “International Community””, International Studies Review, 11: 1, 
2009. 
6 Ellis, “On the Possibility of “International Community””: 5. 
7 A. Orford, “Muscular humanitarianism: reading the narratives of the new interventionism”, European Journal of 
International Law, 10: 4, 1999: 692. 
8 Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, “The “International Community” – Rhetoric or Reality?”: 74. 
9 Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, “The “International Community” – Rhetoric or Reality?”. 
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community’, which exposed a variety of interpretations, ranging from idealised (‘a shared vision 
for a better world‘) to highly critical (‘a dangerous reference point for the naïve’).10 
Chris Brown asked whether international community is ‘an unhelpful fiction’ or, given the 
continuous use of the term, one could think of an agency-bearing collective body of states capable 
of undertaking action on behalf of ‘common good’. He hesitantly concluded that ‘it is unlikely that 
this [international community] is simply an illusion’ but suggested that those who take an interest 
in the issue should stride away from international community, which could be equated with a 
‘rhetorical ploy’ and look straight towards international society, the master concept of the English 
School, in order to gain ‘intellectual substance’.11 For adherents to the English School, 
international community comprises either a more solidarist form of international society12 or is an 
exemplification of world society, which Buzan sees as a ‘liberal, post-Westphalian nexus of states, 
transnational actors and individuals’.13 
The flaw shared by most of the interpretations presented above is that they approach the 
problem too literally. Foreign Policy journal committed the same error that early English School 
theorists made in asking ‘What is international society?’. Formulating the question in terms of 
‘what is’ proceeds from a standpoint assuming there can be a satisfactory answer given to the 
query. Chapter Two explored in detail why this is problematic. Questions asked about 
international society and international community resemble a positivist search aspiring to discover 
and describe something material and existing in the real world to the disregard of potential 
strengths of reflexivist methodology in approaching this problem. On the other side of the 
spectrum, arguments for the contextualization of international community, though commendable, 
run the risk of removing one important aspect of international community discourse – its pretence 
at a universal representation of the international. ‘Localisation’, such as the one postulated by 
Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuhn, does not allow for engagement with consequences of 
according global reach and universal validity to international community.  
International	  community	  and	  statebuilding:	  ideas	  in	  action	  
Not only has international statebuilding become a well-institutionalized policy field but it is 
claimed to have become central to contemporary world affairs.14 For considerable amount of time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Foreign Policy, ‘What is the international community’. The forum’s discussion was also reported/outlined in quite 
detail in: Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, “‘International community’ after Iraq”: 32. 
11 Brown, “Moral agency and international society. Reflections on norms, the UN, the Gulf War, and the Kosovo 
campaign”, 52-53. 
12 Hurrell, On global order: power, values, and the constitution of international society. 
13 Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, “‘International community’ after Iraq”: 35-36. 
14 For academic arguments claiming statebuilding to be high on the international agenda see e.g. P. Haldén, “Systems-
building before state-building: on the systemic preconditions of state-building”, Conflict, Security & Development, 10: 




now leading academics and policy practitioners have underlined that statebuilding is the key task 
in contemporary world affairs. Francis Fukuyama claimed statebuilding to be ‘one of the most 
important issues for the world community’.15 Stephen Krasner confirmed this thesis: ‘I think that 
at this moment the biggest challenge is how to deal with failed and badly governed states’.16 A 
similar opinion was voiced by Iain Macleod, Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office speaking at an event ‘The Role of Law in the Formulation of Policy’ at the Aberystwyth 
University.17 Among institutions dedicated to statebuilding are: OECD-DAC International 
Network on Conflict and Fragility and Governance for Development and Peace. Despite the 
steadily growing scholarly output, two narratives seem to have dominated the field. On the one 
hand, the focus is on the ‘weak state’ problem, with the emphasis on or direct reiteration of the 
policymakers’ appeal that ‘something must be done’.18 International statebuilding is seen as the 
necessary response to state ‘fragility’, commonly explained as a state’s inability to deliver basic 
services to its citizens. External intervention is a desirable strategy of creating ‘functioning states’ 
or indeed of fostering sovereign statehood in weak states.19 On the other hand, the critical strand 
interprets international statebuilding as hiding the purpose of imperial domination. This literature 
emphasizes that international statebuilding policies usually ignore the needs and interests of those 
subject to intervention, which results in undermining the asserted goals of external involvement.20 
International statebuilding, as an interventionist undertaking, is said to reflect the unjust 
distribution of power. A range of statebuilding activities have been described as trusteeship 
(Bain), reworking of imperialism,21 practices of an ‘empire in denial’22 or as a form of ‘corruption 
of humanity’23 or paternalism (Jackson).24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 F. Fukuyama, “The imperative of state-building”, Journal of Democracy, 15: 2, 2004: ix. 
16 ‘Stephen Krasner on Sovereignty, Failed States and International Regimes Theory’, Theory Talk, Issue 21, 19 
October 2008, http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/10/theory-talk-21.html. 
17 'The Role of Law in the Formulation of Policy' 6 February 2014, Aberystwyth University. 
18 R. Caplan, International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2005; S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff and R. C. Thakur, Making states work: state failure and the crisis of 
governance, Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press: 2005. 
19 A. Ghani, C. Lockhart and M. Carnahan, "Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building", ODI 
Working Paper, Vol. 253; J.I. Chong, "How External Intervention Made the Sovereign State", Security Studies, 19: 4, 
2010. 
20 D. Chandler, "The uncritical critique of 'liberal peace'" in A liberal peace? The problems and practices of 
peacebuilding, S. Campbell, D. Chandler and M. Sabaratnam, eds. (London ; New York: Zed Books 2011); R. Paris, 
"Critiques of liberal peace" in A liberal peace? The problems and practices of peacebuilding, S. Campbell, D. 
Chandler and M. Sabaratnam, eds. (London ; New York: Zed Books 2011). 
21 N. Chomsky, The new military humanism : lessons from Kosovo, London: Pluto Press: 1999; M. Duffield, Global 
governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security, London: Zed Books: 2001. 
22 D. Chandler, Empire in denial : the politics of state-building, London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto: 2006.  
23 W. Bain, "In praise of folly: international administration and the corruption of humanity", International Affairs, 82: 
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 The growing significance of statebuilding policies reflects the heightened attention paid to 
the problem of state ‘fragility’, now classified as the ‘indispensable element of the international 
lexicon’ and itself subjected to in-depth studies.25  
A cursory glance at statebuilding and fragility-related policy documents reveals that 
international community is a recurrent phrase and, while analyses of statebuilding practice 
abound, scholarly literature has not addressed the fact that the idea of international community and 
international statebuilding policies are inseparable.26 International community, while it might at 
first be simply a useful catchphrase in the hands of speechwriters, has taken on a life of its own. 
Policy implementation circles and significant parts of the academia converged at regarding 
statebuilding as the imperative for international community.  
Actors undertaking international statebuilding implicitly claim the right to do both: define the 
international as international community and act in the name of that international community. This 
policy discourse reveals and reifies a particular vision of the international. First of all, there has to 
be a conception of the whole to be able to assert that a part does not fit and needs fixing before it 
destabilizes the imagined totality. The reification of some sort of international construct, which is 
valuable and orderly but susceptible to shocks, must take place. Discursive uses of the notion of 
international community made it into an element of ‘communal’ imagining and the enabling 
condition for statebuilding to take place. International community became a framework enabling 
categorization, a context in which some states are characterized by their deficiencies and without 
which legitimization of international statebuilding policies becomes difficult. Moreover, 
international community gained agential features. Those who act under international community 
banner claim the right to judge particular states as quasi, weak or fragile and take upon themselves 
the task of helping these states become ‘normal’. 
Imagining	  the	  world	  and	  its	  states	  
The characteristic feature of international community discourse is that the term is dispersed. It 
would be difficult to come across a document in the area of development cooperation that would 
stop short of employing it, yet rarely does it get explained or engaged with in a more 
comprehensive way.  A number of practitioners interviewed for this thesis admitted that the 
concept is in wide use but there is little reflection on its meaning, significance or the message it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 D. Carment, S. Prest, and Y. Samy, Security, development, and the fragile state: bridging the gap between theory 
and policy, London: Routledge: 2010.; S. Harman and D. Williams, “International development in transition”, 
International Affairs, 90: 4, 2014.; N. Robinson, “State-building and international politics. The emergence of a 'new' 
problem and agenda”, in State-building: theory and practice, ed. A. Hehir and N. Robinson (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 2007).  
26 Statebuilding has become an important concern for scholarly analysis. B. Brast, “A Sociological Turn in 
Statebuilding Research?”, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7: 4, 2013: 531; R. Egnell and P. Haldén, 
“Introduction: the need for new agendas in statebuilding”, in New agendas in statebuilding: hybridity, contingency 
and history, ed. R. Egnell and P. Haldén (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).  
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conveys: ‘We operate with this term a lot in the UN but maybe it is the first time I am actually 
thinking what international community is.’27  
Non-Western states such as China or Russia only rarely get mentioned as members of 
international community, which is most probably the result of the almost automatic linking of this 
community to a particular set of liberal values. International community members are usually 
associated with ‘good citizens’ of international society who are like-minded in the promotion of 
human rights.28  
The document taken to be the foundation of all development and statebuilding activities is the 
UN Millennium Declaration. Contrary to what might be expected, the declaration does not equate 
international community with the United Nations. The document presents international 
community as a separate being, something out there to which one can pledge, which can be 
motivated or urged to take action. Quite against expectations, the phrase international community 
is not overused. It is invoked only once in the entire document and with regard to a specific issue 
of small island states.29 The rich discourse produced by states and organisations engaged in 
development cooperation, however, uses the term international community as though international 
community were the Millennium Declaration’s principal author. For instance, UNDP, one of the 
most important UN aid agencies, states: ‘This issue is studied in the context of UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which have been approved by the international community, and 
which call for poverty reduction’.30 
On the basis of the Millennium Declaration, the policy world established eight targets, the so-
called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which provide the key guidance in various 
development cooperation activities.31 These goals range from halving extreme poverty to securing 
universal primary education. What critical discourse analysis makes us reconsider, however, is not 
necessarily the content of these goals but the assumption behind MDGs. Positing that one may set 
global millennial targets is yet another illustration of how the world is imagined as a community 
which can work towards the achievement of these goals by a specific date (2015).  
World Development Reports (WDRs), an influential annual publication produced by the 
World Bank on the subject of economic development, is another source of discourse with a 
profound impact on policies of development and statebuilding. The very title of the series – World 
Development Report – is significant from a discourse analysis perspective as it reveals the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Interview, senior official at UN Kyrgyzstan, December 2014. 
28 Interview, senior official at Swiss Aid, Kyrgyzstan, October 2014. 
29 ‘We urge the international community to ensure that, in the development of a vulnerability index, the special needs 
of small island developing States are taken into account.’ United Nations General Assembly, United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, 8 September 2000. 
30 UNDP, Millennium Development Goals in Russia: Looking into the Future, Moscow, 2010. 
31 The UN describes for the eight Millennium Development Goals as: ‘a blueprint agreed to by all the world’s 




pretence of the document’s authors. The title informs that publication is reporting development in 
the world. It is thus implicit that there is a world that develops; the process is amenable to 
knowing and lends itself to be reported on. Such a picture of the world's development can be 
compiled by a bank, which has a name no other than the World Bank. It is a clear discursive 
expression of power to name what the world is, to place it on a developmental trajectory and to 
take upon oneself to describe this trajectory selecting its most important aspects to be reported 
yearly.  
Two particular editions – the 1997 and 2011 WDRs – merit closer consideration. The 1997 
document is regarded a paradigm shifter in international statebuilding, whereas the 2011 version 
makes some very explicit claims regarding the international realm. The 1997 imprint is devoted to 
the role and effectiveness of the state. By its title alone, The state in a changing world, it heralded 
significant changes in how the World Bank perceived the role of the state in development. At the 
same time, the 1997 report constitutes a perfect illustration of the discursive construction of the 
international and the embedding of the state within this overarching frame.  
The 1997 report presents development as an explicit and dominant value for the world and 
subordinates the state to its service. The major contours of this image of the world are defined by 
globalization, economic integration and the spread of democracy. The report redefines the state’s 
responsibilities focusing them around ‘facilitating’ world development. Among fundamental tasks 
for the state are: establishing a foundation of law, maintaining an adequate policy environment, 
investing in basic social services and infrastructure and protecting the environment.32 All these 
derive from and at the same time uphold a certain vision of the international, one that is composed 
of well-governed states.  
A particular vision of the international becomes even more explicit in the report’s discussion 
of international collective action. The goal of such action is to provide ‘international public goods’ 
and to prevent fragmentation of the ‘community of nations’.33 Such a framing is embedded in the 
conceptualization of the international in terms of a community linked by certain values and 
composed of specifically organised states whose governments perform well-defined functions. In 
order to maintain the community it becomes indispensable to ‘measure the state’ and its 
capabilities.34 As a result, in addition to the presumed existence of a community of states, the 
report also relies on and constructs a purportedly universal reference point against which states 
can be assessed. Those who do not fit should undertake the necessary transformation and 
readjustment.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, New York: Oxford University 
Press: 1997, 12. 
33 World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, New York: Oxford University 
Press: 1997, 132. 
34 World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, 34. 
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This logic embeds the state in a particular vision of the international and presents weak states 
as unable to participate in ‘global collective action’.35 This image of the international receives a 
very tangible form in WDR 2011:  
Regional institutions can bridge the distance between universal norms and local customs. 
Those customs or practices must conform, in substance, to the core international principles 
from which the international community derives its cohesion. Otherwise cultural diversity 
can simply override, and undermine, the international framework.36 
Fragility or state weakness as major threats to the imagined community is a narrative present 
in a wide variety of policy documents and with various degrees of ‘linguistic’ political 
correctness. The more explicit rhetoric states plainly:  
Least developed countries (LDCs) are considered to be the “poorest and weakest segment” 
within the international community, as their level of development substantially trails other 
categories of countries, and they have failed to emerge from poverty.37 
Fragile situations constitute a particular challenge as an obstacle to sustainable 
development, equitable growth and peace, creating regional instability, security risks at 
global level, uncontrolled migration flows, etc. (...) The international community is 
increasingly concerned about the consequences of fragility, which exacerbate the 
challenge of reaching the Millennium Development Goals, harm people’s wellbeing and 
freedoms and may involve global security risks.38 
Indeed, the very starting point for international statebuilding policies is the assumption that a 
part (i.e. a weak state) does not fit some sort of imagined whole and as such threatens the stability 
of this whole. What has not been fully realised and discussed in literature devoted to international 
statebuilding is that only the idea of the whole allows for depicting certain parts as not fitting, 
fragile, weak and threatening. Viewing the world in terms of a community of states allows for the 
identification of state ‘fragility’ as a problem. The next step is knowledge production about that 
problem, a thorough exposition of the components of the right model and devising policies aimed 
at bringing this model into life in different parts of the world. The accompanying assumption is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, 12. 
36 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, New York: Oxford University 
Press: 2011, 39. 
37 Partners in Development. How Donors Can Better Engage the Private Sector for Development in LDCs, UN Global 
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that one can ‘deal with’ states and thereby resolve problems crucial for global security, understood 
as stability of international community.39  
The objectification of state weakness remains a crucial element of this approach. States 
become the object of statebuilding, they are analysed and meant to be cured. States are labelled as 
‘in transition’, which stipulates there is a goal for them to reach. Some of them are expected to 
‘catch up’, to ‘converge’, particularly if they are ‘stuck’ or fail to ‘match the standards’ of more 
advanced economies. One simply needs to tackle their weakness problem. 
The manners of international courtesy do not extend far enough to prevent states’ 
classification and naming. Ranking states is the order of the day and derogative language is 
omnipresent. The introduction of the word ‘partner’ has done little in terms of altering the 
prevalent vocabulary or masking power relations underpinning policies of statebuilding. A simple 
textual analysis reveals that donors describe their relations with ‘partners’ using words with 
positive connotations such as: cooperate, engage, secure, improve, enable, maximize, 
philanthropic, collaborative. All these contrast starkly with vocabulary describing the ‘recipient’ 
state as the least developed, poorest, weakest, failing and vulnerable. A state becomes an object to 
be judged, classified and ameliorated. Denigration seems justified if the intention is to ‘help’ and 
if the driving force of this process is development or statebuilding. It is far from a new observation 
that rendering others inferior is the chief source of power but ostracizing becomes particularly 
dangerous if it pretends not to be political. Since there are certain standards and structural 
requirements to be met, failure to do so results in lesser international standing and is an obvious 
symptom of a state’s need for help. A decision to undertake international statebuilding policies 
becomes a technical issue. This framing depoliticizes the state as well as statebuilding. It is no 
longer possible or straightforward to recognise statebuilding as an intervention and one that takes 
place on an everyday basis. 
In defining what a fragile state is, mathematical and biological metaphors permeate discourse. 
Different institutions produce classifications and rankings, which are to help determine the level of 
state’s fitness. The USAID, a U.S. government agency working in the area of development 
cooperation, defines fragility as the ‘extent to which state-society relations fail to produce 
outcomes considered effective and legitimate, with effectiveness and legitimacy being equal parts 
of the equation’.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This logic is not uncommon in scholarly literature: R. Caplan, International governance of war-torn territories: rule 
and reconstruction, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2005; Chesterman, You, the people: the United Nations, 
transitional administration, and state-building; S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff, and R. C. Thakur, Making states work: 
state failure and the crisis of governance, Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press: 2005. 
40 Nancy Lindborg, ‘To End Extreme Poverty, Tackle Fragility’, USAID blog, 13 February 2014, 
http://blog.usaid.gov/2014/02/to-end-extreme-poverty-tackle-fragility/ (last accessed 4 August 2014). In this particular 




The reliance on mathematical abstraction, widespread use of statistical data and indices 
dominate. They are believed to allow for making informed decisions based on aggregated data. 
The measures of statehood include: Fragile States Index, Democracy Index or ‘Freedom in the 
world’.41 The 2015 Fragile States Index, an annual ranking of 177 countries across 12 indicators, 
classified Kyrgyzstan under the label ‘high warning’. The state reached 62nd place (the greater the 
number the stronger the state).42 The 2014 Democracy Index, covering 167 countries, placed 
Kyrgyzstan in the 95th position (the greater the number, the less democratic the state).43  
The Kyrgyz Republic measured by The Economist in 2015: 
Electoral process and pluralism  6.58/10 
Functioning of government  3.29/10 
Political participation  6.67/10 
Political culture  4.38/10 
Civil liberties 5.29/10 
  
The Kyrgyz Republic measured by the Freedom House in 2014: 
Electoral Process 6/12 
Political Pluralism and Participation 6/16 
Functioning of Government 4/12 
Freedom of Expression and Belief 9/16 
Associational and Organizational Rights 4/12 
Rule of Law 4/16 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 7/16 
 
Criteria employed by these rankings provide an illustration of components of the ‘right’ kind 
of state. The model encompasses: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, freedom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Fragile State Index is compiled by the Fund for Peace, a non-profit research and educational organization funded 
partly by the American government. Democracy Index is compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit and measures 
the state of democracy in 167 countries. ‘Freedom in the world’ is produced by the US-based Freedom House and it is 
often taken to be a measure of democracy. For a critique of measuring fragility see e.g. Wim Naudé, Amelia U. 
Santos-Paulino and Mark McGillivray (eds.), Fragile States: Causes, Costs, and Responses, Oxford University Press, 
2011, pp. 34-37. 
42 Retrieved from: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ (last accessed 5 July 2015).  
43 Retrieved from: 
http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download&campaignid=Democracy0115 (last 
accessed 5 July 2015). 
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of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, functioning of 
government, political culture, civil liberties and individual rights. 
The ‘New Deal’ for state-building, agreed among donor states in 2011, follows the 
measurement trend very closely: 
By September 2012, a set of indicators for each goal will have been developed by fragile 
states and international partners, which will allow us to track progress closely at the global 
and country levels. These will allow us to measure objectively, as well as gauging people’s 
views on the results achieved.44 
This process of assessment and ranking has become ubiquitous. For instance, the US 
evaluates Kyrgyzstan in terms of: human rights,45 religious freedom,46 trafficking in persons47 and 
drug trafficking.48  
The discourse makes frequent recourses to the Millennium Development Goals and the 
annually published Progress Report on the achievement of these Goals. For instance, the Asian 
Development Bank states: 
The 2011 Millennium Development Goal progress report found that the Kyrgyz Republic 
had reached benchmarks for several indicators, including the reduction of extreme poverty, 
which fell rapidly up to 2008. But it is likely to fall short of targets on maternal and child 
mortality; gender equality; combating HIV/AIDS; and improving access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation.49 
There is an implicit assumption that states in the modern world need to be ‘manageable’. The 
classificatory language is used side by side with highly rationalised discourse that makes frequent 
recourses to expertise and research. The World Bank presents its role as ‘one of the world's largest 
sources of funding and knowledge for transition and developing countries’.50 The Asian 
Development Bank, ADB, states that: ‘sectors and themes [of ADB’s] assistance programme are 
selected based on the results of diagnostic studies’.51 The European Union declares its ‘readiness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 New Deal. Building Peaceful States, http://www.newdeal4peace.org/peacebuilding-and-statebuilding-goals/. 
45 Kyrgyz Republic 2012 Human Rights Report, US Department of State, 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/kyrgyzrepulic/325898/turganbaevaao/HR2012report_Kyrgyzstan.pdf (last accessed 15 
July 2014). 
46 Kyrgyz Republic 2012 International Religious Freedom Report, US Department of State,  
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/kyrgyzrepulic/325898/turganbaevaao/KyrgyzRepublic2012InternationalReligiousFree
domReport.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
47 Trafficking in persons report 2013, US Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210737.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
48 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, US Department of State,  
http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/W6qzW0z2gzzjjhnJj0PoYg/2008_International_Narcotics_Control_Str
ategy_Report.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014).  
49 2013-2017 Country Partnership Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic, The Asian Development Bank, p.2 
http://donors.kg/images/docs/reports_and_studies/cps-kgz-2013-2017_en.pdf (last accessed 8 August 2014). 
50 http://www.donors.kg/en/agencies/107-wb#.U8oND_mSw30 (last accessed 15 July 2014) 
51 51 2013-2017 Country Partnership Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic, The Asian Development Bank, 
http://donors.kg/images/docs/reports_and_studies/cps-kgz-2013-2017_en.pdf (last accessed 8 August 2014). 
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to share its expertise’ concerning democratic reforms.52 The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development claims: ‘This year’s Transition Report explains why some countries may be 
‘stuck’ in traps with little or no reform’.53 Many other donors underline the role of knowledge 
related to transition: ‘Expertise and advice are being shared about how to develop accurate 
economic analyses and forecasts, and support is being provided to strengthen the budgeting and 
auditing processes’.54  
Country specific knowledge production and dissemination, in the form of country analyses or 
country backgrounds, usually accompanies policy plans. For example a Country analysis 
constitutes one of the annexes to the European Community Regional Strategy Paper for 
Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013. A Country Background is the first part of the 
2013-2017 Country Partnership Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic.55 The US Department of State 
compiles annual Human Rights Report on Kyrgyzstan.56 
Ranking and knowledge are usually accompanied by the rhetoric of progress.57 Development, 
transition, movement forward, are all connected to the overarching notion of progress that defines 
and guides international community and is expected to materialise in a state. It would be difficult 
to come up with a more progressive slogan than the one placed on a billboard advertising a donor-
sponsored youth event in Bishkek: ‘Moving development forward’.58 The 2013 High Level 
Development Conference participants were equally creative when they agreed that the goal for 
Kyrgyzstan is not only transition or development but both, ingenuously amalgamated into: 
‘transition to a long-term development’.59 An oft repeated policy conclusion is that: ‘much 
remains to be done, but progress is visible’60; or ‘Kyrgyzstan is a young democracy and has made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 STATEMENT by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following her meeting with the 
President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Brussels, 17 September 2013,130917/04, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/130917_04_en.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
53 Transition Report 2013: Stuck In Transition, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
54  http://www.swiss-
cooperation.admin.ch/centralasia/en/Home/Activities_in_Kyrgyzstan/PUBLIC_SECTOR_REFORMS_AND_INFRA
STRUCTURE (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
55 2013-2017 Country Partnership Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic, The Asian Development Bank, 
http://donors.kg/images/docs/reports_and_studies/cps-kgz-2013-2017_en.pdf (last accessed 8 August 2014). 
56 Kyrgyz Republic 2012 Human Rights Report, US Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204614.pdf.  
57 Also this element shows signs of tautology: international community has a purpose that justifies its existence but it 
is the same time the main discursive creator of this purpose. The way various donors represent affairs in developing 
states makes it indispensable for them to act. 
58 An English- and Kyrgyz-language billboard slogan advertising an internationally-sponsored youth event, seen in 
Bishkek 08.2013. 
59 The conference was organized in the vicinities of Bishkek, 10-11 July 2013. The oversight of the Conference was 
the responsibility of the Consultative Council, a standing body established in August 2012 and co-chaired by the 
Prime Minister and representatives of ‘Development  Partners’, a grouping of donors active in  Kyrgyzstan. 
http://www.donors.kg/upload/docs/reports_and_studies/Joint%20Declaration.pdf 





much progress in a very short period of time. All of the leaders with whom I met today expressed 
their desire to make more progress’.61  
The progress rhetoric accompanying the ‘production’ of a right kind of a state is permeated 
with goal setting and planning. The obsession with planning (including strategies, action plans and 
roadmaps) leads to curiosa that are barely comprehensible:  
Based on the results of the discussion, the working group developed plan of next actions on 
basin planning for the Isfara river, in particular, on prioritization of the problems in the 
basin, which later is to be included into basin plan.62 
The EU welcomed Kazakhstan’s plan for the development of a new National Human Rights 
Action Plan, and agreed to consider how it might support the development of that plan.63  
Since progress in a particular direction is considered to be only natural for a state and granting 
assistance in this process is a positive undertaking, one of specific functions of international 
community discourse is that it naturalises forms of political practice geared towards the creation of 
such a state, i.e. practices of standard setting and statebuilding. 
The	  right	  kind	  of	  state:	  models	  and	  standards	  
Classification – what states are – goes hand in hand with establishing models and standards – 
how states should be. Viewing and presenting the international in a particular way facilitates the 
promotion of a particular state model. It is used as shorthand for a higher instance able to pass 
objective judgements on values deemed universal, as illustrated by the following quotation: 
The abolition of child labour has been an important legislative step taken in Turkmenistan 
although it will be difficult for the international community to form an objective view on its 
implementation.64 
 While it may not be legitimate for the US, France, the UK or any other single Western state 
to set standards for any particular non-Western state, it becomes perfectly natural for international 
community to do so. There is nothing objective about a particular standard but it becomes 
legitimized when it is presented as a building block of international community. 
Democratic institutions supported by rule of law are the major component of the right kind of 
state. USAID goals for Kyrgyzstan are defined as: ‘governing democratically and justly by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Press Availability With Kyrgyz Republic Media, Bishkek, 30 November 2012, 
http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/tr12-5-12.html (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
62 EU project supported meeting of the working group on basin planning in the Isfara river basin, Press release, 26 
July 2013, http://waterca.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/07/2013-07-
15_PR_Expert_workshop_Basin_Planning_Khujand_TJ_WMBOCA_ENG.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
63 EU-Kazakhstan Human Rights Dialogue, Astana, 27 November 2013,  
 http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131127_01_en.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 




strengthening parliament and local governance as well as civil society and media’. USAID aspires 
to ‘promote stability, decrease the chances of unrest, and facilitate efforts to restore core 
government functions’.65 Following the 2010 revolution, the Office of Transition Initiatives of the 
USAID embarked upon a new programme, the goal of which was to provide ‘targeted assistance’ 
supporting ‘the on-going democratic political transition’.66 
Kyrgyzstan is not only to fulfil the standards, but also to serve as a ‘model for the region’.67 
The joint British-American initiative, the Deepening Democracy Programme, aspires to ‘increase 
the effectiveness, and responsiveness of the Kyrgyz Parliament’.68 The then EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton stressed that the European Union pays the bulk of its attention to 
democratic reforms and free and fair elections.69 The document of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) put this goal into the framework of partnership and cooperation.70  
The goals of the World Bank in Kyrgyzstan are to ‘improve governance and fight corruption, 
to maintain efficient and stable public finances, and to strengthen social stability’.71 The Asian 
Development Bank Country Partnership Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic identifies several major 
deficiencies of the Kyrgyz state: ‘political instability, weak rule of law, and corruption’. The 
document then sets the task of ‘reforming legal and regulatory frameworks to improve the 
business environment, expand access to affordable finance across the country (…)’.72 The aim of 
the Swiss Regional Strategy in Central Asia is to assist in ‘the transition process in Kyrgyzstan 
[...] from authoritarian rule and central planning to pluralism and market economy’.73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/embassy_sections.html (last accessed 15 July 2014). The goals are specified by the 
Office of Transition Initiatives of the USAID, 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=c557428cc165a6fa99b7b261696ab98f&tab=core&_cvie
w=0 (last accessed 15 July 2014).  
66 http://www.usaid.gov/political-transition-initiatives/kyrgyz-republic (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
67 http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1869/090613_Kyrgyz-Republic_CLEARED.pdf (last accessed 
15 July 2014) 
68 Senior Kyrgyz Parliamentary Delegation visits UK, 2 September 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/world-
location-news/the-delegation-of-kyrgyz-parliament-members-will-visit-uk (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
69 STATEMENT by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following  
her meeting with the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Brussels, 17 September 2013  
130917/04, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/130917_04_en.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
70 ‘The EU bilateral assistance to Kyrgyzstan for the period 2007-2013 is focused in the sectors of education, social 
protection, agriculture and rural development, conflict mitigation and good governance [...] the EU and the EU 
Member States are ready to continue to support Kyrgyzstan's efforts in consolidating its democracy and in advancing 
and modernizing its social and economic development; the partnership and cooperation between the EU and its 
Member-States and Kyrgyzstan is based on common values and principles; the EU development assistance works and 
is transparent and this aid helps to bring about long term development that leads to dynamic, prospering and stable 
democratic society’. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kyrgyzstan/documents/press_corner/news2013/pr_infomtg_en.pdf (last accessed 15 
July 2014).  
71 http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/alex-kremer (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
72 2013-2017 Country Partnership Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic, The Asian Development Bank, 
http://donors.kg/images/docs/reports_and_studies/cps-kgz-2013-2017_en.pdf (last accessed 8 August 2014). 
73 Swiss Regional Strategy in Central Asia 2012-2015, http://www.swiss-
cooperation.admin.ch/centralasia/en/Home/Regional_Strategy; http://www.swiss-
cooperation.admin.ch/centralasia/en/Home (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
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Models and standards do not only play a role in defining the desired state model with more 
precision. Crucially, the way standards are presented contributes to constructing the idea of the 
international. The causal arrow works both ways. Standards build or reinforce the image of 
international community as one that upholds specific values. Apart from the stress on democracy 
found in various policy documents, there are more direct references to international community 
values. The US State Department annual Human Rights Report, for instance, indicated that the 
judicial procedures implemented following the 2010 riots in Kyrgyzstan did not meet 
‘international standards of fairness’.74  
The list of standards that Kyrgyzstan is expected to meet encompasses politics, trade, finance, 
banking, labour, aviation and even mountain guiding and lifestyle. Their range and framing merits 
a more extended illustration: 
We shall collectively endeavour to protect and promote the realisation of human rights, 
gender equality and the rule of law for all. The judicial reform in line with international 
standards remains an important priority for the consolidation of the rule of law.75 
Since 2000, EXBS has delivered over 24 million dollars in training and equipment in 
support of the Kyrgyz Republic's efforts in border security, non-proliferation, and the 
establishment of strategic trade controls that meet international standards.76 
Customs procedures are being assessed, as is the conversion from the old GOST structure 
(Gossudarstwenny Standart – government standard for Russia and the CIS countries) to a 
high-quality infrastructure based on modern, international standards (ISO – International 
Organization for Standardization).77 
Participants were presented with guidance about the legal basis, operational framework, 
education, logistical needs and investigation techniques necessary for upgrading bilateral 
co-operation to international standards78 
[Participants] learned about best practices and international standards in the delimitation 
and demarcation of a border line.79 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Secretary’s Preface, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
75 Joint Declaration by the Development Partners of the Kyrgyz Republic at the close of the High Level Development 
Conference, 11 July 2013, Bishkek, p. 3, 
http://www.donors.kg/images/docs/reports_and_studies/Joint_Declaration_en.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
76 http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/embassy_sections.html 
77 http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/14062.html 
78 OSCE organizes study visit of Tajik, Kyrgyz experts to Estonia on border delimitation and demarcation, Dushanbe, 




Since 22 April 2002, International Standards of Audit issued in 2001 by the International 
Auditing Practices Committee of the International Federation of Accountants are approved 
as the audit standards of the Kyrgyz Republic.80 
The project will promote the observance of international labour standards81 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) representation in Kyrgyzstan sponsored an 
exhibition entitled Design and modern life based on Japanese experience. The exhibition’s folder 
informs: ‘Construction boom promoted production of interior items and activated entrepreneurs 
interested in creation of a lifestyle meeting international standards.82 
In parallel with the presentation of particular states as weak, in need of adjustments and 
implementation of international standards, the assumption of the imperative to help develops. 
Specific actors take upon themselves the task of building other states. This, in turn, allows them to 
construct themselves as representatives of international community. The discourse of international 
community is thus not limited to producing the idea of the whole. It also constructs and 
reproduces agential international community. 
Agential	  international	  community	  
The narrative of a ‘weak state’ is important for the construction of agential ‘international 
community’. A significant part of statebuilding discourse equates international community only 
with a particular group of states, usually termed ‘donors’. This group consists of highly developed 
states and includes various inter- and nongovernmental bodies financed by these states. The 
donor-focused understanding of international community is reproduced in a number of ways in 
written documents83 but it is also shared commonly by practitioners working in the area of 
statebuilding.84  
Several features of and values accorded to agential international community can be read out 
of policy discourse.85 Texts usually convey the message that ‘something needs to be done’ or that 
action is immediately required. Since it is not only appropriate and responsible but mandatory to 
take action, the agential international community is presented as ready and willing to help. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Audit” http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=4921 (last accessed 15 December 
2014). 
81 http://centralasia.usaid.gov/kyrgyzstan/849 (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
82 http://www.jica.go.jp/kyrgyz/english/office/others/pdf/pressrelease_20081023_en.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
83 ‘the government was in discussions with various parts of the international community—diplomatic, peacekeeping, 
and development—on pressing institutional transformations”.  World Bank, World Development Report 2011: 
Conflict, Security, and Development, 110; ‘the international community, encompassing both the neighbouring 
countries, and bilateral and multilateral partners’. UNDP, "Central Asia Human Development Report 2005. Bringing 
down barriers: Regional cooperation for human development and human security,"  (Bratislava: UNDP Regional 
Bureau, 2005), 3. 
84 Interviews with employees of: the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation, (Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), UNDP, Swiss Aid, September-October 2014, Bishkek. 
85 This analysis is based on research interviews conducted with senior officials of aid agencies with presence in 
Bishkek and Dushanbe, December 2012 and September-December 2013. 
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Activities it undertakes are for a good cause, which makes this international community an 
intrinsically positive entity. 
International community acts in defence or in the name of laudable values. ‘In the service of 
democracy, peace and development’ is the Hanns Seidel Foundation’s motto, which the 
foundation applies to its work abroad.86 ‘Happiness for all’, the motto of KOICA, the South 
Korean aid agency, is accompanied with commendable slogans, such as ‘Making a better world 
together’.87 In addition to direct messages, the concept of international community is usually used 
with affirmative nouns, such as peace, affirmative active verbs, such as peacebuilding, which all 
construct international community as a helpful entity worthy of trust. Commonplace usage of 
words such as partner, commitment and cooperation present international community as highly 
engaged and caring: 
We strongly believe that working together with other donors is key for the success of the 
New Deal in order to reduce the burden on our partner countries. We would like to invite all 
donors to partner us in building staff skills jointly, holding training, and team building so as 
to be more effective and coordinated in supporting the partner country's efforts. At the same 
time, EU is looking forward to contributing to developing a post-2015 framework with the 
objective of ensuring a decent life for all – ending the poverty and giving the world a 
sustainable future, as spelled out in the recent Communication of the European 
Commission.88 
Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they 
convey to the international community.89 
International donors have volunteered to help Central Asian businessmen, offering to 
introduce the concept of Japanese management called Kaizen. Kaizen is derived from the 
Japanese word for good change and is mostly known as a form of management that focuses 
on continuous improvement.90 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The Mission of the Hanns Seidel Foundation  http://www.hss.de/english.html (last accessed 13 August 2013). The 
Hanns Seidel Foundation is a German political foundation associated with the Christian Social Union (CSU) which 
stated aim is the provision of political education. The Foundation’s regional project in Central Asia 
supports state administration academies in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan 
http://www.hss.de/fileadmin/media/downloads/Publikationen/IIZ-Flyer_V-
2_Osteuropa_100x210_mm_4c_ENGLISCH-L4_Web.pdf (last accessed 13 August 2013). 
87 Korea International Cooperation Agency, KOICA official webpage http://www.koica.go.kr/english/main.html (last 
accessed 20 May 2014); KOICA  2012 leaflet http://www.koica.go.kr/download/leaflet2012_eng.pdf (last accessed 20 
May 2014). 
88 Statement by Commissioner Piebalgs for the Third Ministerial Meeting of the International Dialogue on 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 19 April 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/speech-new-deal-
international-dialogue-peacebuilding-statebuilding-piebalgs-20130419_en_5.pdf. 
89 Principles for good international engagement in fragile states & situations, OECD, p. 2 
http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/38368714.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2014). 
90 Interview, senior aid agency official, Bishkek, October 2013. 
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International community as the representation of a global whole and agential international 
community are interwoven. As a representation of the international, international community is 
valuable and worth preserving. It encompasses the notion of global security and prosperity. 
Agential international community, in turn, is indispensable for preserving universal international 
community. Conversely, universal international community depends on positive action taken by 
agential international community. 
Conclusions:	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  international	  
community	  
This chapter illustrated how specific forms of the international community discourse are 
enmeshed with statebuilding policies aimed at constructing a state according to specific standards. 
Even though the international community is just an idea, it structures the way things are done in 
contemporary international politics. This specific representation of the international shapes 
expectations with regard to the state and legitimizes intervention aimed at adjusting certain 
polities to the expected model. The right kind of state should fulfil a set of criteria which make it 
into a fully-fledged member of international community. The state model is supported with 
reference to the allegedly objective knowledge. State rankings – and by extension the discourse of 
states’ weakness – are produced with the help of mathematics. Such rankings are the major point 
of reference for policies aimed at helping states reach a certain level of stateness and meet specific 
standards. There is, however, nothing objective about a particular standard.  
Practitioners discourse on the one hand reifies international community presenting it as a fact 
of international politics, the adequate and objective reflection of the world out there. On the other 
hand, part of statebuilding discourse equates international community only with a particular group 
of states, usually termed ‘donors’. This allows for presenting activities of statebuilding as 
intrinsically good and actors undertaking them as those working for the benefit of all. Despite the 
fact that the idea of international community relies on and reinforces classifications, such as that 
there are two types of states, those developed and those developing, international community is 
valued as virtuous and statebuilding as necessary and unquestionably ameliorative. The most 
paradoxical aspect is that aid activities are not necessarily focused exclusively on states such as 
Kyrgyzstan. They are, in fact, directed at the idea of international community. Quasi-states are 
important for agential international community since they allow this community to pursue goals 
and undertake concrete activities (those of statebuilding) which it can automatically present as 
‘doing something’ and ‘doing good’.  
What emerges out of this analysis is a suggestion that international actors need the 
embodiment of the idea of the international community. The notion of international community 
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gives purpose, becomes the tangible goal and the result of cooperation. It allows for maintaining 
actors’ identity and the perception of themselves as co-operating, caring and responsible. The 
enlightened project of helping those in need keeps them engaged. Statebuilding thus becomes an 
exercise in bonding between highly developed states, just as much as it is an activity of helping 
‘fragile’ states. It becomes the raison d'être of agential international community and is predicated 
upon its image of a purposive entity, acting for the benefit of the imagined international 
community.  
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CHAPTER	  4	  Russia:	  a	  different	  vision	  of	  the	  international	  
	  Introduction	  
This chapter proceeds from the assumption that a closer look at Russia’s view of the world 
facilitates a more critical approach to representations of the international developed by the English 
School. The broader aim is to challenge the reified and purportedly objective nature of international 
society as well as to denaturalise the discourse of international society.	   The constructions of the 
international produced in Russia are not only particularly useful in denaturalising the discourse of 
international society, they also illustrate how a vision of the world is embedded in and conditioned by 
historical and social processes.  
This chapter’s exploration of the Russian portrayal of the international realm is organised around 
two questions: what kind of representation of the international can be said to have emerged as 
significant in contemporary Russian discourse and what conditioned its production. The discussion 
opens with a short review of literature which analyses Russia from international society perspective. 
This section helps to illustrate the disjuncture between the international society-inspired 
interpretation of Russia’s place in the world and the way the international is represented in Russia.1 
The chapter proceeds to outlining sources that have contributed to the construction of the 
international in Russia and analyses the components of the Russian World (Russkii mir) narrative, a 
sui generis culmination of several currents influencing the thinking about the international in Russia. 
Subsequently Chapter Five will explore ways in which representations of the international pursued in 
Russia influence concepts and policies implemented with regard to a state. 
In Western IR literature there is very little discussion of how Russia imagines and represents the 
world. There appears to be little interest among Western scholars in what ‘the international’ means 
for Russia. In addition, ideas stemming from Russia are too readily dismissed as either insincere (that 
is, these ideas are regarded as no more than propaganda and political posturing) or, if they are 
considered genuinely-held, then as irrational and bypassing ‘reality’. No due attention is paid to the 
fact that these ideas, just as is the case with international society/international community, may play 
important roles in shaping Russia’s policy actions.  
There are two caveats in need of explaining at the outset. Firstly, there are multiple voices in the 
Russian debate on the international. This chapter does not claim to be exposing its essence, but 
merely attempts to outline recent directions in the thinking about international politics. It ponders 
meanings and values attached to terms used in order to describe the international realm. Some of 
these terms have long genealogies, some are entirely new creations, while others may be borrowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The review is focused on but not limited to scholars identified with or sympathetic to the English School. Since a clear 
demarcation of the English School is difficult to make and area studies scholars started engaging with the idea of 
international society, it is important to provide a broader overview. 
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from the West and, through the process of transmission and translation, acquire different meaning. As 
will be explained, certain contemporary ideas have a long pedigree and bring to fruition or simply 
provide a coherent rhetorical structure to notions circulating in Russian political thought for many 
decades.  
Secondly, the chapter refrains from situating or analysing Russia’s approach to international 
politics with the use of classificatory frameworks and images constructed in Western IR scholarship. 
The aim is to analyse the Russian view of the international on its own terms, paying attention to 
concerns voiced and questions asked by Russian international relations thinkers and surfacing as part 
of policy discourse.2 Since a clear separation between scholarly and policy discourses is difficult to 
make, to the extent that some scholars see them as mutually constitutive, the chapter discusses them 
in conjunction.3 
The	  world	  eyes	  Russia	  or	  Oni	  o	  nas4 
The classical English School position assumed that Russia had become westernised and that this 
westernisation enabled Russia to join European international society and to play a part in its 
expansion towards Asia.5 Contrary to an argument put forward by several Russian and Western 
scholars, e.g. Madina Tlostanova or Martin Malia,6 that Western Europe never regarded the Russian 
empire as its equal, the English School placed Russia either inside its understanding of European 
borders or compared it on equal terms with other European powers. The tsarist empire was 
interpreted as an outpost of European international society. Contributors to The Expansion of 
International Society discuss the role of the competing powers of Russia and Britain in Asia in 
conjunction rather than in opposition: 
On the whole, the British and the Russians do not seem to have treated Asian states with any 
more impatience and violence than that experienced by smaller European countries in time of 
conflict with more powerful neighbours.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A ‘Russian view’ is a problematic but necessary simplification I resort to in this thesis. What is meant by the phrase are 
elements I identified as prevailing in scholarly and policy discourses I collected from sources identified in Chapter One. 
3 A. Makarychev and V. Morozov, “Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of 
Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR”, International Studies Review, 15: 3, 2013: 330. 
4 Oni o nas (they about us) is a title borrowed from Izviestiya, a popular Russian daily newspaper, which in the section 
They about us publishes a selection of translated articles on Russian politics appearing in the Western press. 
5 Watson, “Russia and the European States System”, 61. Already in 1984, the Foreign Affairs review of Bull and 
Watson’s The Expansion of international society assessed it as ‘Western in outlook’, with no profound discussion of the 
‘Third’ or ‘Communist’ worlds. Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85, review by John C. Campbell. 
6 M. Tlostanova, Towards a Decolonization of Thinking and Knowledge: a Few Reflections from the World of Imperial 
Difference, http://antville.org/static/m1/files/madina_tlostanova_decolonia_thinking.pdf; M. E. Malia, Russia under 
western eyes: from the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum, Cambridge, Mass.; London: The Belnap Press of 
Harvard University Press: 1999. 
7 D. Gillard, “British and Russian relations with Asian governments in the nineteenth century”, in The Expansion of 
international society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 90. 
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Hedley Bull reiterated this view: ‘Like the maritime expansion of the Western European states, 
the expansion of Russia by land proceeded by the subjugation of indigenous communities and 
immigration and settlement by metropolitan peoples’.8 
While in the eighteenth century Russia was seen as joining the ranks of Europe’s great powers, 
in the course of the nineteenth century it began to fall behind its European counterparts. Doubts were 
raised over Russia’s place in European international society. Russia itself felt vulnerable in its 
relations with the West, in particular following Moscow’s defeat in the Crimean War.9 In addition to 
defeats on the battlefield, Russia was seen as failing to comply with the nineteenth-century standard 
of internal governance. This assessment had a negative bearing on its recognition as a great power.10 
Up to 1914, Tsarist Russia did not manage to make up this recognition gap. The Bolsheviks’ political 
project, in turn, placed revolutionary Russia entirely outside the framework of international society.11 
This uncertain status continued during the Cold War, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was one 
of the world’s two superpowers and as such, for Hedley Bull, constituted one of the pillars of 
international society.12  
The break-up of Soviet rule was initially thought to have ended the ‘dissociation of the Soviet 
Union from the West’.13 Post-Cold War Russia was interpreted in terms of: integration into the 
‘community of civilized states’; striving to ‘adapt’ to global Western-led institutions; being involved 
in a ‘quest’ for international society and recognition as a great power; or undergoing a ‘slow and 
uneven process of adjustment towards the acceptance of common rules’.14 The main question for 
scholars was to what extent Russia could be integrated into Western-led international society, and 
how quickly and easily it could be integrated, suggesting thereby Russia’s adaptive and passive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Bull, “The Revolt Against the West”, 218. This affirmative stance with regard to Russia’s role in international society 
has not prevented Bull from assessing that Russia in Europe ‘has always been perceived as semi-Asiatic in character’. 
Ibid. 
9 D. Lieven, “Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity”, Journal of Contemporary History, 34: 2, 
1999: 170; D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian orientalism: Asia in the Russian mind from Peter the Great to the 
emigration, Kindle ed., New Haven & London: Yale University Press: 2010, 233. 
10 The differences in Russia’s governance, explained as its inability to meet Europe-wide standards, undermined its 
credentials to great powerhood and resulted in Russia’s character as a European and civilised state being questioned. See 
I. B. Neumann, “Russia as a great power, 1815–2007”, Journal of International Relations and Development, 11: 2, 2008: 
37-38. In his later work Neumann offered a reconceptualization of Russia’s entry into international society suggesting 
that it should not be framed in terms of expansion but in terms of the entrant passing from one system to another. 
Neumann, “Entry into international society reconceptualised: the case of Russia”. 
11 There is no consensus within the English School on this subject. Adam Watson saw the Cold War international system 
as bipolar in structure but claimed it to be one international society, with a common structure of international law, 
diplomatic representation and rules inherited from European society. Watson, The evolution of international society: a 
comparative historical analysis, 290-298. 
12 Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics, 194-198. 
13 Watson, “Russia and the European States System”, 61. 
14 Y. Stivachtis, "The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in Contemporary International Society: The Case of Russia’s Entry into 
the ‘Community of Civilized States’," in Millennium Annual Conference. Rethinking the Standard(s) of Civilisation(s) in 
International Relations (London: 2013).; Buzan, From international to world society? English school theory and the 
social structure of globalisation, 238.; P. Aalto, “Russia's quest for international society and the prospects for regional-
level international societies”, International Relations, 21: 4, 2007. I. B. Neumann, “Russia's Quest for Recognition as a 
Great Power, 1489-2007”, Institute of European Studies and International Relations Working Paper: 1, 2007.; D. Averre, 
“Russian Foreign Policy and the Global Political Environment”, Problems of Post-Communism, 55: 5, 2008. 
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role.15 This way of framing the debate only confirmed and reinforced international society as a reified 
structure existing in the world.  
The more assertive stance on the international scene adopted by Russia since the mid-2000s was 
interpreted as Moscow’s preference for the pluralist vision of international society.16 Pluralism, with 
its stress on institutions of sovereignty, non-intervention and great power management, was deemed 
well suited as a description of Russia’s re-defined role on the global stage. Moscow was seen as a 
fierce opponent of any broadening of the rights of international society to interfere in domestic 
politics, including by means of humanitarian intervention. With its vision of international order based 
on Westphalian principles,17 Russia was read as resisting the idea of international society guided by 
the principles of solidarity postulated by liberal democratic states. Nonetheless, its place in 
international society was not questioned. Russia continued to be seen as partaking of the ‘thin’ 
version of this society: 
Russia does not reject the norms advanced by the main institutions of European international 
society, but it objects to what it sees as their instrumental application. Thus Russia has 
emerged as a neo-revisionist power, concerned not so much with advancing a set of 
alternative norms as ensuring the equal application of existing principles. Russia certainly 
does not repudiate engagement with international society, but at present is ready only for a 
relatively thin version. In this context Russia balks at being a passive norm-taker but does not 
present itself as a norm-innovator18 
By late-2000s, however, Russia came to be characterised as a challenger to the interests and 
ideas of liberal-democratic states.19 Russia began to be depicted as outside the international society 
core. More recently the argument has been amended slightly but only to suggest that Russia has never 
been a fully-fledged member and remains ‘suspended somewhere in the outer tier of international 
society’.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 C. Browning, “Reassessing Putin's Project. Reflections on IR Theory and the West”, Problems of Post-Communism, 
55: 5, 2008. These assessments were fuelled by Russia’s decline in terms of its military power, its abandonment of the 
Soviet-era claim to universalism and by what seemed as ever closer relations with Western states, in particular with the 
European Union,  throughout the 1990s. S. N. MacFarlane, “Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice”, in Order and 
justice in international relations, ed. R. Foot, J.L. Gaddis, and A. Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
16 Aalto, “Russia's quest for international society and the prospects for regional-level international societies”: 463; 
MacFarlane, “Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice”, 199-201; Browning, “Reassessing Putin's Project. Reflections 
on IR Theory and the West”: 7. 
17 MacFarlane, “Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice”, 201-202; Aalto, “Russia's quest for international society and 
the prospects for regional-level international societies”: 462-463.; A. E. Stent, “Restoration and Revolution in Putin's 
Foreign Policy”, Europe-Asia Studies, 60: 6, 2008. 
18 Sakwa, “Russia and Europe: whose society?”: 197. 
19 J. Mankoff, Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics, Second ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield: 2012; Sakwa, “Russia and Europe: whose society?”. 
20 Neumann, “Entry into international society reconceptualised: the case of Russia”. This view is shared by scholars 
whose work does not engage with the international society interpretative framework. They point to Russia’s ‘semi-
peripheral’ status in the world capitalist economy. T. Hopf, “The evolution of Russia's place in the world: 1991-2011”, 
Demokratizatsiya, 20: 3, 2012. 
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Russia’s interpretation of international relations remained largely unaccounted for by this strand 
of literature, which focused on providing its own narrative of the events guided by the master concept 
of international society.  
Portraying	  the	  international:	  the	  sources	  of	  Russia’s	  view	  on	  
international	  politics	  
Is it actually possible to identify a Russian conception of the international? A large part of the 
literature stemming from Russia is guided by a research agenda similar to that of the English School, 
i.e. to describe Russia’s relations with ‘the world’ rather than to study Russia’s representations of the 
international. Even Gadzhiyev who titled one of his chapters ‘The Russian view of the world’ 
(Russkii vzgliyad na ostalnyi mir), under this heading goes on to discuss Russia, its place and role 
internationally.21 Russian literature on IR often adapts Western theoretical approaches, slightly 
adjusting them to Russian ‘circumstances’.22 It is not uncommon to see the employment of Martin 
Wight’s three traditions of interpreting international politics (realist, rationalist and revolutionary) to 
account for Russian post-Soviet politics and the work of Alexander Sergounin stands out as an 
example.23 But a great deal of Russian scholarly work constructs a unique representation of the 
international realm rather than applying Western IR theory.24 Some of it is explicit in this attempt, for 
instance the ‘controversial’ Russian geopolitical thinker Alexander Dugin has been developing 
‘Theory of a Multipolar World’.25 Policy discourse, especially following the Maidan revolution in 
Ukraine in 2014, has become even bolder in producing specific representations of the international. 
Several elements affect Russia’s worldview and contribute to the construction of idiosyncratic 
narratives of international relations: firstly, the interpretation of historical experience and geography; 
secondly, Russian political thought and questions important for the construction of Russian identity; 
finally, approaches to and objectives of studying international politics, which continue to be 
influenced by the heritage of the Soviet IR scholarship. Although interrelated, these elements can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 K. S. Gadzhiyev, Sravnitelnyi analiz natsionalnoi identichnosti SShA i Rossii, Moskva: Logos: 2014. 
22 P. A. Tsygankov, ed., Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya: teorii, konflikty, dvizheniya, organizatsii, 2nd ed., (Moskva: 
Alfa-M: INFRA-M, 2008); V. A. Achkasov and V. A. Gutorov, eds., Politologiya, (Moskva: Vysshee obrazovaniye, 
2008). 
23 A. Sergounin, “Russian Post-Communist Foreign Policy Thinking at the Crossroads”, Journal of International 
Relations and Development, 3: 3, 2000. For a more detailed exploration of this argument see: N. Morozova, “Geopolitics, 
Eurasianism and Russian foreign policy under Putin”, Geopolitics, 14: 4, 2009. 
24 See e.g. a chapter in the textbook on political science devoted to Russia’s place in international politics, which 
discusses the issue through the lens of geopolitics (I.E. Timermanis (ed.), Politologiya. Uchenbnik dliya bakalavrov 
(Moskva: Yurait 2015)) or Andrei P. Tsygankov’s attempt to explain international relations using ideas elaborated in 
Russian political thought (A. P. Tsygankov, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya: traditsii russkoi politicheskoi mysli, Moskva: 
Alfa-M, Infra-M: 2013). 
25 A. Dugin, Yevraziiskii revansh Rossii, Moskva: Algoritm 2014. Dugin’s contribution to IR theory was recently 
introduced in more detail to the English-speaking audience in the Theory Talks series. Theory Talk’s editor presented 
Dugin as a ‘controversial figure’ who, despite or due to his alleged influence on Putin’s foreign policy, should be taken 
into account in outlining the Russian perspective on the discipline and practice of international relations’, ‘Alexander 
Dugin on Eurasianism, the Geopolitics of Land and Sea, and a Russian Theory of Multipolarity’, Theory Talk, Issue 66, 
December 7, 2014. 
94 
	  
also differ fundamentally in terms of their approach to knowledge, i.e. the possibilities, limitations 
and sources of knowing. While the strand discussing Russian identity allows for a more reflexivist 
approach to knowledge, IR scholarship, particularly the strand following the Soviet school, aims at 
scientific accuracy and claims to be revealing truth. The consequence is that elements of Russian 
discourse on the international prove contradictory. The next section will discuss each source in some 
detail. 
Historical	  experience	  and	  interpretation	  
Historical narratives are crucial for the production of specific contemporary representations of 
the international realm. The historical development of Russia and the West, though connected in 
many ways, cannot be claimed to have followed the same trajectory.26 The experience of certain 
historical events, as well as narratives developed to explain them, differ starkly between Russia and 
the West. There are also differences in the approach to historical knowledge. In Russia history 
remains the privileged source of truth, which speaks not only to the past but also to the present. The 
elevated status of historical knowledge coexists with an emotional attachment to historical events 
developed among the general public. As Sergei Oushakine aptly put it, Russians ‘create some sort of 
an emotional relation with the past’ and live in the past instead of learning from it.27  
One of the most striking contemporary examples of disjuncture in the interpretation of historical 
events is the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which left a legacy of resentment in Russia and a sense 
of triumph in the West. For Russians, the fall of the Soviet Union was not only hard to accept but 
also difficult to believe in: ‘what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart. (…) few 
people realised how truly dramatic those events and their consequences would be.’28 Russian 
academic textbooks refer to the fall of the Soviet Union in terms of an event that drastically altered 
the geopolitical situation ‘on the planet Earth’ (na planete v tselom).29 This attitude is broadly shared 
by the Russian elite: ‘… the sudden crash of and dissolution of a great and powerful state, which 
existed for many centuries and to which they belonged. This catastrophe seems inexplicable not only 
for the man in the street, but for many intellectuals and politicians’.30	  Vladimir Putin called it ‘the 
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century’ and an ‘outrageous historical injustice’.31	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Richard Pipes, ‘To imperium się rozpadnie, Rozmowa z Richardem Pipesem’ [This empire will fall apart. Interview 
with Richard Pipes], Arka, No. 33, 1991. 




29 Timermanis, Politologiya. Uchenbnik dliya bakalavrov: 650. 
30 Y. Borko, “Possible scenarios for geopolitical shifts in Russian-European relations”, in Geopolitics in post-wall 
Europe: security, territory and identity, ed. P. Baev, V.I. Einagel, and O. Tunander (Oslo, London: PRIO, Sage, 1997), 
205. 
31 V. Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 25 April 2005; V. Putin, Address by 
President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889, last accessed 19 March 2014.  
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It is important to note at this point that there is no neat dividing line between a viewpoint, which 
is by no means natural, and historical revisionism or a purposeful idealisation and restoration of the 
positive image of the former regime in Russia. As of mid-2000s, the rehabilitation of the Soviet 
heritage became part of the officially promoted historical identity, a trend symbolically reflected in 
the restoration of the Soviet Union’s anthem, the reconstruction of Stalin’s monuments in the 
vicinities of Moscow and a return to festive celebrations of the victory in the Great Patriotic War 
1941-1945.32 The latter can be interpreted as an instrument of historical policy aimed at the 
consolidation of society. The celebrations are accompanied by a largely uncritical narrative 
dismissing the social costs of the victory.	  2009 saw the establishment of a Committee whose task has 
been to counteract any attempts to ‘falsify history’ which may be detrimental to the interests of 
Russia (Kommisiya pri Prezidente Rossiiskoi Federatsii po protivodeistviyu popytkam falsifikatsii 
istorii v ushcherb interesam Rossii). Despite the fact that the Committee did not take any specific 
action and was ultimately dissolved in 2012, those historians who would wish to question the official 
interpretation of history may have resorted to self-censorship.33  
While it has been habitual in Western scholarship to refer to the break-up of the Soviet Union or 
the fall of communism as important markers denoting the end of the post-1945 historical era, Russia 
in its official discourse prefers to refer to the fall of the Berlin Wall rather than to the breakup of the 
Soviet Union as a marker of a significant change: ‘But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin 
Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice – one that was also made by our people, the people of 
Russia (…)’.34 This distinction illustrates Russia’s uneasiness with portraying the USSR in a negative 
light and a preference for presenting the Soviet Union as the initiator of positive changes. 
Since any historical narrative involves making a choice about which events to include, 
approaching history from a specific perspective involves selecting particular historical events and 
incorporating them into contemporary political discourse.35 In Russia’s case importance has been 
placed on the Second World War and the post war peace settlement:  
‘Beginning from the Primakov times [since he became Russia’s foreign minister in 1996] 
journalists began publishing books praising the Yalta agreement and underlining that Russia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 N. Potapova, “Normativity in Russian History Education: Political Patterns and National History Textbooks”, JSSE-
Journal of Social Science Education, 14: 1, 2014; J. Zajda, "The Politicizing of Russian History Education in the Russian 
Media", Educational Practice and Theory, 36:2, 2014. 
33 W. Konończuk, “Dekomunizacja, której nie było” [Decommunisation that did not take place], Tygodnik Powszechny, 8 
June 2015, https://www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/dekomunizacja-ktorej-nie-bylo-28644.  
34 V. Putin, Vystupleniye I Diskussiya Na Miunkhenskoj Konferentsii Po Voprosam Politiki Bezopasnosti, 10 Fevraliya 
Munich: 2007. 
35 Anne L. Clunan argues that the choice of historical legacies to be incorporated into national identities depends on 
aspirations a particular nation tends to collectively uphold. A. L. Clunan, The social construction of Russia's resurgence: 
aspirations, identity, and security interests, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 2009. 
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is against any revisions of the results of the WWII. Russia sees the world through Yalta and 
Potsdam agreements; the US through 9/11’.36  
The conflict that the West describes as the Second World War (and dates as starting in 1939 and 
finishing in 1945) is framed in Russia as the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) and has often been 
described as the foundational myth of Putin’s Russia.37 The Yalta agreements have been used to 
reinforce Russia’s international standing. Stressing the key role played by Russia, Putin juxtaposed 
the long peace following the Yalta agreement with the failure of the Versailles Treaty, where Russia 
had no place at the table.38 The Soviet Union’s victory over the Nazi Germany is used to justify 
Russia’s privileged place in the world.39 This victory is represented as uniting Russia with its post-
Soviet neighbours. The shared experience of the Great Patriotic War has been recently heavily 
exploited on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of its conclusion, celebrated in May 2015.40 Russian 
official discourse supplemented the numerous references to the Second World War concluding 
agreements with allegations of their breaking or misrepresentation on part of Western states: 
Russia and China maintain the same approaches to the assessment of the WWII outcome. 
They can be found, in particular, in the Joint Statement of the President of the Russian 
Federation and the President of the People's Republic of China on the 65th Anniversary of the 
End of World War II, issued in Beijing on September 27, 2010. The solidarity of our countries 
is of significant importance against the background of constant attempts to falsify the history, 
negate the deeds of soldiers-liberators, and whitewash German fascism and Japanese 
militarism. We believe that recognition in full extent of WWII outcomes, which are fixed in 
the UN Charter and other international documents, is imperative for all the states. First of all, 
it is the inviolability of all the decisions taken by victorious powers.41  
The distinct interpretation of history is supplemented by differences in Western and Russian 
geographical depictions of the world.42 Geography, rather than a product of scientific reasoning, is 
very much subject to interpretation. Terms such as Asia or the East become described or mapped 
onto the world in specific ways depending on who does the mapping. In addition, seeming purely 
geographical (read: scientific) denominations, such as the East and the West of Europe, may acquire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Dr Konstantin Khudoley, Head of European Studies Department, School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State 
University, guest lecture “Understanding Russia's Foreign Policy”, 27.02.2014 Aberystwyth University. 
37 M. V. Linan, “Modernization and Historical Memory in Russia”, Problems of Post-Communism, 59: 6, 2012: 21-23. 
38 Zasedaniye mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba «Valdai», 19 September 2013, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/news/19243.  
39 E. A. Wood, “Performing Memory: Vladimir Putin and the Celebration of World War II in Russia”, The Soviet and 
Post-Soviet Review, 38: 2, 2011. 
40 I. Okuniyev, “Raznyye Realnosti”, Rossiya v globalnoi politike, 13: 2, 2014, 
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Raznye-realnosti-16583.  
41 Interview of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the China Daily published on April 15, 2014, source: 
Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/44375f6eee6a82c944257cbb002097b6!Open
Document  (last accessed 20 April 2014). Russia has been promoting similar declarations, directed against alleged 
attempts to falsify history of World War II, in relations with such states as Israel. 
42 A. de Lazari, O. Riabow and M. Żakowska, Europa i niedźwiedź [Europe and the Bear], (Warszawa 2013): 43-46. 
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symbolic meaning in the course of their employment. While in Western European cultural depictions, 
the East can receive negative connotations, in the Russian culture, the East tends to acquire a positive 
meaning. The former Soviet republics of Central Asia, in turn, tend to be depicted in Russia not as 
parts of Asia but as components of the post-Soviet space (post-sovetskoye prostranstvo) or Eurasia.43 
Particularly in the 1990s these states tended to be described with a politically loaded term of ‘the near 
abroad’ (blizhnee zarhubezhe). The term did not fall into a complete disuse and returned in the 
official names accorded to associations gathering Russian compatriots.44 In some competition with 
the term Eurasia, Russian discourse stretches the conception of Europe. In an oft repeated statement 
concerning either security or the economy, Europe encompasses an area ‘from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok’.45 The malleability of geography is perhaps best illustrated with the positioning of 
Ukraine, which is depicted as either occupying the post-Soviet area, or as part of Russia, as a key 
component of Eurasia or as belonging to the ‘broader European space’. Especially following the 
Maidan Revolution there has been an upsurge in specific geographical depictions of Ukraine. 
Yevgenii Satanovskii, the president of the Middle East Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
wrote in 2014 that Ukraine has always been part of the Russian World. Ukraine’s very name is to 
denote to its location at the edge of Russia (‘okraina bolshogo russkogo mira’).46 
Soviet	  scholarship	  
In addition to historical experience, another important factor influencing contemporary Russian 
thinking on international affairs and the representation of the international realm that is constructed in 
Russia is the heritage of Soviet scholarship. Contemporary social sciences and political thought are 
influenced by and make references to the ‘Soviet legacy’.47 It is thus relevant to provide an 
exposition of the Soviet approach to IR; one which would be sufficiently brief not to distort the main 
argument and one which would avoid the attribution of perfect theoretical consistency to Soviet IR.48 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 B. Lo, Russia's Eastern direction - distinguishing the real from the virtual, Institut français des relations internationales 
2014, 7-8. Neumann develops the argument about the constructivist view of geography suggesting that Russian discourse 
on Europe on vice versa co-constructed the understanding of what it Russia and what is Europe construction. I. B. 
Neumann, “The geopolitics of delineating 'Russia' and 'Europe': the creation of the 'Other' in European and Russian 
tradition”, in Geopolitics in post-wall Europe: security, territory and identity, ed. P. Baev, V.I. Einagel, and O. Tunander 
(Oslo, London: PRIO, Sage, 1997), 148. 
44 For instance in June 2015 Rossotrudnichestvo, Russian federal government agency for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, compatriots and humanitarian cooperation, reported on a IV Regional Conference of Russian 
Compatriots of the Near Abroad Countries. 
45 M. Menkiszak, Greater Europe. Putin’s vision of European (dis)integration, OSW Studies 46, Warszawa: OSW 2013. 
46 Y. Satanovskii, Shla by ty… Zametki o natsionalnoi idee, Moskva: Eksmo: 2014, 443. 
47 Interview with senior IR scholar, St Petersburg University, 27.02.2014. In addition, Makarychev and Morozov argue 
that ‘the Soviet legacy and the poor quality of institutions in contemporary Russia contributed to the relative isolation of 
Russian academic community in the social sciences’. Makarychev and Morozov, “Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? 
The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR”: 332. 
48 This description is based primarily on three major English-language works devoted to the topic of Soviet IR: A. Lynch, 
The Soviet study of international relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1987; Light, The Soviet theory of 
international relations; W. Zimmerman, Soviet perspectives on international relations, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press: 1969. The difference, apart from the time period these works are concerned with, is that their authors decided to 
approach Soviet IR through distinctive perspectives. Zimmerman focuses on actors, hierarchy and distribution of power, 
which he complemented with an exposition of the emergence of IR as a discipline in post-WWII Russia. Lynch 
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The emergence or at least the significant appraisal of the discipline of IR in Russia is usually 
located in the post-Stalinist period.49 In Soviet times policy practice was statutorily motivated by 
Marxist-Leninist ideology.50 Theory employed elements of Marxist doctrine or stood as an outright 
synonym to Marxist ideology. Theory was therefore articulated almost habitually but with little 
precision, given that Soviet Marxism-Leninism itself was not a neat summary of Marx or Lenin’s 
theses. Importantly, theory and practice were considered interdependent. Practice could not exist 
without theory, especially in that theory was believed to have an ‘organising, mobilising and 
transforming’ function.51 Soviet policy was deemed scientific because it was guided by Marxist-
Leninist ideology based on objective laws of social development and, naturally, revealing the 
objective truth.52 Soviet theory enabled, so it was believed, Soviet decision-makers to anticipate the 
direction and the outcome of international affairs. Policy, in turn, was to have a feedback effect on 
theory.53 The claim of a close relation between theory and practice was not, however, substantiated 
by any exposition of the connection between particular foreign policy action and relevant theoretical 
grounds for it. The other characteristic of the knowledge-policy conundrum was that key 
policymakers – Lenin in the first place and also Stalin and Khrushchev – demonstrated ambitions to 
produce general propositions on international politics.54  
The Soviet Union rejected the very idea of the society of states, promoting instead the world-
wide expansion of communism. The working class, rather than states, was the primary frame of 
reference for the organisation of political relations. Soviet theorists, especially in the 1950s and 
1960s, did not view states as occupying an unchallenged position as the most prominent actors in 
international relations. Following a Marxist-Leninist script with its imagery of classes as historical 
agents, Soviet scholars saw the interplay between states as just one aspect of international relations.55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
approached the subject through political studies, sociology of IR and the system approach. Light approached Soviet IR 
through three types of relations: with capitalist states, with the developing world and among communist states. 
49 Zimmerman reports that prior to 1956, there have been important works produced by diplomatic historians (Eugene 
Tarle) and international lawyers (Eugene Korovin and Feodor Kozhevnikov) as well as by Stalin himself, e.g. ‘Economic 
problems of Socialism in the USSR’ where he defended Lenin’s theory of the inevitability of wars. Zimmerman, Soviet 
perspectives on international relations. (chapter 2). 
50 Marx and Engels interpreted the world through the prism of great power politics, which was common among nineteenth 
century historians in Britain. Lenin, in turn, merged the materialist conception of history with voluntary human activity, 
especially when revolutionary activity was in question, thus international politics acquired some autonomy in respect to 
economic forces, see Lynch, The Soviet study of international relations, 8-9. 
51 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 1, 4. Marxism assumed the revolutionary unity of theory and 
practice, see Zimmerman, Soviet perspectives on international relations. Western analysts were divided as to whether the 
Soviet foreign policy was motivated primarily by ideology or power. Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 
2. 
52 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 8. Interestingly, as Light reports, Soviet theorists believed that all 
systems of ideas were the product of social consciousness but the working class standpoint, openly adopted by dialectical 
materialism, did not preclude objectivism: ‘subjective interests of the proletariat coincide with objective laws of 
development’ (p. 8), ‘the Soviet view of what constitutes scientific methodology and science is so self-evidently far from 
Western concepts of science that it is simpler to agree to disagree (p. 10). 
53 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 316. 
54 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 74. With the book Perestroika: the new thinking for our country and 
the world, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union became an 
influential figure in carving the Soviet perspective on the international. 
55 Zimmerman, Soviet perspectives on international relations, 79. 
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They stipulated that relations between socialist and capitalist states were markedly different from 
those among socialist states as well as those between socialist and less developed countries. The 
Soviet Union regarded the ‘Third World’ through a theory of ‘general crisis of capitalism’, which 
was based on the assumption that the historical process inevitably leads towards the socialist system 
and the gradual weaning away of the capitalist-imperialist influence.56 After Nikita Khrushchev took 
over the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, relations between the USSR and the 
less developed states were to be built on the ‘promotion of progress’, ‘non-capitalist path of 
development’ and their drawing away from the West. Meanwhile, the goal in terms of relations with 
the US was to attain strategic parity and maintain a global power position.57  
Peace stood out among important themes in the Soviet approach to international relations. 
Scholarly literature and policy discourse underscored the ‘peace-loving nature’ of Soviet foreign 
policy.58 But, while a number of policies were launched under the banner of peace support, there was 
little conceptual analysis dedicated explicitly to the subject of peace. Margaret Light described it 
aptly: ‘It is almost as if the meaning and content of peace have been taken for granted by Soviet 
theorists’.59  
The reliance on Marxist-Leninist doctrine and programmatic anti-Westernism did not prevent the 
Soviets from borrowing certain concepts from the West. Deterrence theory was one prominent 
example.60 But these borrowings were not an indication of convergence with Western patterns of 
political thinking. As long as concepts and theories employed by Western political scientists could be 
incorporated into and provide greater sophistication for the general class model of society, their 
integration into this model served to reinforce the model rather than stimulating any questions of the 
model’s fundamental elements.61 
Soviet methodology and claims to validity differed from Western approaches to knowledge 
production. A particular polemical style, characterised by frequent recourse to quoting, especially 
from classical socialist writers, was used to balance the absence of evidence, examples or illustrations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 R. C. Tucker, The Soviet political mind: studies in Stalinism and post-Stalin change, New York ; London: Frederick 
A.Praeger: 1963, 181; B. Sen Gupta, “An approach to the study of Soviet politics for the third world”, in Soviet economic 
and political relations with the developing world, ed. R.E. Kanet and D. Bahry (New York: Praeger, 1975). 
57 E. Kridl Valkenier, “The Soviet Union and the Third World: from Khrushchev's "Zone of peace" to Brezhnev's "Peace 
programme"”, in Soviet economic and political relations with the developing world, ed. R.E. Kanet and D. Bahry (New 
York: Praeger, 1975), 4-5. 
58 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 237. Soviet theorists and political leaders employed the Leninist 
principle of ‘peaceful coexistence’ to describe and, arguably, guide relations between socialist and capitalist states. Light 
defines the doctrine as ‘competition…stopping short of military confrontation’ Light, The Soviet theory of international 
relations, 25. and as one which shifts conflict to the realm of economic and ideological spheres  Light, The Soviet theory 
of international relations, 29. 
59 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 238. Light did not identify entries for ‘peace’ in diplomatic 
dictionaries or the Dictionary of scientific communism, despite there being a wealth of writing on the theory of war. 
60 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 244. 
61 Oded Eran, Soviet Area Studies and foreign policy, 1974, Santa Barbara, p. 12 reference after Lynch, The Soviet study 
of international relations, 31. In the 1960s several scholars started questioning the adequacy of Marxist-Leninist axioms 
for the study of international relations and attempted developing a more independent conceptual apparatus. Dmitri 
Yermolenko for instance, in 1966, suggested to discuss world problems within the ‘sociology of international relations’ 
and to approach international relations as social processes. Lynch, The Soviet study of international relations, 40. 
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that supported the arguments. The writing was rich in description but limited in argument. Claims 
were rarely substantiated and tended towards the descriptive rather than the analytical. Methodology 
was rarely explained and assumptions behind the ‘dialectical method’ were never outlined in detail.62 
In general, theory was used with three purposes in mind: to legitimize; to justify; and as a 
‘cohesive device’ to forge a multinational socialist system. As Margot Light puts it: 
although Soviet state interests and the interests of the international working class (…) are 
usually said by Soviet theorists to be identical, it is not necessarily the case that this is 
obvious either to the Soviet public or to other members of the international working class. 
When it is not universally perceived to be the case, theory has a vital role in explaining how 
the international interest is best served.63 
The Soviet approach to facts and theory as well as political pressure on social scientists in the 
Soviet Union not to engage with Western or “bourgeois” type of thinking, created a wide knowledge 
and understanding gap.64 Perestroika started to open up Russian scholarship to foreign influences. 
Under Mikhail Gorbachev and the ‘new thinking’ doctrine, the Soviet Union was to reconsider its 
understanding of and relationship with the outside world.65 Gorbachev’s book Perestroika was 
famously addressed ‘to the citizens of the whole world’ and was an invitation to dialogue on the 
future of global politics. It had a specific intention – ‘we want to be understood’ – and a clear 
objective: ‘to strengthen international trust’.66 Gorbachev’s work, however, was not a break with the 
past. It continued the Soviet tradition, particularly in its reliance on Lenin as ‘an ideological source of 
Perestroika’: 
The works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism remained for us an inexhaustible source of 
dialectical creative thought, theoretical wealth and political sagacity. His very image is an 
undying source example of lofty moral strength (…). Lenin lives on in the minds and hearts of 
millions of people. (...) The Leninist period is instructive in that it proved the strength of 
Marxist-Leninist dialectics, the conclusions of which are based on an analysis of the actual 
historical situation.67 
In his book Gorbachev interpreted the world as divided into three groups with distinct interests: 
socialist, capitalist, and belonging to the ‘Third World’.68 This work was premised on the 
assumption, still very much in vogue, of the equal standing of the Soviet Union and the US. It was a 
visionary manifesto that contained little concrete detail of how to implement the ideals it put forward. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 317-322. 
63 Light, The Soviet theory of international relations, 328. 
64 Makarychev and Morozov, “Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of 
Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR”: 333. See also   Aleksei Bogaturov, ‘Desiat Let Paradigmy Osvoenia’, Pro et 
Contra,  5:1, 2000. 
65 M. S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: new thinking for our country and the world, London: Collins: 1987. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Gorbachev, Perestroika: new thinking for our country and the world, 25-26. 
68 Gorbachev, Perestroika: new thinking for our country and the world, 136. 
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In a chapter entitled, ‘Our road to a new outlook’, Gorbachev outlined the inspiration for his writing 
rather than proposed any steps to take. He also stood firm on the perseverance of socialism: ‘no one 
can close down the world of socialism’.69 
Declaring the desire to avoid international confrontation, Gorbachev underscored the high moral 
standing of the Soviet Union:  
We do not wish to handle international affairs in a manner that would heighten confrontation. 
While we do not approve the character of current relations between the West and the 
developing countries, we do not urge that they should be disrupted. We believe these relations 
should be transformed by ridding them of neo-colonialism, which differs from the old 
colonialism only in that its mechanism of exploitation is more sophisticated.70  
Gorbachev’s views on multilateral cooperation expose his criticism of the West’s exclusionary 
approach to international affairs:  
By all indications, the West would like to keep things in the family, so to speak, within the 
Sevens, the Fives and the like. This probably explains the attempts to discredit the United 
Nations. It is alleged, for instance, that the UN is losing its meaning and that it is almost 
disintegrating.71  
In contradiction to the club-like Western approach, Gorbachev presented international security as 
indivisible. The only solid foundation for security was the recognition of the equality of peoples and 
countries.72 
Studying	  and	  speaking	  about	  international	  politics	  
There are several characteristics of the contemporary Russian approach to the discipline of IR 
that need outlining.73 On the most general level, the Russian IR debate is usually framed in terms of 
foreign policy analysis even if the spectrum of ideas discussed is much broader.74 Compared with 
British academia, there is less scope for pluralism. Several academic figures, usually with experience 
in the world of policymaking, such as Yevgeny Primakov, establish priorities and set the tone. 
Russian academics tend to be the product of the educational system they themselves construct. 
Young scholars follow intellectual directions established by their predecessors to climb up the career 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid. 
70 Gorbachev, Perestroika: new thinking for our country and the world, 139-140. 
71 Gorbachev, Perestroika: new thinking for our country and the world, 140. 
72 Gorbachev, Perestroika: new thinking for our country and the world, 142. 
73 The state of IR discipline in Russia has not been comprehensively researched so far. Only a few contributions offered 
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path. Few had experience overseas and Western-trained academics do not return to undertake 
scholarly work in Russia. As a result, Russian thinking on IR becomes dogmatic and stagnant. The 
broader public debate is animated largely by commentators affiliated with think-tanks that are 
supportive or sympathetic rather than independent or critical of the Kremlin. Two such examples are: 
the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP, Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike) and the 
Valdai Club. The former in its reports promotes both the idea of multipolarity and the necessity for 
Russia to conduct an independent foreign policy, without any dependence on the West.75 The latter 
creates the impression of Western scholarship as biased against Russia.76 
Writing style and translation challenges add to the specificities of the Russian debate about the 
international. The writing about politics is frequently descriptive and takes refuge in metaphor, 
resorts to sayings and implicit comparisons and shies away from conclusive statements. It offers little 
in the way of detail and the vagueness of its arguments makes a critical engagement difficult. That 
Russia ‘stood up from its knees’ (Rossiya vstala s kolen) is a metaphor popularly used to describe 
Russia’s natural and legitimate regaining of its due international position.77 It is difficult to find an 
English language equivalent of velikaya derzhava a phrase which is often used to describe Russia. 
‘Great power’ is a simplification, since derzhava may refer to power, might, or dominion and is also 
said to have a certain mystique to it.78 Russkii mir may mean both the Russian World but also 
Russian peace. 
A relatively common phenomenon in academic textbooks is the manipulation of the timeframe 
that is used. Extensive references to history leave little space for a discussion of contemporary issues 
even in works supposedly dedicated to the analysis of present-day affairs. The accounts of the past 
serve as convenient substitutes for the discussion of the present.79  
The border between translation challenges and purposeful misrepresentation of concepts is 
blurred, especially in the policy discourse. For instance, the term ‘humanitarian’, though not 
unproblematic in Western scholarly and policy discourse, is usually attached to life-saving issues and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Based on an interview with a senior UK based Russian scholar who received his training both in Russia and the UK, 18 
June 2014.  
76 See e.g. Valdai Paper Special Issue: War is Peace by Andrei Bystritsky, http://valdaiclub.com/publication/75660.html 
(last accessed 28 February 2015). 
77 There is also an array of metaphors describing Russia’s domestic politics. ‘The Kremlin has many towers’ denotes to 
different power centres in Russia’s government and their possibly conflicting aims. This theme has been developed 
further by Andrey Makarychev who explains metaphors are an important discursive tool used in Russia’s identity 
construction A. S. Makarychev, “Images, metaphores, and power: reinventing the grammar of Russian trans-border 
regionalism”, in Russia's identity in international relations: images, perceptions, misperceptions, ed. R. Taras (2013). 
78 R. Taras, “The power of images and the images of power: past and present identity in Russia's international relations”, 
in Russia's identity in international relations: images, perceptions, misperceptions, ed. R. Taras (2013), 1; P. Baev, 
“Russia's departure from empire: self-assertiveness and a new retreat”, in Geopolitics in post-wall Europe: security, 
territory and identity, ed. P. Baev, V.I. Einagel, and O. Tunander (Oslo, London: PRIO, Sage, 1997), 186; O. 
Kharkhordin, Main concepts of Russian politics, Lanham, MD; Oxford: University Press of America: 2005.  
79 Especially the most recent editions are selective with regard to post-2000s events taking place in Russia and the post-
Soviet space they decide to cover. No comments are offered on Putin’s third presidential term in particular. See, for 
example, the 2015 edition of the political science textbook (Politologiya), which in the section dedicated to the political 
modernization of contemporary Russia finalizes its analysis on the year 2008 and the beginning of Medvedev’s 
presidency. See Timermanis, Politologiya. Uchenbnik dliya bakalavrov, 588-589. 
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used in the context of humanitarian aid. In the Russian discourse, its meaning is closer to the term 
‘humanistic’ and becomes related to tourism and youth exchanges, as in this passage: ‘Chinese-
Russian humanitarian cooperation has been developing dynamically. The Year of Chinese Tourism in 
Russia concluded with success, and (…) Friendly Youth Exchanges are to be held in the two 
countries’.80  
Differences in meaning, resulting partly from translation difficulties and partly from purposeful 
misrepresentation, are not easily questioned. Concepts such as liberalism or democracy, which in 
Western scholarship are filled with meaning embedded in historical experience, seem more malleable 
in Russia. This lack of specific experiences with how these concepts are put into practice contributes 
to the concepts’ greater openness to interpretation and their susceptibility to acquire meanings 
radically different from those that academia and the policy world may be accustomed to in the West. 
The explanation of concepts crucial for understanding contemporary affairs is characterized by 
ecclectism and internal contradictions. For instance, geopolitics is depicted without any critique as 
‘naturally’ focused on great powers and their privileges over other states, while at the same time 
authors admit that one of the functions of geopolitics is to promote ideology.81  
The re-interpretation of specific terms is accompanied by uncertainty with regard to 
methodology. Some Russian scholars go as far as to claim that Russian IR scholarship lacks 
methodology.82 Pavlova and Romanova argue that, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
Russian IR scholarship drew heavily on the Western ideas of IR but refrained from debating Western 
methodology. As a result, the application of a theory is interpreted as the declaration of the author’s 
political orientation. Constructivism or discourse analysis is usually associated with a liberal political 
orientation, whereas a realist author becomes classified as a conservative, whose writing is oriented 
towards the defence of Russia’s place in the world.83  
The positivist approach dominates IR scholarly writing and the quest for IR as proper science is 
usually satisfied with a recourse to American classics, as in this statement by Bordachev: ‘Structural 
theory of Kenneth Waltz and his successors converted IR into proper science’.84 This may be one of 
the reasons why Russian IR scholars tend to situate their research in the realist tradition, understood 
as focusing on material power. Irina Vasilenko, in a textbook on Russian politics, defines the task for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in an interview to China Daily published on April 15, 2014, source: 
Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/44375f6eee6a82c944257cbb002097b6!Open
Document   (last accessed 20 April 2014). The Russian word gumanitarnyi means both humanitarian and humanist. 
81 Timermanis (ed.), Politologiya. Uchenbnik dliya bakalavro, 626-667. 
82 Pavlova and Romanova, “Ideinoye Sopernichestvo Ili «Tresh-Diskurs»”. 
83 Ibid. 
84 T. Bordachev, “Sila, Moral, Spravedlivost’”, Rossiya v globalnoi politike, 13: 2, 2014. Timofei Bordachev is Russian 
IR scholar and political commentator. 
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Russian political science as: ‘the scientific conduct of objective research on the current problems of 
Russian politics, followed by proposals of constructive solutions’.85 
Part of contemporary Russian IR scholarship claims that Western approaches are incapable of 
accounting for Russia’s uniqueness and proposes developing a specific Russian social theory 
accompanied with idiosyncratic terminology distinct from Western ideas.86 This drive may be the 
result of a merger between an official political agenda and a section of Russian scholarly endeavours. 
Academia is frequently employed to provide background or a ‘scientific’ explanation for the political 
demagogy of ‘sovereign democracy’ and politically motivated re-definitions such as the reframing of 
‘soft power’ into a state’s sovereign right to protect its culture from Western dominance.87 Andrei 
and Pavel Tsygankov took a pioneering attempt to characterize and classify Russian IR. They related 
major currents in Russian IR scholarship to three ideological traditions, identified as Westernism, 
Statism and Civilizationism, arguing that it was ideology and the perception of Self and the Other 
that influenced both the choice of IR theories and the understanding of particular IR concepts.88 
Makarychev and Morozov take, however, a critical stance towards what they term epistemological 
self-sufficiency: ‘any theory designed as purposely non-Western is bound to remain self-referential 
and, in the final analysis, irrelevant’.89 This drive for uniqueness and concept-development has not 
yet found its way into Russian IR textbooks, which focus predominantly on discussing Western IR 
theories.90 
Contemporary	  representations	  of	  international	  politics:	  
multipolarity	  and	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  Russian	  World	  	  
The idea of the Russian World (Russkii mir), which is increasingly articulated by Russian 
scholars and policymakers, constitutes the culmination of thinking about the international that has 
been developing in Russia since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Though it may seem novel, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 I. A. Vasilenko, Sovremennaya rossiiskaya politika. Uchebnik dlia magistrov, Moskva: Yurait, 2014, 15-16. 
86 A comprehensive account of this trend was developed in: Makarychev and Morozov, “Is “Non-Western Theory” 
Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR”. See also Tsygankov, 
Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya: traditsii russkoi politicheskoi mysli. 
87 Makarychev and Morozov, “Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of 
Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR”: 329. See also K. Kosachev, “Ne Rybu, a Udochku”, Rossiya v globalnoi 
politike, 11: 5, 2012. 
88 Tsygankov and Tsygankov, “National ideology and IR theory: Three incarnations of the 'Russian idea'”.  
89 Makarychev and Morozov, “Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of 
Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR”: 333. 
90 Examples include: Tsygankov, “Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational 
Debates” and Achkasov and Gutorov, eds., Politologiya, 579-595. Tsygankov identifies and recounts three major 
theoretical approaches (naiboleye izvestnyye paadigmy): realism, liberalism-idealism and radicalism; engages with 
postmodernism and introduces IR sociology. The English School – termed the British school (britanskaya shkola) is 
discussed only marginally. Another typical textbook on political science, with the section devoted to international 
relations, analyses the major currents in Western IR scholarship since the 1950s with the focus on such scholars as: Hans 
Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, James Rosenau, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye. See also the textbook published under the 
aegis of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, MGIMO: T.A. Shakleina, A.A. Baikov (ed.), Megatrendy. 
Osnovnyie traiektorii evolutsii mirovogo poriyadka v XXI veke (Moskva: Aspekt press 2014). 
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concept has important precedents dating back to the Tsarist and Soviet eras. Notions contributing to 
the idea of the Russian World, such as the Eurasian great power or Russian civilisation, have long 
been present but never dominated Russian discourse.91 Overshadowed, as they were, by approaches 
heralding pragmatism and denying ideological influences, they remained dormant and only 
sporadically resurfaced in policy and academic discourse. 
Russia’s	  internationalized	  identity	  	  	  
Russia’s national identity is inherently related to the way Russia constructs its international 
status and how it reads other states’ perceptions of this status. This is reinforced by the fact that 
Russia does not see itself as just a state among others; it sees itself as a great power.92 Russian 
academic and policy discourse of the 1990s took Russia’s great power status for granted, with only a 
few voices of dissent.93 In political discourse, great powerness was presented as an almost natural 
feature, a quality of Russia’s character. Vladimir Putin famously declared: ‘either Russia will be 
great or it will not be at all’.94 Andrei Kozyrev remarked that Russia was ‘doomed’ to be a great 
power.95 
A state’s constructions of self are influenced by its perception of others.96 This observation has 
been made on several occasions, but it is important to add that the identities that a state develops 
influence its vision of the international arena. Since portrayals of the international in Russia are 
entangled with the views of self, national identity becomes both a source and a component of 
Russia’s representation of the international. Russia’s national identity tends to be constructed largely 
through a particular positioning of the Russian state on the international stage. In addition, the most 
recent literature stemming from Russian academia underscores differences between the image Russia 
has of itself and the way it is viewed in the West, which further complicates the self-the world 
construct.97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Pavlova and Romanova, “Ideinoye Sopernichestvo Ili «Tresh-Diskurs»”.  
92 Taras, “The power of images and the images of power: past and present identity in Russia's international relations”; M. 
R. Freire, “Russian foreign policy in the making: The linkage between internal dynamics and the external context”, 
International Politics, 49: 4, 2012: 470-471; Stent, “Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy”: 1090-1092; B. 
Lo, “Evolution or Regression: Russian Foreign Policy in Putin's Second Term”, in Towards a Post-Putin Russia, ed. H. 
Blakkisrud (NUPI, 2006), 70. 
93 Baev, “Russia's departure from empire: self-assertiveness and a new retreat”, 185. The 1990s discourse was also 
pervaded by the perception of defeat and humiliation, hence the objective for Russia to  ‘get off its knees’ and regain the 
great power status became principal goals of Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. L. Jonson, Vladimir Putin and 
Central Asia: the shaping of Russian foreign policy, London: I. B. Tauris: 2004, 135-136. 
94 L. Shevtsova, Russia-lost in transition: the Yeltsin and Putin legacies, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment: 2007. 
95 B. Lo, Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era: reality, illusion, and mythmaking, Houndmills, Basingstoke; 
Hampshire, NY: Palgrave Macmillan: 2002, 19. 
96 T. Hopf, Social construction of international politics: identities & foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press: 2002; Clunan, The social construction of Russia's resurgence: aspirations, identity, and security 
interests. Hopf was among first scholars to propose a constructivist approach to analysing Russia’s policies. The state’s 
collection of identities, he argued, affects how that state or its leaders understand other states in world affairs. 
97 R. Taras, ed., Russia's identity in international relations: images, perceptions, misperceptions, (2013); S. G. Kara-
Murza, Rossiya i Zapad. Paradigmy osvoyeniya, Moskva: Akademicheskii proyekt "Kultura": 2013. 
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Russian identity is a difficult terrain where philosophy, political thought, art and policy 
intermingle. A term related to the Russian idea and a relatively common metaphorical way of 
approaching Russian identity is by reference to the ‘Russian soul’ (russkaia dusha).98 The meaning of 
this term is even more diffuse than the Russian idea and it is probably best reflected in the English 
word ‘culture.’ That ‘Russia can only be believed in’ is a cherished phrase that made itself very much 
at home in the Russian discourse. Its author, Fyodor Tyutchev, as a Russian poet and career diplomat, 
was himself an example of a merger of two rather different professional identities.99 The identity 
question is often discussed in parallel with the need to determine Russia’s fate (sud’ba Rossii).100 The 
specific mode of Russian writing about Russia, of which metaphors are just one characteristic, makes 
the attempt to conclude or summarize the Russian identity debate or to suggest a coherent set of 
values underpinning Russian society, an endeavour at serious risk of failure. The key question 
guiding the identity debate asks ‘What is Russia?’101 and it came back with a vengeance following 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.102 The discontinuity in the Russian state system casts a shadow 
on Russian identity, which needed to be defined anew, in relation but also in opposition to the 
Soviet.103  
While the Russian idea debate springs from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s philosophical and literary 
writing, more recent works, such as The Russian idea by Igor Chubais,104 rather than offering a 
framework helping to grasp the Russian value system, suggests we are faced with the problem of a 
complete absence thereof. The void is attributed to the destructive influence of bolshevism and can, 
in that author’s view, be filled only as a result of a turn to spirituality and history in search for norms 
underpinning societal cohesion. In that sense Chubais reminds us of the famous nineteenth century 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 See e.g. Andrzej de Lazari (ed.), Polskaya i rossiiskaya dusha (ot Adama Mitskevicha i Aleksandra Pushkina do 
Cheslava Milosha i Aleksandra Solzhenitsyna), Warszawa 2004. 
99 The entire verse of Tyutchev’s poem reads: ‘Russia cannot be understood with the mind alone, No ordinary yardstick 
can span her greatness: She stands alone, unique – In Russia, one can only believe’. Russian poets are relatively 
frequently interrogated and quoted on matters of contemporary politics, for another examples see Pavel Baev who refers 
to the late poet Joseph Brodsky deliberations on Russia’s great power status. Baev, “Russia's departure from empire: self-
assertiveness and a new retreat”, 186.  
100 Gadzhiyev, Sravnitelnyi analiz natsionalnoi identichnosti SShA i Rossii, 343. 
101 S. S. Sulakshin, ed., Natsiyonalnaya ideya Rossii, (Moskva: Nauchnyi ekspert, 2012). 
102 O. Malinova, “Russian and 'the West' in the 2000s: redefining Russian identity in official political discourse”, in 
Russia's identity in international relations: images, perceptions, misperceptions, ed. R. Taras (2013); A. Piontkovsky, 
East or West? Russia's Identity Crisis in Foreign Policy, London: Foreign Policy Centre 2013. For a thorough debate of 
the ‘What is Russia’ question in the Western literature see Clunan, who approached the theme from an innovative 
perspective of ‘aspirational constructivism’, supplementing key constructivist claims with insights from social 
psychology, with special reference to self-esteem. Clunan, The social construction of Russia's resurgence: aspirations, 
identity, and security interests, 3-11. The question of Russian identity has been also linked to Eurasianism and 
geopolitics. Morozova, “Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian foreign policy under Putin”. 
103 Clunan, The social construction of Russia's resurgence: aspirations, identity, and security interests. 
104 Chubais interprets the Russian idea as a system of values which has been subject to ‘historical mystification’ during 
the period of the construction of socialism. His book is presented as a contribution to ‘alternative, non-system social 
science’ and an attempt in ‘philosophical political journalism’ (pp.473). As such, the work does not make a distinction 
between terms such as Russian civilisation and identity. Igor Chubais authored several books on Russia’s identity: 
Rossiya v poiskach sebiya (Russia in search for itself), 1998; Ot russkoi idei k ideye novoy Rossii (From the Russian idea 
to the idea of a new Russia), 1996. The considerable attention these works received in the Russian media is attributed to 
the fact that Igor Chubais was the elder brother of Anatoly Chubais, one of the leading politicians and Yeltsin’s close 
advisors in the 1990s. F. Hill and C. G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press: 2013, 43-44. 
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concern with Russia’s lack of a national identity.105 This is, however, not a conclusion shared 
broadly. The national identity debate is heavily influenced by individuals from the top echelons of 
the Russian ruling elite. A monumental six volume work, Russia’s national idea,106 was co-edited by 
Vladimir Yakunin, who, at the time of its writing and publication, was the chairman of the Russian 
Railways and a persona closely associated with Vladimir Putin. The opus conveys a message that 
Russia still lacks and needs to create its post-Soviet national idea, for which the Russian civilization 
should be the main point of departure.  
The discussion of the Russian idea, suffused with specifically understood terms such as great 
power (velikaya derzhava) and the nation’s mission (natsionalnaya missiya), is interwoven with the 
claim for the existence of a distinct Russian civilization. The question of what constitutes Russia’s 
civilizational identity has been the source of fierce debates, ranging from being a European outpost in 
Asia, the Eastern state with the European façade or a distinct civilisation, combining features of both 
the West and the East.107 This civilizational approach to the question of Russia’s identity underscores 
Russia’s superiority with respect to other states.108 Ivan Ivanov, a Russian IR scholar, proposes for 
instance:  
On the moral plane, the Russian civilizational code contains […] such canons as the primacy 
of the moral principle, priority of spiritual values over material ones, rejection of inequality 
and injustice, community of being, commitment to one’s duty, patriotism, dedication to the 
ideal…109 
References to Russia as a unique civilization are frequent in post-Cold War Russian 
scholarship110 and figure conspicuously in political discourse. The notion of Russia as a distinct 
civilisation has been part and parcel of an intellectual current called Eurasianism. It stressed a 
specific path of Russia’s historical development, emphasising the spatial dimension of the Russian 
state (territorialno-prostranstvennyi faktor) which critics described as ‘territorial mysticism’.111  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 P. Chaadaev, Philosophical Letters, 1836. For an elaboration of this argument, see W. Zimmerman, “Slavophiles and 
Westernizers redux: contemporary Russian elite perspectives”, Post-Soviet Affairs, 21: 3, 2005. 
106 Sulakshin, ed., Natsiyonalnaya ideya Rossii. 
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Cambridge University Press: 1998. 
109 Ivan Ivanov, ‘Anatomia Evropeiskikh Tsennostei’, Sovremennaia Evropa 2, 2000, 21. 
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factor of Russia’s political entity. See Vasilenko, Sovremennaya rossiiskaya politika. Uchebnik dlia magistrov, 21-23. 
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sovremennost”, in Poisk natsionalno-tsivilizatsionnoi identichnosti i kontsept "osobogo puti" v rossiiskom massovom 
soznanii v kontekste modernizatsii, ed. V.V. Lapkin and V.I. Pantin (Moskva: IMEMO RAN, 2004). 




 The civilizational component of the debate on Russia’s identity may be seen as standing in stark 
contrast to the nationalist current. The way the concept of nationalism became incorporated into the 
discussion of Russia’s post-Soviet identity, however, allows for the merger of Russian nation and 
civilisation. In this view, ethnic Russians are the avant-garde of the Russian civilisation.112 
Russkii	  mir	  
Interpretations of the Russian World are still scarce among Western scholars. Some see it as an 
ethnocentric project waiting to be implemented,113 others as a foreign policy tool.114 I propose 
interpreting the Russian World as one among several comprehensive representations of the 
international co-prodced among Russian scholars and policymakers.  
The idea of the Russian World, still elusive as it continues to remain in the process of discursive 
elaboration, galvanised during Vladimir Putin’s third term into a relatively coherent vision of the 
international realm. Russian civilisation, encompassing Russian culture, nation, language and the 
Russian Orthodox Church, is at the heart of this idea.115 In addition to ideational and cultural aspects, 
territory is crucial to the notion of the Russian World. For a number of Russian thinkers, the Russian 
World remained inherently related to the ideology of Eurasianism, which combined civilisation and 
territory.116 The official rhetoric bases the concept on historical ties linking Russia with its post-
Soviet neighbours, the presence of ethnic Russians outside of the Russian Federation and the 
prevalence of Russian language in the post-Soviet space.117  
The use of the notion Russkii mir can be traced back to the mid 2000s. At that time, Russkii mir 
was understood in terms of cultural space of all Russian-speaking individuals. The cultural 
interpretation of the Russian world found its reflection in Putin’s speeches of the year 2007, the year 
officially dedicated to the Russian language. Back then Putin already spoke of the Russian world 
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‘broader than Russia itself’ but this phrase received cultural rather than geopolitical conotations.118 
Valerii Tishkov associates the origins of the Russian World with Gorbachev’s ‘opening’, which 
enabled the Russian diaspora to re-engage with the Russian state.  
The Russian World is not limited to ethnic Russians. The aim of granting protection to Russian 
compatriots living abroad119 coexists with the openness of the Russian World to all individuals who 
feel they belong to the ‘wider Russian World’.120 Although the concept of the Russian World is not 
directed against anyone, there is an implicit opposition towards the West. Simultaneously, the 
Russian World is imagined as enjoying higher moral standing than the ‘degenerated’ Western 
civilization with its ‘extreme liberalism’.121  
The reading of the international in terms of the Russian World was reinforced during Russia’s 
conflict with Ukraine. In the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution in early 2014, the Russian ruling 
elite wholeheartedly embraced and propagated the idea. In his programmatic speech following the 
annexation of Crimea, Vladimir Putin talked about the willingness to ‘restore unity’ to the Russian 
World. Crimea was termed ‘Russian native land’, Sevastopol the ‘Russian city’, and the Black Sea 
Fleet the ‘Russian military glory’.122 Vladimir Putin stressed that Russia and Ukraine are not only 
close neighbours but represent one nation, with Kiev as ‘the mother of Russian cities’ and the state of 
Old Rus’ as the common ancestor.123 
The idea of the Russian World implicitly divides the international realm into a broad Russia-
centred polity and the remaining world, where the West plays a particular role. Contrary to the 
purported inclusiveness of the idea of international society, Russkii mir ostensibly divides the 
international realm between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As the international is divided into two spheres, the 
Russian World and the rest, it is bound to the concomitant feelings of superiority and inferiority. 
Russia’s moral superiority is reproduced and confirmed by the civilizational rhetoric but locating the 
menace to the Russian World directly in the West exposes the inferiority complex. 
The idea of the Russian World transcends the borders of the Russian state in two, somewhat 
contradictory, ways. Firstly, it is based on the perception of the Russian nation spread across the post-
Soviet space following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.124 Secondly, it is the belief in Russia as a 
distinct civilization that cannot be limited to the borders of the Russian state. Russkii mir is composed 
of concentric circles where ethnic and orthodox Russians reside at the heart and are surrounded by 
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linguistic and/or historical-territorial identification with Russianness. According to this conception, 
Russia has a role greater than that of a state. This is possible and legitimate because of Russia’s 
civilizational heritage. Russkii mir allows for the Russian state to swell rather than expand, which 
would have imperialist connotations. In this broader sense, the state and the Russian civilization 
become one.125  
Russkii mir does not coexist easily with a state-centred representation of the international for one 
more reason. In cases when it is presented as inclusive, individuals or peoples rather than states are 
invited in. But the division of the world into states is secondary with respect to the important division 
between the Russia-centred World and the rest. Ambiguity remains with respect to the purported 
openness of Russkii mir. On one hand, the Russian World is accessible to all who feel they belong to 
it. On the other hand, it appears hostile towards those outside of the Russian World. 
Russkii mir is a doctrine directed at the Russian audience and abroad. Its main domestic function 
is the legitimization of a political system.126 The mission of restoring the Russian World becomes a 
useful tool for mobilizing Russian society. The promotion of the idea of the Russian World by the 
Kremlin has gone beyond Russia’s domestic audience. The opening ceremony of the Sochi Olympics 
in 2014, where the Russian culture and language took centre stage together with celebrations of 
Orthodoxy, served as symbolic validation of the idea to the outside world.127  
Russkii mir allows for the galvanisation of several key ideas about international politics, which 
have permeated the Russian discourse over the past two decades. Implicitly the idea encompasses 
elements of neoimperial and ethno-national projects, both of which have been present in the Russian 
discourse since the break-up of the Soviet Union.128 
Unipolarity,	  multipolarity	  
One approach, long transpiring Russian thinking on the international and contributing to or even 
enabling the idea of the Russian World, has been the tendency to interpret international relations in 
terms of competing centres of power or ‘poles’. The world is perceived as divided into regional 
blocs, under the leadership of particular great powers. Small states (i.e. all states with the exception 
of great powers) cannot remain neutral but have to belong to one of the poles.129 This idea found its 
reflection in numerous scholarly writings and policy statements discussing it under the overarching 
term of multipolarity. The understanding of multipolarity in the Russian discourse has evolved since 
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the end of the Cold War. It started as a concept describing a potential and expected world order not 
dominated by the United States. By the mid 2010s, a multipolar world came to be an objective 
representation of reality out there. Putin’s declaration that ‘the world is multipolar’ has been 
generally shared among scholars. 
Unipolarity has been the key frame used in Russia to define post-Cold War international 
relations. Seeing the international realm as unipolar denoted the material primacy of the US. The 
potentiality of the unilateral use of force was seen as the major source of instability, stimulating arms 
races and prompting states to acquire weapons of mass destruction.130 Abuses of power, and as such 
Russia considered US interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, were but examples of the dangers 
related to unipolarity and, in addition, illustrate the ineffectiveness of solutions involving the use of 
force in international relations.131 
In addition to being considered a threat, unipolarity came to have a symbolic meaning. It 
expresses a world where Russia has been denied a proper place, from which its voice has been 
excluded.132 A unipolar world is presented as one in which: 
there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day it is pernicious not only for all 
those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself  (…) And this certainly has nothing 
in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority 
in light of the interests and opinions of the minority. Incidentally, in Russia we are constantly 
being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn 
themselves. I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in 
today’s world. (…) the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral 
foundations for modern civilization.133 
Similar arguments were invoked by Vladimir Putin in his March 2014 speech, following the 
annexation of Crimea:  
After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international 
institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are sadly 
degrading. Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided 
by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to 
believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, 
that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against 
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sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle “If you are not with us, you are 
against us.” To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions 
from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply 
ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall. This happened in Yugoslavia (…) It was 
hard to believe (…) that at the end of the 20th century, one of Europe’s capitals, Belgrade, 
was under missile attack for several weeks (…). Was there a UN Security Council resolution 
on this matter? (…) And then, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the violations of the UN Security 
Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it, the 
bombing started.134 
The interpretation of the international provided by parts of the Russian academia does not differ 
in any substantial way from the one expressed by Putin above. A 2014 textbook issued under the 
auspices of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, MGIMO, the leading academic 
centre for IR in Russia, argues that the international realm is guided by ‘ad hoc’ norms elaborated by 
the West, rather than by a set of commonly agreed  international norms. The ultimate goal of the 
application of such ad hoc norms is the preservation of unipolarity under the primacy of the United 
States. The world is unable to agree on main security challenges. Ideological approaches of particular 
states trump on any possibility to elaborate a common view.135 
Russia’s exclusion from global decision-making processes was understood as a disregard and 
neglect of Russia’s interests and, as such, it was unacceptable for a former superpower.136 Historical, 
geographical and geopolitical arguments were mobilized to support Russia’s claim to defining 
international norms.137 Unipolarity, understood as Western domination and the West’s claim to the 
highest authority in international politics, was considered deeply unjust.138 Feeling ostracized from 
the West, Russia constructed its own resurgence in revanchist terms, recognising the post-Cold War 
order as unilaterally imposed on Russia.139 The perceived exclusion was built into the context of 
traditional Russian concerns: its weariness of NATO and anti-Americanism. NATO, viewed as an 
instrument of US foreign policy contributing to American global ascendance, was seen as forging 
unipolarity.140  
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Russia’s concerns were not limited solely to the context of NATO enlargement. Despite the 
perception of exclusion, Russian decision-makers disregarded and mistrusted Western invitations to 
‘join’ or ‘follow’ the West. Such offers were read as disrespectful, denying Russia the position of an 
architect of the global system and relegating it to the secondary function of a follower or executor of 
Europe’s wishes on the international scene. The European Council’s strategy on Russia of the 1999 
declared:  
The European Union welcomes Russia's return to its rightful place in the European family in 
a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of 
shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilisation.141  
This was met with a Russian response specifically aimed at emphasizing its great power status 
and its right to undertake sovereign decisions on the international stage: 
As a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to determine 
and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of an Euro-Asian 
state and the largest country of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) …142  
Unipolarity reflected the denial of Russia’s proper place and the treatment of Russia as a 
‘defeated’ power, rather than a great power and a leader of the post-Soviet region. It pushed Russia 
into the role of the losing side in the Cold War, one whose place in international politics would be 
constantly undermined by the West.143 Russia, believing itself to occupy a ‘unique place in the 
political scheme of the world, history and development of civilization’, refused to be the ‘object of 
civilizing influences on part of other states’ and required to be treated as an equal among equals’.144 
Rejecting the ‘pupil’ metaphor in its relationship with the West, Russia presented itself as a standard-
setter for other states.145 The drive for equality has been mixed with the feeling of superiority over 
the West and the perception of Russia’s ‘historic mission’ as separate from the West.146  
Multipolarity offered a convenient answer to Russia’s exclusion and self-esteem problem. It was 
a way to place Russia at the centre-stage of international affairs and the Russian World as a polity 
under Russia’s exclusive leadership. Under multipolarity, Russia is necessary for the world. It 
presents itself as ‘a responsible and constructive member of international community’ who 
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contributes to the settlement of global and regional problems.147 More importantly, perhaps, it regains 
the right to define and frame these problems. Russia regards itself as a ‘balancer’ and a contributor to 
maintaining international stability, which is understood first and foremost in terms of limiting the use 
of force by the West without Russia’s consent and protecting sovereignty as the highest value.  
Unsurprisingly, the idea of multipolarity acquired a prominent place in academic and policy 
discourse in Russia.148 The concept’s origins are attributed to Russian scholar-turned-politician 
Yevgeny Primakov and questions he raised while serving as Russia’s Foreign Minister in mid-1990s. 
Multipolarity re-emerged in the official discourse with particular frequency, following the West’s 
interventions in the Balkans in the late 1990s:  
Multipolarity is an obvious choice since it makes Russia’s quest for great power status possible. 
A multipolar world is where Russia would be viewed as a partner rather than a client of the 
West and, together with India and China, could counterbalance American hegemony.149  
Russia’s Military Doctrine of the year 2000 embraced multipolarity in a specific way. Among 
threats to national security it identified: ‘attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation’s 
interests in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one 
influential centre in a multipolar world’.150 Multipolarity was elevated to the level of official 
doctrine, which could serve as ‘an alternative to Western hegemony’.151 The multipolar world has 
become the central idea for Russian political class: ‘In 2007 in Munich Putin declared he would not 
play the game if the rules were established without Russia. The Customs Union was thought to be 
good enough to be the centre of the new pole’.152 Putin went so far as to recognize the multipolarity 
as a sui generis ‘law of nature’, depicting the attempts to maintain unipolarity as incompatible with 
‘diversity, given by God and nature’.153 
Towards the end of the 2000s, Russia declared the twilight of unipolarity and the transition to 
multipolarity. The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept described multipolarity as an ‘emerging’ 
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phenomenon.154 In 2008, following the Russia-Georgia war, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated 
that the unipolar world ceased to exist as a result of Russia’s military victory over Georgia. The 
global economic crisis of 2008 strengthened the perception of the waning of unipolarity. The political 
establishment and significant parts of Russian academia started perceiving the declining influence of 
the ‘historical West’ as an opportunity for Russia’s greater inclusion.155 Reflexions went beyond the 
material conception of Western power and pointed to the opening up of the ideational space: 
For the first time in many years, a real competitive environment has emerged on the market of 
ideas [between different] value systems and development models (…) the West is losing its 
monopoly on the globalization process156  
The foreign policy decree, signed by Vladimir Putin following his inauguration for a third 
presidential term in 2012, instructed the Foreign Ministry to implement a foreign policy ‘under the 
conditions of an emerging new, polycentric system of international relations’,157 a formula repeated 
in the 2013 Foreign Policy Doctrine.158 Putin additionally declared: ‘We cannot change the logic of 
global political and economic development. As I said, the world is multipolar.’159 Russia regarded 
these changes as the opportunity to ‘break out of the subordinate development paradigm, in which it 
has been since the Soviet Union’s break-up, and to return to the world stage as a co-manager of the 
new world order’.160 In that way, multipolarity – with power centres separated from each other – 
emerged as a necessary condition for the Russian World to come into being. Since regional blocs 
were supposed to constitute the sinews of the new architecture of international politics, the role of 
Eurasian integration as one of Russia’s contributions to the creation of a multipolar international 
order was repeatedly underlined in Russian official discourse.161 Multipolarity evolved from an 
academic concept into a policy goal. In the crude manoeuvre of reification, world politics made a 
quick transition from viewing multipolarity as a goal to declaring it a fact of being.  
The	  international	  as	  the	  realm	  of	  competition	  and	  confrontation	  
The combination of the distinctiveness of the Russian World, the conviction of Russia’s moral 
superiority and the perception of being threatened by the West, are all underpinned by the view of the 
international as the realm of competition and confrontation. For Russia, developments unfolding over 
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158  See also: Makarychev and Morozov, “Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of 
Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR”: 340. 
159 V. Putin, St Petersburg International Economic Forum, 23 May 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7230. 
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the two decades following the Cold War suggest a replacement of the East-West ideological 
confrontation with a ‘geopolitical’ one between Russia and the West. Since Russia and West are 
represented as geopolitical rivals, this only contributes to the perception of the West as a threat.162 
Consequently, the concept of victory (pobeda), which is key for Russian national narrative, features 
prominently in the thinking about the international. 
For those parts of the Russian elite who perceived the international realm in terms of 
confrontation and competition, geopolitics turned out to be a useful explanatory tool. Geopolitics has 
marked Russian writing about international relations since the break-up of the USSR. Characterised 
by concepts of national interest and spheres of influence, it has been present in academic, policy and 
popular discourses. While generally interpreted in terms of international competition or a zero-sum 
game, discursive struggles over the meaning of geopolitics have been common.163 For instance, 
geopolitics understood as a ‘balanced, non-ideological assessment of Russia’s national interests’ was 
first officially articulated by Russia’s first foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev in early 1990s. 
Considered ‘pragmatic’ and ‘objective’, at that time it was deliberately contrasted with ‘ideologised’ 
Soviet foreign policy.164 This approach was premised on a rather artificial distinction between a 
policy that can be either ideology-permeated or interest-driven. Over time nationalistic concerns 
about Russia’s ‘territorial integrity’ have been incorporated under the ‘geopolitics’ label. Political 
elites during Yeltsin’s presidency used geopolitics to win over nationalist voters’ support.165 
Geopolitics began to be perceived as a remedy for Russia’s foreign-policy identity crisis. It was 
expected to provide a new way of interpreting the international, following the fiasco of Soviet 
ideology.166 Contemporary literature oriented at popular readership presents geopolitics in terms of 
quasi-mechanical forces and regards historical events as ‘proofs’ of the laws of geopolitics operating 
in the world.167 
Questions posed within the framework of geopolitics ask how Russia is to preserve its territorial 
integrity and enhance its international standing.168 Although before the annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
the aim of Russian territorial expansion was thought of as unlikely, territorial gains are very much a 
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feature of geopolitical thinking. Geopolitics looks at the world through the prism of territorial 
acquisition or, when that is impossible, the preservation of spheres of interest.169 The characterisation 
of the Central-Eastern European states as forming the ‘cordon sanitaire’, separating the ‘old Europe’ 
from Russia and the perception of the EU in geopolitical terms, gains in popularity.170 
Despite the powerful message of Gorbachev’s Perestroika and its proclaimed opening to the 
world, the representation of the international as the site of competition and confrontation has 
increased since the late 1990s. It was to be found in the rhetoric of Russia’s leaders as well as in 
foreign policy and national security concepts. In 2006, Vladimir Putin stressed that the potential for 
conflict had steadily increased.171 He reinforced this diagnosis several years later, underlining that old 
sources of rivalry persist and new ones appear.172 Key documents pointed to the increasing rivalry 
among power centres.173 The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept accentuates this on-going competition in 
world politics:  
The current stage of the world development is characterized by profound changes in the 
geopolitical landscape largely provoked or accelerated by the global financial and economic 
crisis. (…) For the first time in modern history, global competition takes place on a 
civilizational level, whereby various values and models of development based on the universal 
principles of democracy and market economy start to clash and compete against each other. 
Cultural and civilizational diversity of the world becomes more and more manifest. (…) 
emphasis on civilizational identity. Desire to go back to one's civilizational roots (…) Increased 
competition for strategic resources.174  
The scholarly world has also drawn extensively from geopolitics in order to account for 
developments taking place between Russia and the West. The post-Soviet space is interpreted as an 
object of ‘geopolitical bargaining’ between Western states and Russia.175 Since the Ukrainian crisis, 
the interpretation of the international realm in confrontational terms has increased. Confrontation 
with the US, or the West, is perceived as the defining feature of the international realm. Washington 
is seen as trying to defend its position in the world but the stakes are higher for Russia as the outcome 
of this confrontation will define Russia’s place in the world. Losing such a conflict would inevitably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 For an English language discussion of the term geopolitics, see: S. Guzzini, ed., The Return of Geopolitcs in Europe? 
Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
170 Efremenko, “Za Flazhki”.  
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mean Russia has lost its position of a ‘pole’ in international politics.176 Competition in the 
international realm is regarded as transcending state borders. Both the Orange revolution in Ukraine 
in 2004 and the Maidan revolution in 2014 were interpreted in Russia as instances of geopolitical 
rivalry, a global competition for spheres of influence.177 Moscow views a string of recent popular 
uprisings, starting with the so-called Colour Revolutions of the early 2000s, the Arab Spring 
Revolutions and the toppling of the Moscow-backed government of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine, 
as sponsored and encouraged by the United States.178 Russian discourse accuses Western states of 
hypocrisy. In Russian eyes, the West only creates the impression that the period of ‘spheres of 
influence’ ended, while de facto it continues to broaden its own sphere of interest and denies this 
right to other powers, including Russia.179 This confrontation includes the imposition of the West’s 
cultural code under the guise of ‘universal values’.180  
Imagining the international in terms of competition and confrontation influences Russian 
approach to security. Security provision becomes associated with preventing Western involvement 
and ensuring protection against the West. Security is understood primarily in strategic terms, with 
particular focus on territory and material capability, both guaranteeing the state’s survival. This logic 
allows the claim that security increases through territorial expansion. Russian scholarship and policy 
view the security of individuals and communities as relying upon the strength of the state. 
The portrayal of the international in terms of competition and confrontation does not exclude a 
degree of discursively emphasised conciliatory approach. For instance in a 2014 presidential address 
Putin emphasized: 
Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are constantly 
proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to strengthen our level of trust and for our 
relations to be equal, open and fair. But we saw no reciprocal steps.181  
Equality has been emphasised as the condition for dialogue, but equality understood in a specific 
way. It is not the equality of sovereign statehood symbolised by the UN membership but Russia’s 
equality with other great powers, or the West.   
Western-­‐oriented	  view	  of	  the	  international?	  	  
Despite its name, the Russian World is an idea that in a multitude ways is oriented towards the 
West. It is a view of the international that Russia considers dominated by the West. Despite the overt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Karaganov, ‘Rossiya-SShA: dolgoye protivostoyaniye’, Rossiya v globalnoi politike, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2014, 
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Rossiya--SShA-dolgoe-protivostoyanie-16923. 
177 Efremenko, “Za flazhki”. 
178 V. Putin, Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889, last 
accessed 19 March 2014. 
179 Sergei Karaganov, “Rossiya-SShA: dolgoye protivostoyaniye”. 
180 Kosachev, “Ne Rybu, a Udochku”.  
181 V. Putin, Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889, last 
accessed 19 March 2014.  
119 
	  
Russocentrism of this concept, relations with the West constitute the primary frame of reference.182 
This paradoxical reliance on the West in constructing the view of the international is in a way an 
extension of the Russian identity debate. Many Russians would consider themselves to be European 
and would simultaneously subscribe to the view that Russia is in competition with Europe. Russia 
has long been depicted as part of Europe, but a part that emerged outside the framework of the social, 
political and cultural life of the West. Underscoring the distinction between ‘the West’ and ‘Europe’, 
Russian discourse has been able to reconcile the opposition towards Western political values with a 
sense of belonging to Europe.183  
Russia’s ideas about international politics tend to be described as reactive, i.e. in response to 
policies of the West.184 Russia either aspires to be part of the West, or leaves it.185 But even if Russia 
positions itself outside of the West, the West as an audience plays an important role in how Russia 
constructs the perception of the international and of the self within it.186  
Russia’s perception of the West, in turn, is not uniform and often becomes contradictory. On the 
one hand, the Russian elite regards the West as in decline, primarily due to military failures in Iraq 
and Afghanistan as well as the global economic crisis of the late 2000s. On the other hand, the West 
is conceptualised as the main threat for Russia despite Russia’s increased self-confidence.187 This 
approach towards the West is yet another reflection of the simultaneous feeling of superiority and 
inferiority which is fundamental to Russia’s depictions of the international realm. Feeling entitled to 
a partnership with the West, Russia implicitly acknowledges the West’s role as the key international 
audience, the one expected to acknowledge Russia’s privileged status.  
Conclusion:	  the	  Russian	  World	  and	  implications	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  
international	  society	  
This chapter asked about the main elements and sources of the representation of the international 
in Russia. I argued that several factors underpin Russia’s perception of the international, such as: a 
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distinct interpretation of history; the feeling of exclusion; the reluctance to play by someone else’s 
rules and the claim to great power status. These factors have fuelled a confrontational rather than co-
operative view of the international realm and prompted the galvanization of the idea of the Russian 
World. 
Despite the fact that towards the mid-2010s the interpretation of the international in terms of a 
Russkii mir took a more consolidated shape, the idea continues to encompass different and even 
antithetical visions and approaches. Competition with the West is accompanied by treating the West 
as the main audience. The West, seen as the greatest threat, is simultaneously perceived as in decline 
and of lesser moral standing. As a result Russia becomes both superior and inferior to the West. 
Russia’s views of self intermingle greatness and exclusion, triumphalism and victimhood. There are, 
however, several fundamental features uniting these dichotomous elements. The first is egotism. 
Policy and academic discourse presents the international in such a way as to, first, expose Russia’s 
place in it and, second, enhance Russia’s international standing. The Russian World is a 
representation professed on a polycentric model of the world, where civilizational identities play a 
major role. While the language of geopolitics and competition between poles may seem permeated by 
neo-realism, this representation of the international has to be considered against the backdrop of 
Russian multifaceted identity and civilizational debate. The confrontational representation of the 
international facilitates and legitimizes the need for the Russian World. The Russian World and 
multipolarity are mutually indispensable. 
These features of Russia’s view of the international make it impossible to approach international 
society as a framework where Russia could be fitted in or as a scholarly tool facilitating 
comprehension. An attempt at comparing the visions could be made for instance by analysing how 
Russia positions itself with respect to classical building blocks of international society, such as: the 
state; international law; and diplomacy. Importantly, however, these elements, while resurfacing in 
Russian discourse, acquire specific meanings. They do not come together in a way the English 
School sees them coalescing. Despite the fact that the international society perspective takes for 
granted the common understanding of terms it uses to describe the international, Russia accords them 
different and far from fixed meaning. The state, diplomacy and international law are terms used in 
various ways to fit in the discourse of a state feeling both in the very centre and on the margins of 
international politics. Russkii mir, extending beyond the borders of the Russian state, does not sit 
easily with the state-centred discourse of international society. The perception of the West as a 
permanent threat is difficult to reconcile with the idea of international society based on some degree 
of commonality of interests and cooperation. Russia’s interpretation of the international cannot be 
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easily reconciled with Manning’s optimistic supposition: ‘Probably we, most of us, have our personal 
mental pictures of an international society in enjoyment of more or less permanent peace’.188 
There are, however, a number of similarities in the way the Russian World and international 
society have been thought of. Russia’s image of the international is value-laden and normatively 
underpinned, just as the English School concept of international society is primarily animated by 
liberal ideas. The idea of Russkii mir filled the void left by the 1990s officially endorsed denial of 
ideology in Russia’s foreign policy.189 The Russocentric view of the international exposed by Russkii 
mir is analogous to the Eurocentricity of international society narrative, placing liberal states at the 
hub of an international order where they themselves play the role of rule setters and those responsible 
for the maintenance of communal interstate cohesion.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 C.A.W. Manning, Peaceful change: an international problem, London: Macmillan: 1937, 190. 
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towards pragmatism and interest-based foreign policy. The attitude towards possible utilitarian aspects of ideology 
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CHAPTER	  5	  Russia:	  the	  state	  in	  Russia’s	  representation	  of	  the	  
international	  
Introduction	  
This chapter aims to explore the links between Russian scholarly and policy 
representations of the international and the state. It asks how does the idea of the Russian 
World, and the currents feeding into it, influence conceptualizations and policies with regard 
to the state. It argues that the image of the international produced in Russia requires a 
conception of Russia greater than a state. The specific representation of the international 
reinforces the thinking of Russia as a strong state and justifies policy practices towards other 
post-Soviet states, such as unequal regional integration, aid without institution-building and 
maintaining control through practices of intervention. Unlike in the case of Western-led 
statebuilding, where a specific state model is well articulated, it is impossible to find a model 
of a state that Russian discourse would be promoting, forging or enforcing in the post-Soviet 
area. The idea of the Russian World facilitates the portrayal of Russia as a polity greater than 
a state and helps legitimize its political disregard for the sovereignty of other post-Soviet 
states. Russia scholarly and policy discourse does not engage in any precise elaboration of 
requirements for the right kind of state in terms of institutions or standards underpinning it. 
In arguing that scholarly and policy discursive representations of the international have a 
bearing on concepts and policies towards a state, I acknowledge that this relation is by no 
means one-directional. By placing emphasis on the connection from the representation of the 
international to the state, I wish to supplement analyses attributing Russian foreign policy 
action directly to a specific organisation of Russia’s domestic political system.1 Several 
landmark studies have been devoted to discerning links between Russia’s identity and its 
international behaviour.2 But while they all provide important arguments for Russia’s 
national self-image influencing its foreign policy orientation, they remain silent on the way 
Russian representations of the international inform conceptualization and policies with regard 
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L. Hansen, and C. Wight, “The end of International Relations theory?”, European Journal of International 
Relations, 19: 3, 2013. 
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to the state. In this analysis I take into account the Russian state and other post-Soviet states, 
with particular reference to Kyrgyzstan. 
The chapter opens with an overview of Western approaches to the Russian state and 
suggests that it is valuable to pay attention to ideas stemming from Russia. Russian discourse 
remains dominated by the notion of a strong state. The understanding of such a state is 
interconnected with a specific vision of the international, one where Russia needs to be strong 
to counterbalance and to be ready to confront other centres of power. The second part 
discusses policies for securing such a strong Russia.  
The	  Russian	  state	  
Western scholarly assessments of the Russian state are dominated by the application of a 
socio-political transformation lens. The Russian state has been interpreted as a work-in-
progress endeavour geared towards the attainment of the sole legitimate model of state – a 
liberal democracy. Most of the time, therefore, Russia’s statebuilding efforts were deemed 
unsuccessful. With the use of such concepts as: ‘pre-modern state-building’, ‘hybrid regime’ 
or ‘grey zone’ scholars attempted to explain the dynamics of state formation in Russia.3 The 
most critical analyses go as far as to suggest considering the Russian Federation below the 
‘stateness’ threshold.4 Western literature described the Russian state as networked 
authoritarianism where power is diffused among the ruling elite. Authors emphasise the 
private-corporate nature of state power and the failure of Putin’s centralization efforts.5 
Sistema – a web of informal networks – is said to undermine the hierarchical vertical of 
power.6 The political system in Russia is viewed as ‘weak authoritarianism’,7 in need of 
‘manual control’.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ambrosio, Authoritarian backlash: Russian resistance to democratization in the former Soviet Union; T. 
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Russia is mindful of these analyses and, given that the West is an important audience and 
a reference point, the Russian scholarly and policy worlds pay attention to how Russia is 
perceived abroad. Contemporary Russian discourse recognizes the challenge of defining 
Russia’s image as a state. There is a perception of Russia as not fitting the prevalent model.9 
Simultaneously, the elite has become more and more outspoken in its renunciation of the 
Western standard related to political organisation and the system of government, in particular 
the good governance state, which is eagerly described as just a label with little substance.10 
This rejection, however, does not mean that an alternative vision of a state model and 
international statebuilding has been clearly articulated. 
If we exclude opulent debates regarding Russian identity, which focus on culture to the 
disregard of institutions, contemporary Russian scholarly literature appears not to engage in a 
thorough discussion of the question of what sort of a state Russia is or strives to become.11 
The political system in Russia is mostly discussed in terms of its historical development and 
readers are left to draw their own conclusions, particularly if they look for assessments 
regarding the contemporary Russian state.12 The legitimacy of the Russian state is explained 
on the basis of policies pursued by particular leaders rather than the construction of state 
institutions.13 Moreover, state institutions ‘imported’ from the West are often considered to 
be in contradiction to Russian political culture.14 
There is an exception to the general lack of interest or lack of opportunities to engage 
with the topic of state institutions in Russia. Scholarly legal writing is productive in that 
regard but it also remains uncritical. Interested in the liberal state model it stresses the 
government’s subordination to law, first and foremost the Russian constitution. The concept 
of a strong state is usually associated with the rule of law (printsip verkhovenstva prava), 
juridical independence, the primacy of human rights and the development of civil society. 
The political-legal construction of the Russian state is not seen as substantially different from 
that of Western states.15 Even those authors who see certain deficiencies in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Interview, Moscow, October 2013. 
10 Interview, Moscow, October 2013. 
11 An exception is a monograph by S. N. Baburin, Mir imperii: territoriya gosudarstva i mirovoi poriyadok, 
Moskva: Magistr Infra-M, 2010. 
12 R.T. Muchaev, Teoria gasudarstva i prava, 2014; interviews, Moscow, February 2015. 
13 B. I. Isayev and N. A. Baranov, Sovremennaya rossiiskaya politika: uchebnoye posobiye, Sankt-Petersburg: 
Piter: 2013, 48-54. 
14 B. I. Isayev and N. A. Baranov, Sovremennaya rossiiskaya politika: uchebnoye posobiye, Sankt-Petersburg: 
Piter: 2013, 164-165. 
15 T. N. Mikheeva, “O printsipe verkhovenstva prava na sovremennom etape razvitiya gosudarstva”, Zakon i 
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implementation of Russian law, emphasize that the model or idea of the state remains the 
same as the one encapsulated in modern Western constitutionalism.16 The relationship 
between particular elements of the political system is deemed to resemble solutions 
predominant in the West.17 Political discourse, in turn, underlines the indispensability of the 
strong Russian state.  
The	  evolving	  vision	  of	  a	  strong	  state	  
The idea of a ‘strong state’ is inherently connected to the Russian representation of the 
international. It is important to start this discussion with the analysis of what exactly a strong 
state means in Russian discourse and how the term evolved against the backdrop of political 
changes Russia has undergone following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The emergence of a new entity, the Russian Federation, in the early 1990s, exacerbated 
dilemmas related to Russian identity and institutional arrangements, which both suffered 
considerable damage. The Russian elite was forced to reinvent the state – institutionally and 
ideationally. Tensions emerged between the idea of an empire, the nation-state and a 
civilisation, which were additionally complicated by debates regarding Russia’s place in the 
world.18 Developments that took place during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency between 1991 and 
1999, and most importantly the 1993 constitution (Konstitutsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii), 
provided legal foundations for the new state. But, while the legal construction followed the 
Western model of constitutionalism, efficient and legitimate state institutions were not quick 
to emerge. The coercive capacity of the new state was limited and the Russian state was 
unable to retain the monopoly on the use of violence. Towards the end of the 1990s, the 
Russian state was deprived of authority, understood as the ability to create a set of rules for 
non-state actors.19 It evolved into a polity with two different sets of rules: public ones, 
governed by formal institutions and fundamental constitutional laws, and informal ones, 
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dopolnennoye ed., Moskva: Yurait: 2013; Kharkhordin, Main concepts of Russian politics. 
16 M. A. Riekkinen, “Mezhdunarodnyye standardy uchastiya grazhdan v upravlenii delami gosudarstva”, 
Moskovskii zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava: 2, 2011; Kharkhordin, Main concepts of Russian politics. 
17 L. A. Nudnenko, “Pravovyye garantii parlamentskoi oppozitsionnoi deyatelnosti v Gosudarstvennoi Dume 
Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, Gosudarstvo i pravo: 8, 2011. 
18 R. Sakwa, “The problem of ‘the international’ in Russian identity formation”, International Politics, 49: 4, 
2012; T. Uyama, Asiatic Russia: imperial power in regional and international contexts, Abingdon, Oxon ; New 
York: Routledge: 2012; A. P. Tsygankov, Russia's foreign policy: change and continuity in national identity, 
Third edition ed., Lanham, MD; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield: 2013. 
19 B. D. Taylor, State building in Putin's Russia: policing and coercion after communism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 2011; R. Sakwa, The crisis of Russian democracy: the dual state, factionalism, and 
the Medvedev succession, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2011. 
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controlled by the ‘administrative regime’.20 The inheritance of this dual construction 
constituted the baseline for Vladimir Putin’s rule. 
Vladimir Putin placed the idea of re-building the Russian state at the core of Russian 
politics. From the very beginning of his presidency, the concept of a strong state stood out as 
the dominant current in the official discourse.21 In the first presidential manifesto of 
December 1999, Vladimir Putin presented his vision of the Russian state. The central tenet 
was the need to ‘restore’ the statehood weakened following the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the turmoil of the 1990s. This was to be accomplished by establishing a ‘power vertical’ 
(vertical vlasti), supposed to increase the efficiency of the Russian state. Stressing the need 
for strong state authority (silnaya gosudarstvennaya vlast’), Putin related it to democratic 
procedures, rule of law and federalism.22 A series of reforms were outlined to bring about this 
vision of the strong state ideal: the creation of a more efficient administrative structure and 
competent cadres, juridical reform, the development of policies strengthening civil society.23 
In this initial representation, the strength of the state was equated with impartiality and 
effectiveness of its institutions, and the application of law for which Putin coined an 
interesting term, the ‘dictatorship of law’ (diktatura zakona).24 The state’s autonomy from 
other domestic actors, such as big business and federal subjects, constituted another element 
of Putin’s idea for a strong Russian state. Despite heavy emphasis on the guiding role of the 
executive, the goal was not to create a state apparatus that would prevail over particular 
societal actors but to stimulate conditions for their independent development: 
Russia needs a strong state power and must have it. I am not calling for totalitarianism. 
History proves all dictatorships, all authoritarian forms of government are transient. 
Only democratic systems are intransient. Whatever the shortcomings, mankind has not 
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24  See also Taylor, State building in Putin's Russia: policing and coercion after communism, 2. 
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devised anything superior. A strong state power in Russia is a democratic, law-based, 
workable federative state.25 
The official rhetoric presented a strong state in positive light, as an entity desired by the 
people and capable of bringing order: 
For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to fight against. On the contrary, it is the 
source and guarantor of order, the initiator and the main driving force of any change…. 
Society desires the restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state.26  
Russian academia seemed in agreement with the official line and described Putin’s first 
two presidential terms as the period of the ‘strengthening of statehood’.27 Although the 
concept of good governance was not included in the official notion of the strong Russian 
state, the emphasis on state quality was implicit in Putin’s early pronouncements. These early 
representations of a strong state attempted to reconcile coercive capacity with state 
effectiveness, to combine the Western model with Russian characteristics. The representation 
of the international as the realm where primarily great powers mattered was conducive to the 
perception of a strong state as a necessary step on the way to regaining the great power status 
for Russia. Such strong state was to be achieved in close economic co-operation with the 
European Union and the ‘strategic partnership’ with the US, inaugurated in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks.28 
The meanings attached to a strong state started changing incrementally in the mid-2000s 
and should be linked more directly to the evolution of Russia’s portrayal of the international 
realm. Russian representation of the international was becoming increasingly dominated by 
the belief in an inherent competition and confrontation among great powers and the portrayal 
of the West as unwilling to recognize Russia’s equal status. Multipolarity came to be 
presented as a natural state of international politics and was expected to return following the 
brief period of unnatural predominance of the United States. The official discourse linked the 
strength of the Russian state more and more explicitly to Russia’s international performance, 
its status as a great power and the West’s peer. Russia’s ruling elite perceived state strength 
as a necessary condition for Russia to be reckoned with internationally: ‘Russia is only 
respected and has its interests considered when the country is strong and stands firmly on its 
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26 Ibid. 
27 N. M. Alexandrov, Sovremennaya rossiiskaya politika. Tekst lektsii, Yaroslavl: YarGU: 2014, 42-48. 
28 Tsygankov, Russia's foreign policy: change and continuity in national identity. 
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own feet’ (Rossiyu vosprinimayut s uvazheniyem, schitayutsiya s nei tol’ko togda, kogda ona 
sil’na i tverdo stoit na nogakh).29 Along with material resurgence of the early 2000s, the 
metaphor of Russia ‘rising up from its knees’ (Rossiya vstala s kolen) and Russia’s 
independent international standing (Rossiya s sil’nym, ustoichivym suverenitetom) became the 
sinews of Russia’s high international status.30 The Russian academic world generally 
reiterated these ideas. Even textbooks on contemporary Russian politics, for instance one by 
Isayev and Baranov, made a direct link between the international and the domestic and called 
for securing Russia’s ‘great power’ (velikaya derzhava) aspirations.31 
The Russian elite believed that the external world would reckon with Russia only if 
Russia was one of the ‘building blocks’ in what was perceived as the emerging multipolar 
international order. This influenced the understanding of the type of political entity Russia 
needed to become. The goal of creating Russia as a strong international actor was intertwined 
with defining the global order as multipolar. The concept of a ‘sovereign democracy’, which 
entered the Russian political discourse in the mid 2000s, was but one reflection of these 
goals.32 It denoted not so much to the political system in Russia but to the state’s independent 
position on the international stage. 
The discursive construction of Russia as in danger surfaced as an equally important 
element of the official discourse.33 Speaking of the ‘enemy at the gates’ coalesced with the 
depiction of the international realm as the area of competition and confrontation. The strength 
of the Russian state became increasingly associated with its ability to defend itself from a 
number of threats stemming from outside the state. Putin’s speech delivered in the aftermath 
of the Beslan siege in 2004 is a clear illustration of the beginnings of this trend. Putin 
explained that the Russian state had not reacted adequately to processes taking place globally 
and ‘demonstrated weakness’ in the world where ‘the weak get beaten’.34  
The period of Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency and Vladimir Putin’s premiership, 2008-
2012, was accompanied by contradictory rhetoric regarding the strong state. Medvedev, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Putin, "Rossiya i meniayushchiisiya mir". The official English-language translation can be found at: 
http://valdaiclub.com/politics/39300.html.  
30 Putin, "Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 18 marta 2014." 
31 Isayev and Baranov, Sovremennaya rossiiskaya politika: uchebnoye posobiye, 167. 
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calling for an overarching modernization, described Russia as ineffective state machinery 
with outdated economy. Putin continued to promote his vision of a state that needed to be 
strong to counter external and domestic threats.35  
Two developments, one international and the other domestic, were exploited with the 
view to validate Putin’s narrative in the eyes of the Russian ruling elite and the population at 
large. The first was the wave of the Arab Spring revolutions, commencing in 2011. These 
events were interpreted by the Russian elite as a threat to their grip on power. Secondly, 
Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, following a period of his premiership between 2008 
and 2012, led to mass protests in Russia. This constituted a serious challenge for the regime. 
Official rhetoric was quick to depict the protests as inspired and steered from abroad.36 
Defending the ‘fortress Russia’ became Putin’s third term mission. Moscow interpreted 
Western critique of Russia’s internal developments as an attempt to weaken the Russian state 
and undermine the ruling elite’s legitimacy: ‘the strengthening of our statehood is sometimes 
consciously interpreted as authoritarianism’.37 The crisis in relations with the West, which 
followed Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and ‘silent’ intervention in Ukraine, only 
strengthened the identification of a strong state with the ability to defend the regime from 
enemies. Both developments fell in line with those elements of Russia’s representation of the 
international that stressed the competitive nature of international politics and the West’s 
‘malign’ intentions towards Russia. 
More importantly, during this period the discourse of the Russian state as transgressing 
the territorial boundaries of the Russian Federation gained prominence. The Russian state 
was to be reinforced by way of integrating the post-Soviet space and uniting Russia with 
former Soviet republics. Integration, as will be explained further, was not accorded the same 
meaning that it commonly receives in reference to the EU. The Russian World – an idea that 
is supposed to be unifying the post-Soviet territory – helped to construct a distinct 
geopolitical entity, able to compete in what was read as the multipolar international order.  
Russia’s vision of the international and in particular the representation of it as a 
multipolar order composed of rival groupings larger than a state facilitated a particular 
representation of the Russian state and had a bearing on the way Russia has been approaching 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 R. Sakwa, Putin Redux. Power and contradiction in contemporary Russia, London and New York: Routledge 
2014. 
36 S. A. Greene, "Beyond Bolotnaia", Problems of Post-Communism, 60:2, 2013. 
37 Putin 2004, Poslanie Federalnomu Sobraniju Rossijskoi federacii (26 May 2004) quoted after Malinova, 
“Russian and 'the West' in the 2000s: redefining Russian identity in official political discourse”. 
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states in the post-Soviet space. Since regional pre-eminence improves Russia’s international 
status, Russia is less interested in building strong states other than its own. The post-Soviet 
space became a means of reinforcing Russian’s position. Organizing and dominating the 
post-Soviet region creates a sui generis regional basis for Russia’s participation in what 
Russia itself identifies as the multipolar order.38 
The	  post-­‐Soviet	  space:	  a	  state	  ‘not	  quite	  foreign’	  
While depictions of the international realm in terms of a society of states spur claims that 
a particular model of a state – a rule-of-law, democratic one – is a self-evident standard and 
an indispensable part fitting this society, for Russia to accept such a model would place it in 
the difficult position of actually not meeting the standard. This does not, however, mean that 
Russia proposes any alternative state model. 
Russia has been identified as an actor pursuing an international environment conducive 
to the survival of autocracy.39 Western analyses of the Russian state provide rich material for 
constructing a model of ‘illiberal statebuilding’, one geared towards the creation of polities 
akin to Russia. Taking into account conclusions reached by the literature on Russia’s political 
system, one might construct a ‘model Russia’ comprising: strong personalistic rule assuring a 
degree of order but requiring respect and intolerant of criticisms; a state subordinate to the 
wishes of the leader with no consolidated elite; cadres whose recruitment is based on elite co-
optation; and a parliament relegated to ‘a department of presidential administration’, where 
political bureaucratic intrigues replace democratic controls.40 Illiberal statebuilding would 
consist of re-creating states in Russia’s own image. The process would be geared towards 
undermining democracy – in places where it has taken root – and opposing or resisting 
democratization.41 It would encompass the promotion of patrimonial rule undermining the 
rule of law, the favouring of direct state rule rather than indirect governance, creating 
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institutions without a constitutional basis and supporting parties that do not function as 
intermediaries of interest articulation.42 The idea of the Russian World makes the state a 
redundant construct when it comes to post-Soviet polities other than Russia. An independent 
post-Soviet state ceases to be a relevant institution in and of itself; instead it is meant to 
become part of the Russian World. 
The process of discursive subordination of the newly independent states to the Russian 
‘centre’ started prior to Russia’s economic revival of the mid 2000s and set the stage for the 
re-hierarchisation of the post-Soviet area. While for the West it has been the notion of state 
‘failure’, ‘underdevelopment’ or ‘fragility’ that paved the way for policies of international 
statebuilding, Russia undermined its new neighbours’ sovereignty in more explicit ways. 
Shortly after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia, determined to gain international 
legitimacy for its zone of special interests in the post-Soviet region, embarked on securing 
what it saw as its unalienable rights in the region. In Russia’s rhetoric of the time, it aimed to 
legitimize its status as the guarantor of peace and stability in the post-Soviet space. In 1992 
Evgenii Ambartsumov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, declared that as the legal 
successor to the USSR, Russia had the right to a sphere of its vital interests and it ‘must seek 
the world community’s understanding and recognition of its interests in this space’.43 The 
newly independent states were considered of lesser international standing than Russia, the 
successor to the global empire. The term ‘near abroad’ was in frequent use in Russian 
discourse on the post-Soviet sphere.44 It manifested and symbolised Russia’s challenging the 
right of post-Soviet states to sovereignty. A sister-concept of ‘not quite foreign’ reinforced 
and exposed the inferior position post-Soviet states were deemed to occupy.45  
Parts of the official discourse referred to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
as a ‘form of statehood’:  
Many people both in Russia and in Ukraine, as well as in other republics hoped that 
the Commonwealth of Independent States that was created at the time would become 
the new common form of statehood. They were told that there would be a single 
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currency, a single economic space, joint armed forces; however, all this remained 
empty promises, while the big country was gone.46  
The tone of the sphere of influence argument has been undergoing changes. During 
Medvedev’s presidency it was supplemented with a strong rhetorical emphasis on regional 
integration and started emulating the discourse prevalent in the West, in particular the EU’s 
rhetoric of neighbourhood. In 2008, the then Russian president Medvedev stated:  
… there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to 
countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as 
friends and good neighbours, we will pay particular attention to our work in these 
regions and build friendly ties with these countries …47 
Despite this aspiration for political correctness, Russia seemed torn between the urge to 
manifest strength and the need to expose benign motives. Admittedly, more attention has 
been paid to justification and legitimization. The discourse, however, remained rich in 
references to civilisation, suggesting that arrangements proposed by Russia for the CIS states 
are of higher value, and pertain to a rational and progress-oriented vision. Russia’s political 
leadership on several occasions referred to the Eurasian Union as ‘the most civilised’ way of 
arranging regional relations.48 
The global economic crisis of 2008-9 reinvigorated the Eurasian integration project. 
Integration began to be portrayed as a necessity and justified in terms of a natural process of 
repairing the damage that ensued after the common space, i.e. the Soviet Union, broke 
apart.49 Discourse has described the Eurasian political space in terms of a distinct 
civilisation50 and referred to the post-Soviet states as ‘brotherly nations’ (bratskiye narody).51 
The integration project has effectively been portrayed as re-integration. Numerous failed 
integration ideas of the 1990s (enumerated in the next section) came to be depicted as success 
stories or as springboards to the newest phase of integration. Stress has been laid on the 
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continuity of the goal of integration rather than on missed opportunities.52 It became 
important to demonstrate the common ownership of this process as opposed to alleged 
Russia’s aspirations to hegemony. For that reason the discourse underscores that the idea for 
Eurasian integration was initially presented by Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev.53  
Vladimir Putin, the then prime minister, offered the most comprehensive vision of the 
Eurasian integration in an article published in the Izvestia daily in October 2011.54 Putin, 
accentuating civilizational ties, described the integration idea as the ‘historic landmark’, not 
only for those participating in the project, but also for all post-Soviet states. Integration was 
presented as a long-term process that should remain isolated from short-term variations. Putin 
directly identified the Eurasian Union as one of the poles of international politics, located 
between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific region.55  
The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation demonstrates a double 
approach towards post-Soviet states. On the one hand, stress is laid on the common cultural 
and civilizational heritage, implying equality among all post-Soviet states. On the other hand, 
the document attempts to justify Russia’s privileged rights with regard to ethnic Russians, or 
compatriots (sootechestvenniki), living in post-Soviet states.56 Although Russia declares its 
respect for choices made by particular states, it expects these states to fulfil their ‘obligations 
that had been assumed’ with regard to integration processes in the post-Soviet space.57 
Declarations made by Russian officials about respecting the sovereignty of post-Soviet states 
are always accompanied by the emphasis on close ties, which confirm the only possible 
direction for their relations: ever closer integration.58  
Practical	  engagement:	  building	  more	  than	  a	  Russian	  state	  	  
There are a number of tools Russia uses to re-arrange the post-Soviet space. Regional 
integration in its economic and political guises is the most prominent one but arrangements 
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related to security and development aid also play a significant role. Importantly, none of these 
tools are explicitly geared towards the strengthening of state institutions in former Soviet 
republics, while all are implicitly directed towards enhancing Russia’s regional standing. 
No	  ‘model	  Russia’	  
Undoubtedly, Central Asian regimes look to Russia for inspiration. Local elites follow 
Russia’s example in adopting legislation allowing for curbing political protests and 
enhancing tools for political repression. Russian legislation has served as an example for 
Kyrgyzstan in its attempt at stigmatising gay people. Legislative mimicking includes a law 
that requires NGOs that receive funding from outside the country to register as ‘foreign 
agents’. Such a law took effect in Russia at the end of 2012, in Tajikistan in 2014 and in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2015. This process has been described in literature as ‘regional authoritarian 
learning’.59 This learning has been facilitated by a belief, widespread among the elites of 
post-Soviet states, that this is the way it has always been and should be. Legislation has 
always come from Moscow, which is why contemporary initiatives raise few doubts.60 
But these processes cannot be summed up as a deliberate creation on part of Russia of a 
state according to a specific model. Statebuilding is neither an element of Russian discourse 
with reference to post-Soviet states, nor can it be found in the repertoire of Moscow’s 
policies. Despite Moscow’s significant influence on various aspects of post-Soviet statehood, 
the concept of statebuilding is contested, if not altogether rejected in Russia.61  
Eurasian	  integration	  
As opposed to the increasingly sophisticated rhetoric, the balance sheet of Russia’s 
practical engagement in regional integration looks mixed. Russia proposed a number of 
integrationist ideas for specific states from its vast neighbourhood area. The Economic Union 
built around the rouble, the Customs Union, the CIS Free Trade Agreement, the Single 
Economic Space and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) are just several 
examples. Some of these initiatives remained on paper only, while others were given shape in 
the form of agreements, remaining, however, without the necessary ratification or 
incorporation into national legislation and hence never proceeded to the implementation 
phase. The multiplication of integration structures, termed by Russian officials as ‘flexible 
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geometry’ or ‘differentiated speed’,62 reveals Russia’s determination as well as poor 
efficiency in terms of rearranging the post-Soviet space. 
The most recent initiative comprises the creation of the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space, both now functioning under the umbrella of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
A renewed impulse for integration came from the then prime minister Vladimir Putin in June 
2009, following his meeting with presidents of Belarus and Kazakhstan. In November 2009, 
three states – Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus – signed documents forming the legal basis for 
the Customs Union. As of 2010, these states started applying the single customs tariff and the 
Common Customs Code. The customs border between Russia and Belarus ceased to exist in 
the second half of 2010, and between Russia and Kazakhstan in 2011.63  
The legal basis for a more advanced form of economic integration, the Common 
Economic Space (CES), was agreed in 2010 and the CES started functioning in January 
2012.64 The goal of the Common Economic Space was to introduce the ‘four freedoms of 
movement’: of goods, services, capital and labour, and as such a creation of a single market 
among the participating states. Members agreed to coordinate their macro-economic policies, 
harmonise competition policy, public procurement, investment rules and technical 
standards.65 In November 2011, presidents of the three states signed documents envisioning 
the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU).66 The Eurasian Commission, a 
joint institution managing the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, started 
functioning in 2012. The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union was signed in 2014.67 In 
the same year, Armenia, under Russian pressure, declared its readiness to join the new 
organization, while Kyrgyzstan agreed a ‘road-map’ to membership. The Eurasian Economic 
Union became operational in January 2015, the same month Armenia was reported joining 
the organization. In May 2015, President Almazbek Atambayev committed Kyrgyzstan to the 
EaEU. 
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The EaEU is an ‘umbrella’ for the previous forms of integration, i.e. the Customs Union 
and the Common Economic Space. The aims for future integration are ambitious. Apart from 
the single market envisioned by the CES, it should lead to the creation of a single financial 
and energy markets by 2025.68 Institutional arrangements of this project resemble those of the 
EU. Formally, integration is administered by a supra-national body, the College of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission. College members are selected by member states to oversee 
23 departments, each of which is responsible for particular economic sectors and issues. The 
College is overseen by the government-level Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission. 
Both are supervised by the High Eurasian Economic Council, which operates at the level of 
prime ministers or presidents.69  
The steps that preceded the current phase of integration, namely the establishment of the 
Eurasian Development Bank in 2006 and the Eurasian Anti-Crisis Fund in 2008, additionally 
testify to Moscow’s willingness to retain exclusive influence over the post-Soviet area. 
Russia created these institutions in order to limit the influence of what it perceived as 
Western-led international financial institutions, such as the IMF or the Asian Development 
Bank, where the US and Japan play an important role. 
The scope of the EaEU project’s ambitions demonstrates that Russia wants to achieve 
political as well as economic goals. Even though official documents stress that integration 
takes place exclusively in the economic sphere and emphasize the necessity of respecting all 
member states’ sovereignty, successful economic integration can be expected to lead to 
political integration and the de facto subordination of smaller states to Russia. Russian 
authors point out that closer economic ties will lead to the strengthening of the external 
borders of the EaEU.70 While the European states in their international arrangements 
attempted to diminish differences in political and economic power, for Moscow, post-Soviet 
integration in the form of the EEU is to secure Russia’s leadership and reinforce the existing 
hierarchical arrangements. Integration is also expected to foreclose the post-Soviet space 
from the European Union’s influence.  
The practices of functioning of Eurasian integration relatively quickly demonstrated both 
the limitations of economic co-operation and the scope of Russia’s political ambitions. 
Tensions in relations with the West and the sanctions that Russia has encountered since the 
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annexation of Crimea and the intervention in Ukraine, triggered a unilateral change in the 
principles on which the Eurasian integration was founded. Despite the existence of the 
Customs Union and progress in the establishment of a single market, Russia decided to 
impose a number of limitations on the transit of goods from Belarus to Kazakhstan through 
the territory of the Russian Federation.71 Such actions undermine the economic logic of 
integration but they reinforce Russian political control over particular members. They reveal 
that both the supranational character of key institutions of the EaEU and the legal foundations 
of integration are illusory.  
Russia is the initiator and main stakeholder in all the new institutions taking shape in the 
post-Soviet area. Their creation is perceived by the Russian elite as a way to guarantee 
Russia’s political oversight, influence and control over the post-Soviet states.  
Development	  aid:	  everything	  but	  statebuilding	  
While in the realm of Western-led development assistance statebuilding acquired a 
depoliticised, technical meaning, it is deeply politicized in Russia and as such preferably 
avoided. Russia prefers to speak of its engagement with less developed post-Soviet states in 
terms of social, economic and humanitarian assistance (the term gumanitarnaya pomoshch is 
by far the most frequently used). Statebuilding is non-existent at the discursive level of 
Russia’s development assistance as well as in terms of projects implemented in particular 
post-Soviet states.72  
The donor role, the role of a promoter and centre of integration initiatives, is perceived 
by Russia as a matter of status, enhancing its position on the international arena.73 Back in 
2004, Russia still figured on the OECD list of aid recipients.74 Russia’s renunciation of the 
aid recipient role is part and parcel of Russia’s strategy for achieving and maintaining self-
esteem as well as making other actors recognize and acknowledge it. Rather than the 
improvement of specific conditions in the receiving state, the goal of Russia’s development 
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co-operation is to ‘look seriously’ in the international arena and to be perceived as a 
‘responsible and civilized’ donor.75  
In 2007, Russia adopted a policy strategy on development assistance – The Concept of 
Russia’s participation in development co-operation.76 Since then it has been building up its 
aid implementation agency – Rossotrudnichestvo – with branches in former Soviet republics. 
Between 2009 and 2011, the World Bank and the Russian Finance Ministry pursued a 
project, funded by British Department for International Development (DFID), aimed at 
strengthening Russia’s potential as a donor.77  
The other angle of Russia’s involvement in development cooperation is its declared 
strategy of using aid to pursue national interests. Beyond the symbolic role of Russia’s 
development co-operation, pragmatic incentives underlie its engagement. The 2007 Concept 
indicates that development cooperation should help Russia obtain political dividends, limit 
external risks and strengthen Russian economic presence on foreign markets.78  
Russia aspires to be visible as the key donor in the CIS states. Implementing projects 
which could be identified as ‘Russian’ by the elites and societies of recipient states is to 
increase Russia’s image as an indispensable and benign great power in the post-Soviet space. 
Dmitri Medvedev defined the goal of Rossotrudnichestvo in the following way: ‘These states 
which obtain funds from us, should know better, where does the assistance come from’.79 
Russia thus wants to make its own mark and to create an image of Russia as an engaged 
regional actor. These practices are, however, intrinsically linked to Russia’s rejection of what 
it interprets as ‘US activities in the realm of soft power’, which are said to encompass the 
fomenting of colour revolutions and the creation of hostile regimes.80  
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Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian military forces participated in a 
series of conflicts: civil wars in Tajikistan, Georgia81 and Moldova,82 and the war between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh. Moscow legitimised its engagement in 
terms of ‘international peacekeeping’83 even if conflict prevention has not always been the 
most immediate aim and in each case Russian military forces supported the secessionist 
movements and enforced cease-fires, disadvantageous for central governments.84  
Russia has been legitimizing its various degrees of intervention by reference to the need 
to protect large numbers of ethnic Russians remaining beyond Russia’s borders following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union.85 In the early 1990s, on top of peacekeeping, the right to 
defend compatriots was used to justify Russian-led military intervention in the civil conflicts 
in the post-Soviet space: Abkhazia (Georgia), South Ossetia (Georgia), Transnistria 
(Moldova).86 This argument returned in 2008 during the Russian-Georgia war, when it was 
re-packaged in the rhetoric of human rights protection. Russia claimed there existed urgent 
necessity to prevent humanitarian catastrophe and drew upon the responsibility to protect 
concept.87 
Russia’s involvement in Ukraine in 2014 represents a similar practice of retaining control 
through intervention. Before the annexation of Crimea, Russia invoked its right to defend 
ethnic Russians. The Kremlin initially denied having sent additional troops to Crimea with 
the view to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet present there. In the aftermath of the annexation, 
however, Russia admitted an increase in its military presence and justified it with the need to 
protect civilians from the alleged threat posed by the Ukrainian forces.88 In addition, 
president Putin legitimised the move with reference to Kosovo:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 W. H. Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict, 
Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press: 2012, 31-35. 
82 W. H. Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict, 
Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press: 2012, 52-56. 
83 R. Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2013, 127-129. 
84 Tsygankov, Russia's foreign policy: change and continuity in national identity, 81-85; Hill, Russia, the Near 
Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict. 
85 Morozova, “Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian foreign policy under Putin”: 670. 
86 Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, 126-127. 
87 Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, 156-159. This approach was usually assisted with 
providing individuals in the break-away provinces of independent states, such as Georgia and Moldova, with the 
Russian Federation’s passports. 
88 R. Allison, "Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules", International 
Affairs, 90: 6, 2014. 
140	  
	  
the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our 
Western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they 
agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is 
doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s 
central authorities.89 
Russia’s regional interventions clearly contradict Russia’s concern with territorial 
integrity and respect for sovereignty. While on the global scale Russia relishes norms of 
sovereignty and non-intervention, the regional realm has been subject to a variety of moves 
compromising the sovereignty of post-Soviet states.  
The	  case	  of	  Kyrgyzstan	  
Relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan are multifaceted but it would be difficult to 
claim they have been built on sovereign equality or around the aim of statebuilding. There is 
no state model that Russia has promoted in Kyrgyzstan. 
While Western states in their development assistance and statebuilding efforts are 
motivated by the ideology of progress, Russia places particular discursive emphasis on the 
notion of friendship and prosperity. A common term used with regard to the future of 
Kyrgyzstan is ‘a prosperous state’ (protsvetayushchaya strana). In its promotional fliers 
Rossatrudnichestvo declares its activity is aimed at an ‘even stronger’ rapprochement 
between the two states. A banner in the Bishkek branch of Rossatrudnichestvo announces: 
‘Russia and Kyrgyzstan: strong friendship and fraternity are the wealth of our nations’.90 The 
notion of friendship goes far back in history. In Soviet times it was an important idea 
promoted between all Soviet republics. The idea survived the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and was perpetuated in various forms throughout the 1990s. For instance the 1998 edition of 
The Compilation of official documents on Russian-Kyrgyz relations in the 18th and 19th 
centuries opens with a photograph of the then presidents Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Askar 
Akaev of Kyrgyzstan. The introductory chapter is a narrative about ages of friendship and 
makes repeated use of the notion brotherly countries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Vladimir Putin addressed State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and 
civil society representatives in the Kremlin  http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 , accessed 19-03-2014. 
90 The phrase is a rhyme in Russian: Rossiya i Kirgizya: krepkaya druzhba i bratstvo – nashikh narodov 
bogatstvo (Россия и Киргизя: крепкая дружба и братство – наших народов богатство).   
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The narrative of friendship is disrupted by less cordial rhetoric and gestures.  The 
Russian Embassy has issued a number of official communiqués in which the ambassador 
comments on speeches of particular Kyrgyzstani MPs, Bishkek city council deputies or the 
post-2010 government in general. This discourse addresses Kyrgyzstan with reprehension 
and denigration. For example, commenting on a Kyrgyzstani MP’s statement on a financial-
legal matter related to payments for the translation of Russian television programmes, the 
official communiqué reads: ‘The Embassy hopes that the Kyrgyz parliament will be able to 
handle the situation’ (Posolstvo nadeyetsya, chto kirgizskiye parlamentarii smogut 
razobratsya v slozhivsheysya situatsii). This comment’s insulting undertone suggests 
disregard for parliamentary democracy in Kyrgyzstan. It is, however, difficult to assess to 
what extent this is a result of a deliberate policy, and how far it is the consequence of a 
general disregard for Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty, irrespective of the political system currently 
in place. 
State institutions, which find the pride of place in Western representation of a state, are 
of no particular importance for Russia. Instead of supporting institutions, Russia lends 
support to individual figures on Kyrgyzstan’s political scene and attempts to forge or sustain 
pro-Russian sentiments among the Kyrgyzstani citizenry.  
Stability has been the key organising concept used by Russian scholars and officials with 
regard to Central Asia. It has been identified as the desired goal, one which Russia should 
help executing.91 The discourse of stability has served to portray Russia as the only possible 
player capable of delivering it and as yet another way of expressing contempt for the state of 
Kyrgyzstan:  
You in the West know nothing about states such as Kyrgyzstan. Everything can 
collapse there in just two days’ time. This is a savage state and needs to be treated with 
a stick.92  
A specific approach to and understanding of democracy and institutions transpires in this 
approach, both are seen as either undermining stability or delaying the necessary 
stabilization:  
Russia has to do its utmost to stabilize the region, other aspects, such as institutions, 
will come after that, we will work it out step by step.93 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Interview, Rossotrudnichestvo, Moscow, October 2013. 
92 Interview, Moscow, October 2013. 
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Russian development aid to Kyrgyzstan has been presented as aimed at the provision of 
economic and political stability. 94 Political practice did not correspond to this rhetoric. In 
April 2010, Kyrgyzstan faced a revolution that overthrew the then president, Maxim Bakiyev. 
Roza Otunbayeva, sworn as the new president, explicitly asked for a military intervention 
when clashes erupted in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. Moscow refused and limited its 
actions to increasing the number of soldiers in the military Kant base situated in the north of 
the country.95  
Officials interviewed for this thesis, when asked about a model of a state Russia was 
promoting in Central Asia, usually reminded me that Russia, unlike the US, had never been 
interested in the politics of regime change. The discussion was usually immediately directed 
towards deficiencies in the Western approach. The West would then be criticised for its 
deliberate aim of wanting to organise states such as Kyrgyzstan in its own image and, 
crucially, without Russian participation: ‘The West wants it all to be without Russia, it wants 
Kyrgyzstan to be independent of Russia’;96 ‘Russia wants its interests to be respected’.97 
Interviewees pointed out that Russia does not think Western support for electoral processes 
would be effective.98 The West was also castigated for an overtly technocratic approach: 
‘You have not given them any values’.99 
The realm of cultural co-operation is an example of the production of what should appear 
as a joint political space. Russia opened a number of initiatives that aim at the strengthening 
of historical, cultural, scientific and educational ties between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. The 
Eurasian Foundation (Fond kulturno-istoricheskoye soobshchestvo «Yevraziytsy — novaya 
volna») was established in May 2010. Its goals include the strengthening of historical, 
cultural and educational ties between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, support for the Kyrgyz NGOs 
and media, and the promotion of the Russian language. The Fund’s activities focus on 
Eurasian integration and aim at reinforcing the image of Russia as Kyrgyzstan’s ‘genuine 
friend’.100  
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Russia contributes to the shaping of Kyrgyzstan’s historic identity and its recent efforts 
have been focused on reinforcing the notion of a common identity and common historical 
heritage. The commemorations of the Great Patriotic War are among many events that help in 
this endeavour. Russia also engages in the promotion of specific ‘national’ heroes of 
Kyrgyzstan. In February 2015 Rossotrudnichestvo organized the commemoration of the 130th 
birthday anniversary of Mikhail Frunze. Born in Bishkek, as a Soviet commander he 
subordinated Central Asia to the Bolshevik rule.101 The capital city bore his name between 
1926 and 1991. 
Kyrgyzstan’s political and public landscape remains divided when it comes to the 
assessment of Russia’s discourse and policies. President Atambayev has been reported as 
stating: ‘Without Russia we have no separate future’.102 Some media outlets, in turn, see 
specific political and economic manoeuvres in Kyrgyzstan as Russification or re-
colonisation. For instance The Times of Central Asia interpreted the sale of Kyrgyzgaz 
company for a symbolic price of US $1 to Russian gas monopoly Gazprom as a landmark 
example of Kyrgyzstan’s Russification.103  
Despite the difficulties in tracing direct links, Russia has influence on Kyrgyzstan’s 
media landscape. Between 2010 and 2013 Russian-language newspapers in Kyrgyzstan 
covered Russia-sponsored initiatives to the neglect of West-funded projects. Articles 
describing Russian assistance projects replaced columns dedicated to Western aid. There has 
been very little critical press regarding the prospects of joining the Customs Union. Opinion 
columns or interviews with pro-Russian figures started dominating the Russian-language 
daily, Vecherny Bishkek. For instance, the newspaper published an interview with Leonid 
Ivashov, Russian general of Kyrgyzstani origin, arguing that the future of Kyrgyzstan is 
‘together with Russia’ and that the governing of a state should be based on a system of tight 
control (sistema zhestokogo kontrolya).104 
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In this chapter I argued that the way Russia envisions the international is intertwined 
with Russian discursive and practical approaches to the state. First, it makes Russia focus 
predominantly on the Russian state, the interpretation and discursive construction of which 
extends beyond geographical borders of the Russian Federation to cover the majority of the 
post-Soviet space. The second and related point is that representations of the international 
produced in Russia facilitate the disregard for sovereignty and institutions of post-Soviet 
states, such as Kyrgyzstan. The discourse of the Russian World and Russian civilization, 
which supplanted the early 1990s narrative of the sphere of influence, refocuses the terms of 
debate from institutions to grandiose civilizational ideas conducive to and used as 
justification for downplaying the sovereignty of post-Soviet states.  
Unlike the case of Western-led statebuilding, where a specific state model is well 
articulated, it is impossible to find a model of a state Russia would be promoting, forging or 
enforcing in the post-Soviet space. There are no rules that would form a clear model of 
illiberal statebuilding. The strengthening of institutions is not the primary goal. Nor has 
Russia constructed a coherent and distinctive set of characteristics that  could counter or 
challenge the Western ‘menu’. The key difference, in comparison with Western ambitions, is 
that Russia does not engage in any precise elaboration of requirements for the right kind of 
state. While the liberal conceptions of the state are highly elaborate and commonly presented 
with scientific language, Russia speaks about the state in very general terms and mostly with 
reference to its own statehood rather than with respect to polities occupying the post-Soviet 
space. The primary aim is not to be explicit about a state, nor to build one.  The objective for 
the post-Soviet area is to sustain feeble polities relying on relations with Russia. Despite the 
fact that Russia has significant impact on polities in the post-Soviet space, it does not see 
itself as participating in the statebuilding effort. Instead its policy practice is focused on the 
construction of a greater polity, one deemed necessary to secure a proper place for Russia in 
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Maps, through the ambition of their creators and their purposeful aesthetics, legitimize 
knowledge claims and mask the ideology accompanying their production. These 
characteristics boost their power to arrange the world in specific ways. The point of departure 
for this intellectual journey was to enquire how – in the domain of international politics rather 
than in cartography – certain contemporary representations of the international realm 
influence the thinking and practical approaches to the state. The thesis engaged with the idea 
of international society as advanced in academia and with the concept of international 
community pursued in the discourse of policy practice. I proposed to look at these two in 
many respects cognate ideas from the sociology of knowledge perspective. The thesis was 
motivated by my observation that in international politics there is not enough recognition of 
how a vantage point skews the theorists and policy practitioners’ view and too little reflection 
on the consequences of representations which are the product of theorising, the result of 
frameworks or lenses we adopt. My hope was to encourage reflection on these issues and to 
disrupt ideas which started to seem natural in international politics as theorised and practised. 
The thesis argued that representations of the international can become powerful ideas, 
particularly when they stimulate thinking and acting with regard to phenomena beyond their 
description, such as the state. In the hope of illuminating the process through which ideas 
gain power and in order to shed light on the consequences of constructing specific images of 
the world, I asked about ways in which representations of the international, such as the 
scholarly concept of international society and the idea of international community, contribute 
to shaping the thinking, expectations and actions with regard to the state. I illustrated how 
only a particular, desirable type of a state is a welcome member of international 
society/community. The model of a state is as much a technical thing, i.e. a set of criteria, 
standards and policy prescriptions to be implemented, as it is an ideological one. Contributing 
to the unity of the greater whole, this particular model of a state is considered to be of 
superior validity. Aiming to distort the purported naturalness of international society, I 
juxtaposed the international society idea with representations of the international produced by 
Russian scholars and policymakers. The representation of the international in terms of the 
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Russian World and its confrontation with another world pole, the West, requires efforts to 
strengthen a polity that would transcend Russian Federation borders.  
The thought of Bourdieu, Skinner and Mannheim served as an important springboard for 
making arguments about knowledge production on the international realm. Sociology of 
knowledge allowed for adopting a distant perspective on IR frameworks, rather than working 
through them, treating them as tools or lenses. Skinner stimulated my thinking about 
scholarly and policy representations as ideas and made me discern these ideas from an array 
of texts and acknowledge their historical context. Bourdieu suggested a method of reading 
these representations from scholarly and policy discourse and made me think of them as 
elements of knowledge production. Thus my understanding of context broadened and started 
to encompass, beyond events in world history, social processes taking place in the history of 
IR as a discipline and among the community of policy practitioners. Mannheim and 
standpoint ontology suggested there was merit in distinguishing between perspectives, even if 
the subject matter was the supposedly shared or intersubjectively constructed international 
realm. Accepting that sociology of knowledge in IR is an extremely broad research problem, 
I humbly propose a reflection taking into consideration varying social circumstances and 
distinct interpretations of history, which are all conducive to the production of specific rather 
than common representations of the world. 
This concluding part, recapitulating consequences that representations of the 
international have on concepts and actions pursued with regard to states, extends the analysis 
and explores similarities in the process of knowledge production in the West and in Russia. In 
considering parallels in academic and policy knowledge production enterprises, the 
concluding chapter attempts to go a step further and asks what makes certain representations 
of the international so powerful. The thesis suggests that ideational representations of the 
international perform functions akin to political myths, i.e. they are a specific type of a 
narrative, believed to be true or acted upon as if they were true and executing several 
important functions. A political myth of international society/community assists in defining 
the common purpose, for scholars and policymakers alike. It expresses collective identity and 
provides a sense of cohesiveness in both worlds: that of the ivory tower, in particular among 
scholars claiming identification with the English School, and in the policy realm among 
practitioners of statebuilding. The myth of the Russian World embeds multipolarity as a 
natural state of affairs. It naturalises Russia’s special role in the post-Soviet space, justifying 
actions undertaken beyond Russia’s borders. Political myths, while creating the illusion of 
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simplicity and control, provide significance, help comprehend experiences, clarify or offer 
objectives and prompt action in their pursuit.1  
Representations	  of	  the	  international	  and	  their	  bearing	  on	  the	  
state	  
Through this thesis I attempted to illustrate that specific representations of the 
international have the potential to influence concepts and policies pursued with regard to 
states. I argued that the idea of international society had the power to structure thinking about 
the right kind of state member of the society of states.  
The English School’s main contribution to world history is to show how an 
international society formed in Europe expanded to take over the world. Through the 
success of its imperialism, Europe remade the world politically in its own image of 
sovereign territorial states, diplomacy and international law. Decolonization left behind 
a world in Europe’s image, in some places made quite well, and in other places badly.2 
This quotation does much more than just assessing or praising the English School’s 
contribution. The world in Europe’s image becomes reified and validated, together with the 
model of a state, which, when implemented well, leaves practically nothing more to be 
desired in international politics. International society framework requires a particular kind of 
state, one meeting the criteria for ‘rightful membership’. Thereby international society – a 
mere representation of the international – becomes powerful enough to dictate what kind of 
subjects are entitled to participate in international relations and how they are meant ‘to 
behave’.  
Discourses pursued in policy practice developed a similar narrative. A weak state has 
been presented as not fitting the whole portrayed as universal international community. The 
idea of international community allows for the objectification of state weakness and the 
production of various rankings geared towards states classification. This is accompanied by 
constructing a state model and the production of a variety of international standards a state 
should meet. The idea of international community prompts specific policies directed at states 
deemed weak. Democratic institutions supported by rule of law are deemed the major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The characteristics and functions of a political myth are based on Foley, Ideas that shape politics; Bottici, A 
philosophy of political myth. 
2 A. Acharya and B. Buzan, Non-Western international relations theory: perspectives on and beyond Asia, 
London ; New York: Routledge: 2010. 
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component of the right kind of state and the key basis for statebuilding policies. At the same 
time policy discourse presents statebuilding as an activity undertaken in the name of 
international community. The need for statebuilding arises from what international 
community is considered to be and it has been carried out by those claiming to represent it. 
International community discourse enables and legitimizes the production of the right kind of 
state. In this process statebuilding becomes a natural and thus apolitical enterprise. 
The way Russian political and scholarly discourse produces knowledge about the 
international realm has implications for the way Russian policymakers view and act with 
regard to a state. It allows for presenting Russia as an entity greater than a state and facilitates 
the perception of states occupying the post-Soviet area as not entirely sovereign. Kyrgyzstan 
or Ukraine’s statehood is in no need of strengthening as the best way for these polities to fit 
the international is by aligning with Russia-built and governed institutions, subsuming under 
and contributing to the Russian World. 
If, in this specific representation of the international, relations between the Russian 
World and the West are organised in confrontational rather than cooperative terms, efforts 
related to state strengthening will be centred on the Russian polity. The strong Russian state 
at the heart of the Russian World guarantees the preservation of multipolarity. Conversely, 
multipolarity, as the sole system that secures Russia's proper place in the world, requires a 
Russia that would be greater than a state. The Russian World and multipolarity are mutually 
indispensable. In this context, state strength is tightly linked to the government (read: the 
ruling elite) instead of effective and representative institutions. Confrontational representation 
of the international facilitates and legitimizes the need for a strong state. 
Unlike in the case of Western-led statebuilding, where a specific state model is very well 
articulated, it is impossible to find a model of a state that Russia would be promoting, forging 
or enforcing in the post-Soviet space. Russia does not engage in any precise elaboration of 
requirements for the right kind of state. Nor are there any clear rules for illiberal 
statebuilding. The key difference, in comparison to Western ambitions, is that the aim is not 
to be explicit about a state. Russia’s objective for the post-Soviet area is to sustain feeble 
polities relying on relations with Russia. Russia is not openly anti-democratic, although it 
does tend to emphasise problems related to parliamentary democracy. Neither is Russian 
discourse explicitly pro-authoritarian, but instead of supporting institutions, it lends support 
to individual figures on a state’s political scene and attempts to forge or sustain pro-Russian 
sentiments among citizenry of post-Soviet states.  
149	  
	  
Similarities	  in	  the	  process	  of	  knowledge	  production:	  the	  
West	  and	  Russia	  
Sociology of knowledge allows for exploring similarities in the process of knowledge 
production without necessarily valorising or validating any of the approaches. Mannheim was 
particularly interested in the process through which specific ideas come to assume a central 
place in human experience, how it happened that a worldview gained prominence. 
Mannheim’s interest was in conceptions, methods of thinking, methods of knowledge and 
intellectual strategies, which he deliberately distinguished from logical systematisations.3 
Representations of the international share several important characteristics, even though 
they have emerged in distinct political and social settings. Similarities in the process of 
knowledge production cut across the blurred and feeble boundaries between the West and 
Russia. In spite of all significant distinctions in the approach to the international realm, in the 
West and in Russia knowledge production involves reifications. Russia’s reification of 
multipolarity is parallel to the English School treatment of the idea of international society. 
International society became equated with international political reality. In addition, 
endowing international society with agency became common in English School writings. On 
the other side of the European continent, multipolarity was cherished as offering a convenient 
answer to Russia’s exclusion and self-esteem problem. Multipolarity was first considered a 
concept through which one could make sense of some features of the world, an adequate 
description of the world.  It was later elevated to the level of official doctrine and presented 
as the real world, in Putin’s pronouncement: ‘The world is multipolar’. It may be expected 
that the employment of the idea of the Russian World in political and scholarly discourse will 
lead to this concept’s reification. Discursive legitimization of the annexation of Crimea was 
the first poignant illustration of how the Russian World may be presented as an objective 
description of the world out there. 
Reification is accompanied by asserting higher value and positive functions to specific 
representations of the international realm. The English School discourse is filled with 
appreciative adjectives. International society has usually been presented in positive light, as 
bringing order or as acting for the benefit of common humanity. The Russian World is to 
denote to cultural and spiritual richness. It is also an ideational guarantor of Russia’s proper 
place in the world.  
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The employment, explicit or otherwise, of specific values transgresses the East-West 
split. We necessarily make choices about what questions we ask and which elements to 
emphasize when we provide the answer. Such choices are motivated by value commitments.4 
Knowledge production is embedded in value preferences. Liberal values play an important 
role in the way the idea of international society has been constructed and asserted itself in IR. 
This idea enjoys high currency due to the fact that it responds to the socio-culturally 
underpinned estimation of harmony, order and integration. The idea emphasizes order rather 
than disorder, leaving the confusions and injustices pervading international politics in the 
background. The first generation of the English School scholars shared the liberal ideology 
which impacted on the way they interpreted order in the world. The international society 
view of world politics is prefigured in liberal terms. International society, which states are 
said to be forming between them, secures their orderly coexistence. Importantly, values 
embedded in and conveyed by this approach are concealed by the theory’s purported value-
free scholarship. Despite the idea’s deep roots in liberal political thought, the supporters of 
the international society view of international relations have presented their concept as 
pragmatic and functional. 
Values play a role in the construction of the idea of the Russian World but, in 
contradiction to the international society, it would be difficult to categorise them under one 
ideology. The concept feeds on several important currents in Russian political thought, which 
stress Russia’s distinctive nature and incompatibility with the West. These, however, cannot 
be easily subsumed under a conservatist label for it would suggest that the meanings ascribed 
to conservatism in Russian and Western political thought converge. The idea of the Russian 
World draws on Orthodoxy which results in the conviction about Russia’s moral superiority. 
Specific understanding of authority, under which a leader unconstrained by rules 
(samoderzhaviye) had a moral obligation to act in the interest of his/her people, may have 
fuelled the perception of Russia’s leading role in the post-Soviet region.5  
Knowledge production plays a role in identity formation among communities that 
produce knowledge and among those who, in various ways, become familiar with specific 
elements of that knowledge. The idea of international society/community contributes to the 
shaping of Western identity in international politics; it builds the image of the caring West, 
ready to ‘save strangers’. It provides the elevating feeling of helping. The Russian World, in 
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5 Tsygankov, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya: traditsii russkoi politicheskoi mysli, 19-37; Kharkhordin, Main 
concepts of Russian politics, 11-18. 
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turn, allows for some conclusions to be drawn in the debate on Russia’s identity. It allows for 
transgressing the borders of Russia and reinforces Russia’s self-image as a distinct 
civilisation.  
The production of representations of the international is influenced by particular 
historical experience it aims to explain. The types of thinking that generated the ideas of 
international society and the Russian World have been rooted in concrete experiences. 
Hedley Bull rightly admitted that ‘theorists themselves elaborate their ideas with the 
preoccupations and within the confines of a particular historical situation’.6 The English 
School has been praised for emphasising that IR research should be historically informed. 
The School’s approach was deemed more complete because it drew on and accounted for 
historical experience. One of the contributors to The Expansion of international society 
reminds the reader: ‘We certainly hold that our subject can be understood only in historical 
perspective, and that without the awareness of the past that generated it, the universal 
international society of the present can have no meaning’.7 The School was said to be capable 
of combining the study of history with theory.8 Its success has been sought in the way it 
validated the turn to history as a source of IR theory and a part of the study of IR.9 In 
advocating an historical approach to the study of international politics, Bull underscored its 
validity in the following way: ‘Historical study is essential also because any international 
political situation is located in time, and to understand it we must know its place in a 
temporal sequence of events’.10 
The English School has not, however, managed to fully unfold the consequences of this 
view. Scholars did not take into account that differing interpretations of historical events 
inevitably lead to dissimilar perceptions and interpretations of international relations. 
Embedding IR in history, the English School failed to recognize various views on and 
interpretations of history. Some English School scholars were cognizant of the fact that there 
may be different historical interpretations of world history. But, Martin Wight’s idea that 
international theory is equal to historical interpretation, important as it is, has not been taken 
up by those contributing to the expansion paradigm. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Bull, “The theory of international politics 1919-1969”, 32. 
7 Dore, “Unity and diversity in world culture”. 
8 T. Dunne, “The English School”, in International relations theories: discipline and diversity, ed. T. Dunne, 
M.H. Kurki, and S. Smith (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
9 Jiangli and Buzan, “The English and Chinese schools of international relations: comparisons and lessons”. 
10  Bull, “The theory of international politics 1919-1969”, 30. 
152	  
	  
A tendency to universalize a historical experience may be just a by-product, a not 
entirely intentional result. But the interpretation of world politics in terms of an orderly 
society was in conformity with the interests of states, which were the primary architects of 
the post-War and post-decolonisation international institutions. It expressed the dominant 
thinking shared by those living in a specific era and a particular location. Paraphrasing 
Mannheim, it expressed the ideology of the dominant group and served to legitimize claims 
to leadership.11  
The idea of international society/community continues to justify policies of statebuilding 
undertaken by Western states in international politics. It provides legitimacy for particular 
forms of political practice such as standard setting. The Russian World, in turn, legitimizes 
Russia’s disrespect for the sovereignty of other post-Soviet states. Russia’s interventionist 
practices, the most obvious of which have been the recent wars in Georgia and Ukraine, 
coexist with the discursive appraisal of sovereignty. Accusations of hypocrisy 
notwithstanding, such an approach illustrates that post-Soviet polities are not considered in 
terms of independent states but rather parts of a greater whole. 
Disciplinary and institutional developments have played a vital role in the advancement 
and wide acceptance of ideational representations of the international. The discipline of IR 
and the policy practice of development assistance and statebuilding over the years became 
significant undertakings that created their own specific language and thinking frameworks. 
The production of discourse led to almost customary repetition of the narrative. For the 
English School specific circumstances related to the formation and development of IR as a 
discipline were crucial. The English School, which formerly positioned itself as a challenger 
to mainstream IR, is now regarded very much as part of the pantheon of classical theoretical 
approaches.12 Throughout the past several decades, many authors have been committed to the 
defence of the School as a legitimate and fruitful framework within IR study.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Mannheim referred to the dynamics accompanying the raise of German conservatism and compared it to the 
way Burke’s thinking ‘expressed the ideology of the dominant nobility in England and in Germany, and it 
served to legitimize their claims to leadership in the state’, Mannheim, Conservatism: a contribution to the 
sociology of knowledge, 106-107. 
12 Jiangli and Buzan, “The English and Chinese schools of international relations: comparisons and lessons”; H. 
Butterfield and M. Wight, eds., Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics, 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1966). 
13 Tim Dunne has been one of the most committed in that regard as he has devoted a significant part of his 
scholarship to discussing the place and value of the English School for IR theory. Dunne’s Inventing 
international society: a history of the English school focused on introducing the work of a group of scholars 
assembled in the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics and focused on their jointly 
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The way literature developed a comprehensive world image based on the English 
School’s initial narrow claims about the society of states refers us back to Bourdieu’s 
argument that the conventions of science make scientists downplay the role of imaginative 
acts in devising hypotheses or theories.14 Far from an abstract logical systematisation, which 
may be the professed aim of IR theory, the detailed representation of the international as the 
society of states involves imaginative acts. We are invited to associate with an image 
produced by a theory not only on the basis of its logical assumptions and explanatory 
potential but also affect. In other words, theories are persuasive not just for the type of 
explanations they provide but also for the type of an image they construct and emotions this 
image instigates. The Russian World is a similarly comprehensive representation, which 
spurs positive emotions in Russia. It allows for overcoming the trauma caused by the break-
up of the Soviet Union and offers a solution to the Russian identity conundrum. 
Just as a map is an image, IR theory is capable of creating an image of the international. 
A map is persuasive not only for its supposed accuracy and rationality but also through its 
aesthetics.	  Maps are beautiful objects whose graphics, colours and finely drawn features are 
used to emphasize their authority. Contemplating a map, we think we see an accurate, even if 
standardized, representation of the world but beneath the layers, selection and manipulation is 
taking place. It is indeed quite paradoxical how the drive for rigour in the study of 
international politics paves its way through imaginative acts and affect. International society, 
despite its claim to belong to the domain of knowledge rather than art, just like art requires 
the suspension of disbelief. 
A map is valued for the fact that it provides a ‘big picture’. It is admired for its coherence 
and wholeness. The image of the world the English School creates aspires to be similarly 
coherent. The objective is to show the big picture of world affairs, which in the academia can 
claim the right to be recognised as a grand theory. Outside of the ivory tower comprehensive 
representations are easier for spectators and participants to identify and engage with. Despite 
the elusiveness of the international, ideas such as that of international community help ground 
the international and present as though on a plate for a consumer. The English School 
implicitly adopts and perpetuates the view that a degree of wholeness and coherence is 
attainable in depicting the international realm. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
published key volume, Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics, edited by 
Butterfield and Wight. 
14 Bourdieu, Science of science and reflexivity, 15-18. 
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Since the process of producing knowledge is not entirely dissimilar in the West and in 
Russia, the resulting representations of the international share several characteristics. The 
first outstanding element is the concentration on self, which does not hinder the tendency to 
create universal representations of the international. The Russocentric view of the 
international exposed by Russkii mir is analogous to the Eurocentrism of international society 
narrative, which places liberal states at the hub of an international order, where they 
themselves play the role of rule setters and those responsible for the maintenance of 
communal interstate cohesion. Both ideas are driven by specific self-representation. Russia’s 
place and position in international relations, the one desired and the one it assesses to be 
occupying, is of utmost importance for the way Russian discourse represents the 
international. Russia sees itself as a great power. The West, in turn, through representations 
such as international society/community – becomes a self-acclaimed agent of the universal 
force for good. The worldly representations aim to achieve contradictory goals. Aspiring for 
universal acceptance, they underscore the exceptional position of one particular region or 
state in the world.  
It is relatively easy to claim that knowledge production in the West is for the sake of 
knowledge itself, whereas in Russia it is a much more politicised process. But knowledge 
production is a political and social process regardless of its Western or Eastern origin. There 
are significant differences in the social setting and what is and is not allowed in terms of 
knowledge production in a non-liberal state, but certain elements are shared. Knowledge is 
produced to provide significance, objectives, and, ultimately, it contributes to identity-
building. 
Theory	  and	  practice	  and	  their	  representations	  of	  the	  
international	  
The theory-practice debate is one with a long pedigree in IR. The discussion has 
oscillated around themes of IR scholarship policy relevance and the extent to which scholars 
should participate in advising policy. Academic IR was, on the one hand, criticised for 
moving away from government.15 On the other, it was expected to maintain distance in order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations”. 
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to be able to evaluate policy, question the common sense of policy debate and what passes as 
an accepted view.16  
Assigning theory and practice to different spheres was questioned on several occasions. 
Theory as generalizing practice and practice as using theory marry the two together in some 
important respects. Doing politics was supposed to involve theorizing and – at the other end 
of the equation – theoretical inquiry was held to be practically motivated. Literature admitted 
that all IR scholars ‘to a greater or lesser extent do “empirical” work’17 and that there is a 
theory-practice linkage rather than separation.18 This debate is partial if it continues to 
disregard the fact that both, theory and practice, should be recognised for their capacity to 
produce knowledge.19  
This dissertation shed some new light on the academia-praxis relationship from 
sociology of knowledge perspective. Rather than asking whether IR scholarship is or should 
be relevant for policy, it illustrated how these two realms engage in knowledge production 
and explored affinities in how knowledge is produced by the ivory tower and in the policy 
world.  
Unicorns were worshipped by the ancient Babylonians, and written descriptions of 
them appear in texts from the ancient Persians, the Romans, the Greeks and ancient 
Jewish scholars, all describing a horse-like creature whose single horn had magical 
properties and could heal disease.20 
This reference to unicorns is not intended to discredit the idea of international society, 
nor to denote its falsehood. It is aimed at distorting academia’s claims to higher knowledge 
and theorists’ aversion to the role of imaginative acts in knowledge production. The Latin 
word, academia refers to a community dedicated to higher learning.21 Inevitably, the theory-
practice dichotomy reaffirms this eleveated position of scholarly knowing. It contributes to 
the presentation of certain types of knowledge as superior to or more valuable than others. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Smith, “Power and Truth: A Reply to William Wallace”: 514. 
17 Booth, “Discussion: a reply to Wallace”: 371. 
18 Smith, “Power and Truth: A Reply to William Wallace”: 515. 
19 Smith did mention that ‘practice is unavoidably theoretical’ and that theories constitute the world but neither 
did he elaborate on these remarks nor provided examples of what he meant. Nadir pursued a starkly distinct 
perspective: T. Nardin, "Theorizing and doing as distinct: implications for international relations theory," in 
International Studies Association (ISA) 53rd Annual Convention (San Francisco: 2013). 
20 This quotation derives from The Scotsman, 5 October 2012, Scotland’s official animal: the Unicorn,  
http://www.scotsman.com/lifestyle/heritage/scottish-fact-of-the-week-scotland-s-official-animal-the-unicorn-1-
2564399  (last accessed 27 January 2015). 
21 M. Lamont, How professors think: inside the curious world of academic judgment, Cambridge, Mass. ; 
London: Harvard University Press: 2009. 
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This dissertation exposed a puzzling relation between concepts created in IR theory and those 
circulating in and guiding international politics. The underlying assumption behind naming a 
particular element of knowledge as theory is that it grants validity and enhances the status of 
a specific claim. This work argued that no clear dividing line is possible to draw between the 
way theory and practice create representations of the international. Neither realm is free from 
generalizations and both engage in discourse formation. Both, if by different means, embark 
on various forms of validation and persuasion to their viewpoints.  
The idea of international society/community gains power in academia and the policy 
world for not altogether different reasons and not through entirely distinct processes. Images 
of the international constructed in both domains have some remarkably parallel elements. In 
representing the international both domains resort to tools beyond logical reasoning, among 
which aesthetics play an important part.  
In both worlds, the academic and the policy, defining the international is intertwined 
with questions of power. The very fact that a particular group of scholars claims the right to 
ponder and represent the international is, ultimately, the exposition of power. Power 
permeates the process of standard setting common in the world of policy practice. Defining 
what constitutes international standards and who is expected to meet them is an expression of 
power. In addition it becomes supported with concrete policies and budgets, which are 
deemed to contribute to the maintenance of international community as it is imagined by 
policymakers. 
A theory arguing for or accounting for a rule-based international order seems harmless. 
The idea of international society/community expresses the desire for order and simplicity but 
this approach perpetuates what is considered normal and acceptable in international relations. 
There is a degree of unacknowledged and possibly unrealised complicity on part of IR theory 
as it reports on international politics rather than questions it. Steve Smith argued that  
‘theorists should question the common sense of the policy debate, and interrogate what passes 
as the accepted view, thus show how these are not “obvious” and how the commonsensical 
always reflects the interests of the powerful in society’.22 The international society approach 
is not entirely well-prepared to reflect critically on political processes precisely because the 
English School saw their task as observing practice and extracting knowledge on IR from that 
practice. 
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Knowledge	  production	  and	  a	  political	  myth	  
Communities are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness,  
but by the style in which they are imagined23 
	  
That ideas are forces to be reckoned with in the international realm is a well-established 
argument. Ideas ‘make sense of experiences, arouse and direct social consciousness, provide 
objectives to be sought and prompt action in their pursuit’.24 It is also a widely acknowledged 
argument that narratives not only explain but also help constitute social realities.25 In this 
section I intend to discuss why specific representations of the international become powerful. 
Several processes contribute to the force of world representations. When they are 
discursively transformed from ideas into a material reality, a concrete object out there, they 
become difficult to question. In the process of reification they may also acquire agency. A 
capacity to act, even if it is only discursively produced, enhances the idea’s power. The 
application of favourable evaluative-descriptive terms by those producing specific 
representations, creates and embeds their positive connotations. Representations following 
Voltaire’s illusion of the ‘best of all possible worlds’ tend to be accepted more readily, 
especially if they are coherent and aesthetically pleasing. Academic engagement, which 
produces and commends rather than condemns such representations, enhances their 
credibility. In order, however, to provide a more thorough account of social processes 
accompanying the production of specific world representations and thereby to explicate their 
power, I propose resorting to the concept of a political myth. Scholarship discussing roles and 
characteristics of a political myth allows me, one the one hand, to return to Charles Manning, 
one of the founding fathers of IR conceptualisation of international society, and, on the other, 
to add important nuance to conclusions he reached regarding international society.  
Approaching International Relations via the concept of myth has a relatively long 
pedigree. Two thorough engagements with the concept of a myth in IR are Cynthia Weber’s 
International relations theory: a critical introduction and Benno Teschke’s The myth of 
1648. The way both authors use myth is geared towards exposing falsehood. The central 
argument of Weber’s work is that different theories are founded upon myths. Myths, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 B. Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Rev. ed., London; 
New York: Verso: 2006 [1983], 6. 
24 Foley, Ideas that shape politics, 1. 
25 Suganami, “British institutionalists, or the English School, 20 years on”: 267. 
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interpreted as apparent truths, serve to transform the particular and ideological into what 
appears to be natural and empirical. In Teschke’s view, the myth of 1648 should be 
considered a foundational myth within IR. It is organised around the claim – shared by 
realists, members of the English School and constructivists – that the Westphalian treaties 
were the turning point in the creation of modern international relations. In this account, too, a 
myth is used to denote to falsity and to emphasise possible alternative interpretations of 
specific events and processes.26 A justificatory function of myths in IR was explored in detail 
in Buffet and Heuser’s edited work.27 In this case, myths were understood as preconceived 
patterns, simplified representations of the past allowing for the legitimization of policies in 
the present. This work saw the role of myths in instrumentalist terms. Myths such as those of 
Swedish Neutrality, European Concert and the Division of the World, were used by 
journalists and politicians aiming for quick persuasion and appeal. The quest for simplistic 
and plain explanations as well as to the protective role of myths as ‘lessons learned’, securely 
guiding future actions made myths into important devices in politics.  
One important aspect remains pushed to the margins by these engagements of IR 
literature with the concept of a myth. A myth should not be dismissed as false. Sociology of 
knowledge allows problematizing circumstances accompanying the construction of myths. 
The concept of a political myth, elaborated by Chiara Bottici, points to specific social 
processes accompanying the production of narratives, influencing their popularity and 
longevity. Bottici, instead of following classical theories of political myth presenting it as an 
object, proposed a relational and phenomenological approach to myths. Bottici’s original 
contribution to the study of political myths is her interpretation of a myth as a process rather 
than an object or final state of being.28 The narrative dimension is key to myths as it allows 
for reducing the complexity of social life in order to facilitate comprehension. Political myths 
are a specific type of a narrative that is believed to be true or acted upon as if it were true. As 
narratives, political myths provide a sense of cohesiveness, help make sense of experience 
and define common purpose, thereby shaping collective identity. Political myths, while 
creating the illusion of simplicity and control, provide significance and grant stimulus for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 C. Weber, International relations theory: a critical introduction, 2nd ed., London: Routledge: 2005; B. 
Teschke, The myth of 1648: class, geopolitics, and the making of modern international relations, London: 
Verso: 2003. 
27 C. Buffet and B. Heuser, Haunted by history: myths in international relations, Providence, Oxford: Berghahn 
Books: 1998. 
28 Bottici, A philosophy of political myth, 132. 
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action.29 All these elements are components of scholarly and policy practice knowledge 
production on international politics.  
There are affinities between this interpretation of a political myth and Michael Foley’s 
writing about the force of ideas in action. Foley drew attention to the fact that ideas are 
mutually and in multiple ways related to action. They may be used consciously and 
intuitively but in both instances they structure experience, shape attitudes and prompt 
action.30 John H. Kautsky interpreted communism as a myth that, since it was believed in, 
could condition behaviour. Guided and inspired by such a myth, individuals would behave 
differently in comparison with their behaviour in the absence of the myth. Hence the myth, 
argued Kautsky, however false, should be treated as one in possession of real behavioural 
consequences. The ‘subtle interplay of myths and policies’ had political consequences since a 
myth could inspire action or induce political quiescence.31  
This argument would be incomplete without giving a final nod of appreciation to Charles 
Manning. This chapter’s title, The fairyland of ideas, suggests the need to return to 
Manning’s discussion of the nature of international society.	  Although Manning confusingly 
presented his approach as empiricist, he deserves credit for recognising the world of politics 
as a fairyland of ideas. Manning’s discussion of the nature of international society 
emphasizes the role of ‘assumptions’, ‘as ifs’ and ‘make-believe’. His ‘social cosmos’ was 
‘notional’ in character, it only happened in idea.32 A return to the view of international 
society as an idea rather than a reified being existing out there and possessing agency is the 
first step to acknowledging that, as an idea, it may be powerful. As an idea it is not the result 
of pure logical thinking but its production is stimulated by specific social processes. 
International society as an idea is not simply a means to representing relations among states. 
Nor should it be treated as a benign or utilitarian structure as it becomes consequential for the 
conceptualisation and policies pursued with regard to a state. One important reservation is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Bottici emphasized the need to keep myths distinct from religion. Myths, unlike religion, do not need to 
explain the meaning of life in general, they solely need to be significant. There are affinities between historical 
narratives and myths but not all historical narratives can be regarded as myths. A narrative unavoidably alters 
the content, thus mythical and historical narratives cannot be juxtaposed as real versus fictitious. Accounts of 
significant events such as the French Revolution have been working as political myths only in certain contexts. 
Bottici, A philosophy of political myth. 
30 Foley, Ideas that shape politics, 1. 
31 J. H. Kautsky, Communism and the politics of development: persistent myths and changing behavior, New 
York ; London: Wiley: 1968. Kautsky relied on three interrelated concepts: Georges Sorel’s ‘myth’, Murray 
Edelman’s ‘symbolic reassurance’ and Robert K. Merton’s ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. He did not approach 
‘myth’ in an exactly same way Sorel did. Sorel allied his ‘myth’ with revolutionary movements, while Kautsky 
found myths to be the expression of the will to act.  
32 Manning, The Nature of International Society, 201. 
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that Manning presented the idea as believed in by all engaged in the ‘game of states’ and 
failed, thereby, to acknowledge the potential multiplicity of representations, each informed by 
specific standpoints, ideologies and differing objectives.  
Despite Bottici’s claim that the work of a political myth under contemporary conditions 
is potentially global,33 the idea of international society/community cannot be claimed to be a 
myth shared across the world. It functions as a myth predominantly among particular sets of 
actors, specific communities of practitioners and institutions collectively producing and 
upholding the myth. It finds particularly fertile ground in societies subscribing to liberal 
values and leaning towards cosmopolitan ideals. As a myth it answers the needs of societies 
animated by the ideology of progress and good doing.34  
The practice of statebuilding is informed and reinforced by the myth of international 
community. International community, as a political myth, normalizes a particular state model 
as the only conceivable option and international statebuilding as a natural and desirable 
political practice. The myth of international community not only conveys the message of 
what is right, it also answers and fulfils popular expectations of what is right. International 
community is reassuring and gives a promise of making intelligible what is different or odd. 
The myth of international community allows addressing the perennial call that ‘something 
must be done’ in the face of widespread suffering. It thus caters to the imperative of ‘saving 
strangers’ and perpetuates the feeling of righteousness among those who do the helping.  
The myth of international community feeds on the rhetoric of responsibilities and 
obligations towards its members. It is fused with ideas of progress, benevolence and purpose. 
To sustain the notion of a community, there is a need for a common and conscious objective, 
which, in this case, is assistance in the achievement of development and/or progress.35 
Having a purpose is considered uplifting. The aim of development, which can be pursued by 
international community is, naturally, a fleeting target and thus, ultimately, illusory. This, 
however, is an asset rather than a disadvantage. The fact that this goal is simultaneously 
never ending and unattainable is perversely appealing. The purpose-driven culture motivated 
by the relentless desire for progress is reassured by the prospect of an everlasting goal.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Bottici, A philosophy of political myth, 202. 
34 This analysis has been focused on specific actors – those engaged in statebuilding – but could be extended. 
The myth of international community is an important part of how the West sees and constructs itself to itself and 
projects this image to the outside world. 
35 There is a clear analogy here with the 19th century idea of progress, which in the US and Western Europe 
worked as a ‘motivating faith in movement towards a positive good’ M. Foley, “Progress”, in Ideas that shape 
politics, ed. M. Foley (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 1994), 222. 
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The notion of international community gives purpose, becomes the tangible goal and the 
result of cooperation. It allows for maintaining actors’ identity and the perception of 
themselves as co-operating, caring and responsible. Statebuilding thus becomes an exercise in 
bonding between highly developed states, just as much as it is an activity of helping ‘fragile’ 
states. Helping, building and developing are all elements enabled and reinforced by the myth 
of international community and the constant process of its creation. 
In the academic world, the myth of international society secured the claim to significance 
that a group of scholars was making in the discipline of IR. Arguments about international 
society were often presented in a defensive manner, subsumed under the chief objective of 
defending the English School as an autonomous academic pursuit. The frightening prospect 
of the ‘non-existence of the English school’36 may have contributed to the consolidation of 
interpretations of international society.  
The paradigm of the English School thought has been influenced by socio-historical 
circumstances. Apart from developments in international politics, which undoubtedly had a 
significant bearing on the thinking trajectories, historical circumstances related to the 
development of IR as an academic discipline played a role in the way the English School 
scholarship developed. The reification of international society may have been an unintended 
result of the ambition to come up with an interpretative framework or a theory of 
international relations distinct from realism or transgressing realism and liberalism’s 
shortcomings. Reification has been the fruit of social process accompanying the rise of IR as 
an academic discipline and an element of a conscious undertaking of a group of scholars, 
aimed at positioning the English School within IR. The debate on international society was 
developing at a time when IR was only just confirming its place in the academia. The way 
international society figured in these debates was consistent with the interests linked to the 
position the English School aspired to occupy within that new field. Especially in its early 
years the English School was keen to establish its place and distinguish itself from American 
IR, as exemplified by the following quotation: ‘The British have probably been more 
concerned with the historical than the contemporary, with the normative than the scientific, 
with the philosophical than the methodological, with the principles than policy’.37  
This process continued also at a time when IR started making a spectacular career at 
universities. This, however, was not a guarantor of the English School success. Concerned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Wilson, “The English School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader”: 51. 
37 Butterfield and Wight, eds., Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics. 
162	  
	  
with dwindling interest in international society analysis and amid claims that IR was an 
American social science, James Mayall attempted a reinvigoration: ‘Despite its current 
unpopularity, a strong case could be made for reviving the traditional debate about 
international society’. Not only did he endow the debate with the aura of tradition but added: 
‘I reassert the concept of “international society” as central to international theory’.38 
Tim Dunne is another prominent author whose work was largely aimed at positioning the 
English School in the mainstream of IR and exposing the school’s potential to contribute to 
the discipline’s development. The question inspiring Dunne’s first book – Inventing 
international society - and indeed Dunne’s research agenda, has been that of the place and 
value of the English School for IR theory.39 It exposes Dunne’s commitment to the defence of 
the School as a legitimate and fruitful framework within IR study.40  
Academic writing is dedicated to the advancement of knowledge on international politics 
but this does not exclude other objectives, such as the need to cultivate a research tradition 
and to keep a research programme going. This goal is greatly facilitated by the myth of 
international society. This myth has a utilitarian function as it continues assisting scholars in 
positioning their research within the social realm of IR scholarly practice. It gave the body of 
scholarship termed the English School significance in IR studies and has been helping the 
English School make its claim to significance in the discipline of IR.   
The myth of the Russian World reinforces Russia’s sister identities of a distinctive 
Eurasian civilisation, where the emphasis is on culture, language and religion, and of a self-
proclaimed leading Eurasian great power with a special role within the post-Soviet area and a 
significant global standing. In the latter case the emphasis is on geopolitics. The Russian 
World is an idea that helps position the Russian Federation on the world map in a specific 
way. It allows Russia to claim a role in determining the direction of world affairs. The power 
of this myth goes beyond the justification of status claims. Discursive uses of the idea endow 
Russia with great powerness, thereby erasing the need for this status to be acknowledged by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Hoffmann, “An American social science: international relations”; J. Mayall, “International society and 
international theory”, in The reason of states: a study in international political theory, ed. M.D. Donelan 
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others, primarily the West. The idea provides Russia with significance and gives a sense of 
direction to the political elite and possibly the society at large. Russia acquires not only a 
sense of direction but also an elevating civilizational mission. The myth of the Russian World 
does not emerge spontaneously. It is a process actively promoted by the ruling elite as one of 
its most immediate functions is to justify particular foreign policy actions.  
Despite many attempts, in place since the early nineteenth century, to hold valid only 
enquiry amenable to scientific verification, and render myths and the need for them 
meaningless, myths have not withered away. The complexity of modern societies exacerbates 
the need for a symbolic mediation of political experience: ‘political phenomena transcending 
the individual’s horizon of experience need to be imagined even more in order to be 
experienced’.41 However much we would prefer to see myths as a part of ordinary, everyday 
life or pertaining to folklore and thus not reaching the purportedly higher level of academic 
accuracy or the authority accorded to policy, they are in fact elements of the process of 
knowledge production.42 The enterprise of producing knowledge involves the construction of 
political myths and neither academia nor the policy world is free from it.  
Viewpoints	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  theorising	  	  
Coherent theories in an incoherent world are either silly and uninteresting or oppressive 
and problematic, depending on the degree of hegemony they manage to achieve. Coherent 
theories in an apparently coherent world are even more dangerous, for the world is always 
more complex than such unfortunately hegemonic theories can grasp43 
 
Despite contemporary maps’ pretence to objectivity, based on their claim to be the 
outcome of a scientific enterprise, no standardized and universally accepted map of the world 
exists today.44 Albrecht Penck’s ambitious International Map of the World project suffered 
defeat. The spirit of global cooperation that underpinned the initial idea and Penck’s hopes 
that the ‘international community’ would be able to work together to produce a uniform 
world map withered away despite the United Nations involvement in the project.45 
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44 Brotton, A history of the world in twelve maps, 439. 
45 Brotton, Great maps, 213. 
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One other prominent map project merits a mention towards the end of this thesis. Just 
like the theoretical approach this thesis engaged with, it too claimed to be premised on the 
idea of equality of all nations. In 1973 Arno Peters, a German historian, unveiled his map 
guided by what he termed the Peters Projection. The Guardian newspaper heralded it as the 
‘Brave New World’ and described as ‘the most honest projection of the world yet devised’. 
Harper’s Magazine called the map ‘The Real World’. The equality of all nations was 
premised on Peters’ claim to have retained the ‘correct’ dimensions of countries and 
continents. This was a significant attack on the Mercator’s projection, still in vogue at that 
time. Peters’ map became one of the bestselling world maps but also one vehemently 
criticised by cartographers. British academia dismissed it with labels such as cartographic 
deception, absurd and nonsense. Both sides, cartographers on the one and Peters on the other, 
claimed objective truth but:  
invariably this objectivity quickly unravelled to disclose more subjective beliefs and 
vested personal and institutional interests. Gradually the debate turned into o deeper 
reflection on the nature of mapmaking. Were there established criteria for assessing 
worldmaps (...)? What happened when a map was accepted by the public at large but 
rejected by the cartographic profession (…) What was an “accurate” map of the world, 
and what was the role of maps in society?’46  
Just as maps, representations of the international are not solely historically contingent but 
depend on a viewpoint. A point of view, in turn, relies on much more than the time-period of 
a theory’s creation. Bourdieu, referring back to Leibnitz, persuasively argued that there was 
no ‘absolute point of view from which the world presents itself as a spectacle, a unified and 
unitary spectacle, the view without a point of view’.47 Since the God’s-eye view on the world 
is not available, knowledge of political reality will always be incomplete.48 Any 
representation will necessarily be speaking from a specific vantage point.49 A viewpoint, 
contingent upon the experience and interpretation of history, prevalent values, approaches to 
knowledge and social processes accompanying its production, will be ever changing. A 
defence of a particular vision as universal or necessarily good is a violation of the right to see 
international affairs through various prisms and from varied standpoints. 
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48 H. Arendt, The life of the mind, London: Secker & Warburg: 1978. 
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Bull recognised that international theory may apply solely to some particular period in 
history, particular state or group of states: 
By theory of international politics we may understand the body of general propositions 
that may be advanced about political relations between states. (…) Such propositions 
need not be general (…) They may be general statements which apply only to some 
particular condition of international society50 
But, in problematizing the requirement for generality, Bull remained committed to the 
view of the international as a society of states. Despite allowing for realism and 
revolutionism to represent certain features of world more accurately, he remained, 
paraphrasing Mannheim’s words, sensitive only to certain aspects of international politics and 
not entirely concerned that the interpretation from the point of view of a different state may 
be different.51 
The continued engagement with powerful world images, produced by theory and policy 
discourse, and the processes accompanying and structuring their production is necessary. 
Following Harding in her dismissal of theories as uninteresting may be as detrimental as 
claims attesting to their neutrality. Harding, whose words serve as the motto for these 
concluding remarks, rightly pointed out that coherent theories are unattainable. But she was 
not entirely correct in casting them as dull. In the first place, theories or specific analytical 
approaches continue impacting the direction of debates in IR. Secondly, the need for 
theoretical frameworks has unrelenting resonance as theories are the source of significance 
for large swathes of IR scholarship.52  
Proponents and explorers of the idea of international society added important 
qualifications to their work. Andrew Hurrell, for instance, argued that broad images of the 
world, and particularly those shaping politics, should be subject to academic scrutiny.53 Ian 
Clark noted that according agency to international society depends on ‘unacceptable 
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assumptions about international society homogeneity, and ends with hopeless reification’.54 
Authors underlined that assumptions about international society homogeneity are 
unacceptable, nor should one take neat and tidy arrangements of the global system for 
granted.55  
The language of “international order’” (…) is never politically neutral. Indeed a 
capacity to produce and project proposals, conceptions, and theories of order is a 
central part of the practice of power.56 
These authors should be praised for calling attention to the homogeneity problem. 
Nevertheless, the expression of these fundamental doubts did not go hand in hand with the 
exploration of their consequences. A careful discussion has not taken place of what becomes 
of the idea of international society if one decides to take these qualifications on board. 
Scholars expressed these concerns but never embraced them. These fundamental observations 
were treated as a caveat, a reservation, rather than the key element. Ian Clark’s most recent 
publication, for instance, acknowledges the possible negative consequences of international 
society. International society should be understood, Clark argues, as encompassing a range of 
formations both benign and malign in consequence. This critique points to negative outcomes 
but they are ascribed to international society’s power to ‘socialize’ not only the positive but 
also the negative, to develop practices around ‘deformities’ of international politics.57 Still 
missing is the discussion of potential negative effects of producing schematic yet powerful 
representations of the international and the consequences these ideas have.	  
Hedley Bull acknowledged: 
all discussions of international politics … proceed upon theoretical assumptions 
which we should acknowledge and investigate rather than ignore or leave 
unchallenged. The enterprises of theoretical investigation is at its minimum one 
directed towards criticism: towards identifying, formulating, refining, and questioning 
the general assumptions on which the everyday discussion of international politics 
proceeds. At its maximum, the enterprises is concerned with theoretical construction: 
with establishing that certain assumptions are true while others are false, certain 
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arguments valid while others are invalid, and so proceeding to erect a firm structure of 
knowledge58  
This quotation reveals that Bull was a supporter of contestation but also a firm believer 
in the potency of theory and the possibility for theoretical advancement. He clearly proceeded 
from a standpoint of one, rather than many knowledges.   
IR theory, if it is to have continued relevance, should derive its relevance and strength 
from the reflection upon its own status and from the incessant consideration of its own 
limitations and processes of knowledge production it arises from. It should also pay more 
attention to the consequences of knowledges it produces. To paraphrase what Bourdieu 
suggested in relation to sociology: IR needs to use its own gains to monitor itself.59 
Reflection on one’s own research frameworks and tools should be a normal rather than 
extraordinary part of scholarly engagement with international politics. In IR consensus cannot 
be reached on the fundamental questions, let alone what the answers are. But, how questions 
are asked is, too, of enormous consequence. The way we formulate questions already directs 
our study and discloses certain presuppositions about international politics.  
If the political is associated with plurality, contestation and conflict, international society 
as a research framework depoliticizes the interpretation of the international realm as it 
precludes other possible ways of viewing international relations. International society has 
become central to much of IR theorising about the world to the extent that it may seem 
almost nonsensical to deny that there is such a thing as a society of states. It has also been a 
dominant problematic for English School scholarship as an interpretative framework through 
which world politics lends itself to be studied and as a phenomenon existing out there. 
International society ceased to be a representation and became normalcy, it became natural 
and unquestioned. Taking on an aura of self-evidence, it became difficult to have a critical 
view of it or simply an outsiders’ view. Representing the international as a social whole 
removes politics from the practice of representing the international realm for it impinges on 
the right to interpret the international from various perspectives. It can be argued that 
producing a coherent scholarly discourse requires generalization. The danger is when we 
forget that we are generalizing. Representing international society as a contingent historical 
fact, a spatial entity or as a timeless and universally applicable theory are instances of 
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reification. The dangers of such reification are related to the fact that this view has been 
expressed from the position of authority accorded to the academia.  
To be able to claim we want to engage with the world, we have to be ready and willing to 
look at it from different perspectives. It is important not only to address common questions 
and to agree that IR study should be informed by history. It is crucial to acknowledge that 
there exist different questions informed by distinct experience and interpretation of history. 
These suggestions allow for a simple conclusion that we should not organise our thinking in 
terms of looking for an ideal answer, the aim is for the discussion never to close. 
 




All too often do maps and political representations of the world accept and try to reveal 
the reality of an external world, despite the fact that perspectives and hence perceptions of 
that world differ. There is an autobiographical aspect to research which culminated in the 
thesis. Back in 2008, when tsunami and flooding hit Burma, I was just beginning to adjust to 
the role of humanitarian aid worker in the development cooperation department. I intended to 
make use of the humanitarian aid budget and start the procedure for overseas humanitarian 
assistance. I was, however, held back by my superiors with this argument: ‘No, we cannot 
start sending out the airplane just yet, they have not asked the international community for 
assistance’. This was the exposition of a very common pattern in the practice of development 
cooperation, where international community acquired material form and tangible 
consequences, becoming a strain on financial flows and a barrier for airplanes to set off. The 
international community, which could be addressed and whose agential powers were strong 
enough to organise humanitarian action in order to save the lives of thousands, has since then 
not stopped perplexing me. 
Two years later, I was teaching the Introduction to IR theories to a group of students in 
Kyrgyzstan. The students were the least persuaded by one particular theoretical approach we 
discussed – that of international society advanced by the English School. In 2010 Kyrgyzstan 
was still very much entangled in the war in Afghanistan, it had just survived a revolution, 
followed by ethnic violence and Russia’s refusal to intervene despite Kyrgyzstan’s request. 
With American and Russian military bases just outside the capital, the country was expected, 
on the one hand, to be democratizing and, on the other, to subject itself to Russia’s political 
guidance. This was not a particularly stimulating environment to be persuaded by the image 
of the world produced by international society scholarship. This was also a period when, as 
an aspiring researcher, I was working on a problem of Kyrgyzstan’s borders. Following my 
interviews, it was clear that interviewees understood the border and its functions in starkly 
dissimilar ways. There was no one ‘border’, it meant different things to different people. 
Seminars with students and my first research experience prompted me to reflect on the 
construction of knowledge and the power of representation. Even concepts deemed 
fundamental for the study and practice of international relations, such as the border or the 
state, may acquire different meanings and significance through social processes of knowledge 
production. This autobiographical afterword reflects on experiences which conditioned my 
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thinking, affected the subjective process of designing the research framework, composing and 
modifying the research question and which influenced my attempt at drawing conclusions.  
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